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Chapter 1
General Introduction
This thesis consists of four self-contained papers linked by one common topic: the interac-
tion of human capital, fertility and the macroeconomic environment. We start by looking
at an economy characterized by dismal social and economic conditions: low life expectancy,
high mortality, little investment into human capital, low income, and high fertility. In the
first two chapters, we examine the development path from a Malthusian trap to a Solowian
economy and make an attempt to provide possible explanations which forces could have
potentially shaped this process. To focus only on the link between human capital, fertility
and survival probabilities, we deliberately ignore the issue of physical capital accumula-
tion which will be brought back in chapters 4 and 5. Then we move on to an economy
with fundamentally different conditions. We look at the problems of an aging but devel-
oped economy. The challenges faced by these economies are radically different from those
described above. Now, the problem is not that short lives and frequent diseases make in-
vestment into human capital economically unviable but rather that long living and healthy
centenarians exert financial pressure on our social security systems. The disincentive to
invest into human capital stems now from high taxation rather than from a short planning
horizon. Capital dilution due to high fertility rates is no longer the problem but we worry
that currently low fertility rates may endanger the fiscal sustainability of the pay-as-you-go
pension systems and lead to distributional conflicts between old and young. No matter
at which situation we look, it is evident that the answer is likely to be dominated by the
interaction of these variables.
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The following sections contain a short non-technical summary of each chapter. Proofs and
technical details are provided directly at the end of each chapter. Due to the fact that
a part of the literature is common to all chapters, references are provided in one single
chapter at the end of the thesis.
1.1 From Malthus to Modern Growth: Child Labor,
Schooling and Human Capital
Chapter 2 develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of fertility, human capital accumu-
lation, child labor and uncertain child survival focusing on the qualitative and quantitative
effect of declining child mortality on household decisions and economic development. Due
to uncertainty about child survival, parents have a precautionary demand for children.
Rising survival probability leads to falling fertility, eventually to investment into schooling
and the demise of child labor. Child labor can be an obstacle to development since it low-
ers the incentives of parents to educate children. Furthermore, we argue that the decline
of precautionary child demand as a consequence of falling mortality is not sufficient to
generate a demographic transition. Falling mortality can only explain a relatively small
part of the fertility decline. A sizable reduction in fertility can only be achieved by human
capital investment and the induced quantity-quality trade off.
The modeling environment follows the literature by allowing families to choose their con-
sumption level, number and quality of their children. Children’s quality is measured by
the level of their human capital which is the result of time investment into a human capital
formation technology. At the same time, parents choose the level of child labor: children
can thus contribute to their families’ income. They can simultaneously work and go to
school, as long as their total time budget is not exhausted. For the parents’ utility func-
tion we assume that it is increasing in their own consumption, the number and quality
of their surviving children but decreasing in the level of children’s labor supply. Thus,
parents face a trade-off between higher consumption and the disutility from child labor.
Further, by having working children, they sacrifice some potential utility gain from en-
dowing them with human capital. Since the survival of children is uncertain, parens have
a precautionary demand for children. This means that in times of high child mortality,
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parents will have high fertility. High fertility implies that child labor can be a large source
of family income whereas child education is relatively expensive. Especially, if the human
capital technology to be productive requires some minimum level of investment per child,
investing in children’s human capital can be virtually infeasible. They simply cannot afford
to endow each child with that minimum educational requirement. In times of low death
probabilities, the optimal number of children is lower, potential income from child labor
is also lower and parents can afford a higher level of education per child. If this level is
above the minimum threshold, parents start investing into child education and decrease
child labor supply. This serves as an accelerator of the development process, fueling further
acquisition of human capital by future cohorts. This in turn will lead to lower mortality
for the next generation and the dynamic process will lead the economy towards a steady-
state with low child mortality, low fertility and high educational investment. The chapter’s
contribution to the literature is twofold. Firstly, it is the first paper to bring together the
quantity-quality decision of children and child labor in an analytically tractable framework
with uncertainty. Secondly, the paper provides quantitative evidence on the contribution
of falling mortality, rising schooling and the role of child labor to the demographic tran-
sition. Using historical macro-data as benchmarks, we calibrate the model and show that
the decrease of precautionary demand for children as a consequence of falling mortality is
able to explain a small drop in fertility but it is unlikely to be the main driving force of
the demographic transition.
1.2 Human Capital and the Demographic Transition:
Why Schooling Became Optimal
As opposed to the previous chapter, here we focus on the implications of rising adult life
expectancy and its role for human capital investment and fertility. Moreover, we propose an
explanation how a schooling system could emerge without the intervention of a government.
We show that if parents invest their own time into children’s human capital, rising adult
life expectancy always increases fertility. If children are educated in schools and parents
pay tuition fees, fertility will fall. Furthermore, parents deciding to send their children to
a school have – for any life expectancy – fewer children and invest more in their human
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capital. Without a schooling system, rising life expectancy therefore initially increases
fertility. As life expectancy rises during the development process, a schooling system will
be endogenously adopted and the relationship between fertility and longevity reversed. We
argue therefore that it is important to account for the change in the nature of the costs of
child education: from time costs to monetary costs.
We use a simple life cycle model in which adults differ with respect to their productivity on
the labor market and decide about consumption, investment into adult and child human
capital and the number of children. They also have the choice to invest some of their own
time into the human capital of their children. Alternatively, they can send their offspring
to a school and pay tuition fees. Agents’ utility function closely follows the setup from
the previous chapter. Parents like consumption over their life-cycle and a quality-quantity
composite of children.
Using this setup we show that if parents increase children’s human capital by using their
own time, fertility will unambiguously increase. The economic explanation is that as adult
life expectancy increases, this additional lifetime can be used to work and thus consume
more or have more children. By concavity of utility in consumption and children, the agent
will distribute the additional lifetime on both. The reaction of agents deciding to send
their offspring to a school is, however, ambiguous. If parental human capital is sufficiently
productive and the agents’ utility in the quality-quantity composite is sufficiently concave,
fertility decreases. This comes from the fact that the price of education is now fixed and
does not increase with parental investment into adult human capital. In other words, if
parents spend their own time to enhance children’s human capital, rising life expectancy
increases the price of quality and quantity. With investment into child human capital via
a school, increasing adult human capital increases only the opportunity costs of quantity
but leaves the price of education unchanged. Thus, if parental human capital is sufficiently
productive and the marginal valuation of an additional child is rather low, the rising relative
price of quantity will bias the parental decision toward more investment into quality and
decrease the number of offspring. Furthermore, we show that not only the reaction of
agents with respect to change in their life expectancy differs across educational systems:
parents choosing the school system will – for any life expectancy – decrease fertility and
increase investment into both types of human capital.
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The decision which system to adopt depends on the ability level of each parent. Initially
agents have low life expectancy and only high ability parents will afford education via a
formal schooling system. As the economy develops and life expectancy rises, also less able
agents will be able to purchase schooling. Thus, more parents will opt for the formal sys-
tem. For initially low life expectancy fertility increases due to the fact that the economy
is dominated by families investing own time into children’s education. Later, as the share
of agents participating in the schooling system reaches a threshold value, the relationship
between fertility and life expectancy changes on the aggregate level. Thus, the key contri-
bution of this paper is to provide a novel explanation for the fertility transition and the
endogenous appearance of a mass schooling system in an otherwise rather standard model.
The explanation is based on a change in the nature of investment in child quality from
time costs to monetary costs. We thus propose a theory why a formal schooling system
emerged endogenously without a state intervention on a large scale. We do not, however,
make the next step and model why the society – via government and parliament – decided
set up a free public schooling system financed by taxes. The extension by such a political
economy element is left for future research.
1.3 Mortality, Fertility, Education and Capital Accu-
mulation in a Simple OLG Economy
In the final two chapters of this thesis we move on to a developed economy. We reintroduce
physical capital into the economy but assume now that fertility is exogenous. In chapter 4
we develop a simple two-period OLG model with exogenous fertility and mortality in the
spirit of Diamond (1965) to analytically show that aging leads to increased educational
efforts through a general equilibrium effect. The mechanism is that scarcity of raw labor
increases the return of human capital relative to physical capital. While a reduction in the
birth rate is shown to unambiguously increase educational efforts, increases in the adult
survival rate have ambiguous effects. Falling birth rates also increase capital per worker but
the effects of rising survival rates are again ambiguous. Therefore we argue that our model
is a useful laboratory to highlight potentially offsetting effects in models with endogenous
education and overlapping generations.
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The model setup is fairly standard. We assume that agents live for two periods and they
survive to old-age with an exogenous survival probability. In the first period (“young”)
agents can save, invest time into human capital accumulation and consume. Time invest-
ment in the first period increases the stock of human capital. In the second period (“old”)
agents work an exogenous proportion of their available time and are retired for the rest.
During retirement they receive a lump-sum pension. We model a PAYG pension system
in which agents contribute a share of their wage income to the pension fund. Then, by
the assumption of a balanced budget and taking the population structure as given, we
compute pension payments and can express the level of pensions as a share of current net
wages. Using such a setup, we are able to conduct policy experiments by varying either
the contribution or the replacement rate and let the other adjust. Finally, we embed the
households in a general equilibrium setup and study the effect of changing survival rates
and birth rates on wages and interest rates.
The key contribution of this paper is that we use a rich setup and are able to show
that in general, changes in survival rates have ambiguous effects on the capital stock and
education. Further, our setup enables us to analytically show where this ambiguity comes
from and therefore we can conclude that it is key to consider the interactions between
annuity markets, the pension system and productivity of education.
This chapter is joint work with Alexander Ludwig and has been published as “Mortality,
Fertility, Education and Capital Accumulation in a Simple OLG Economy”, Journal of
Population Economics, 23(2): 703-735, 2010.
1.4 Demographic Change, Human Capital and Wel-
fare
The final chapter of this thesis evaluates the role of human capital adjustments for the
economic consequences of demographic change on wages, returns to capital and welfare.
As opposed to the previous chapter, here we are interested how large the quantitative
effects of such an adjustment are. We find that endogenous human capital formation
is a quantitatively important adjustment mechanism which substantially mitigates the
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macroeconomic impact of population aging. On the aggregate level, the predicted decrease
of the rate of return to physical capital is only one third of the predicted decrease in a
standard model with a fixed human capital profile. In terms of welfare, while young agents
with little assets gain up to 0.8% in consumption from increasing wages in both models,
welfare losses from decreasing returns of older and asset rich households are substantial.
But importantly, these losses are about 50 - 70% higher in the model without endogenous
human capital formation. Ignoring this adjustment channel thus leads to quantitatively
important biases of the welfare assessment of demographic change. We also document that
sticking to the status quo social security system and letting contribution rates increase will
largely offset any positive welfare effects for future generations. Our contribution to the
literature is thus the quantification of the additional adjustment possibility of investing
into human capital.
To quantify these effects, we employ a calibrated large scale overlapping generations (OLG)
model with endogenous human capital formation using a Ben-Porath (1967) technology.
We assume that agents life up to a maximum age of 90 years and survive to the next period
(age) with an exogenous probability. Agents retire at the age of 65. During retirement they
receive retirement benefits from the pension system which is financed by contribution of the
working cohorts. We allow agents in each period to work, invest time into human capital or
consume leisure. Investment into human capital increases, whereas depreciation decreases
the stock of human capital next period. With our calibration we are able to reproduce
the hump-shaped pattern of labor supply and decreasing investment into human capital
as individuals proceed through their life-cycle. The role of the government in our model
is limited: it manages a simple social security system with balanced budget. Taking the
demographic structure and this government policy as given, we can determine equilibrium
pension payments. By adjusting either contribution or replacement rates we can simulate
alternative pension reform scenarios.
The underlying economic mechanism is that an aging society will accumulate more phys-
ical capital and thereby decrease the rate of return of savings. Thus, on the one hand
the incentive so save decreases and on the other hand, the opportunity costs of borrowing
when young decrease. Hence, young agents have a strong incentive to invest more time
into human capital accumulation, borrow while spending time on the acquisition of hu-
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man capital and repaying later. As summarized in the first paragraph, we find that the
additional possibility to invest into human capital helps to limit welfare losses in an ageing
society.
In our policy lab, we conduct two social security experiments. In our first scenario, we
assume that contribution rates are freezed at current rates and let therefore the replacement
rates decrease such that the budget of a pension system is balanced. In the polar scenario,
we simulate a generous pension system and keep the replacement rate constant at current
levels. In an aging society, this requires rising contribution rates thereby decreasing net
wages of workers. We find that the distortionary effects of the rising contribution rates will
largely offset potential gains from higher human capital accumulation. Thus, not reforming
the social security system will involve welfare losses of future generations. Nevertheless,
without a welfare criterion or knowledge about social preferences we do not make any
statement about the optimality of pension policy.
This chapter is joint work with Alexander Ludwig and Thomas Schelkle. An earlier version
in which we model additionally different skill types and the effect of human capital invest-
ment on the permanent growth rate in the spirit of Lucas (1988) is available as Ludwig,
Schelkle, and Vogel (2007).
Chapter 2
From Malthus to Modern Growth:
Child Labor, Schooling and Human
Capital
2.1 Introduction
Key stylized facts characterizing the evolution of humanity from an era close to subsistence
levels to today’s high-tech economies are – among other facts – increasing technological
progress combined with rising educational attainment and the demise of child labor on the
one hand and falling mortality and fertility causing a demographic transition on the other
hand. These events have occurred in today’s developed countries from the onset of the
industrial revolution to present times and are currently under way in developing countries.
These stylized facts can therefore be observed both across time and across countries (see
section 2.2). The motivation for this research is to build a model explaining these facts in
a general equilibrium setup. Although there is a large body of literature on each of the
mentioned items in isolation, work on the combination and interaction of these phenomena
is scarce.
To replicate the historically observed sequence of these stylized facts, this paper develops
a dynamic general equilibrium model of endogenous fertility, human capital investment
decisions, child labor and uncertain child survival. The driving force of the model dynamics
9
10 CHAPTER 2. FROM MALTHUS TO MODERN GROWTH
is the changing child survival rate. Parents maximize utility from own consumption, child
leisure and a quantity-quality composite of children. In addition to adult labor supply,
parents can choose to send children to work and thus generate additional income. Quality
is measured in terms of the child’s human capital whereas the quantity refers to the number
of surviving children. The macroeconomic piece of the model consists of a production
function with human capital and a fixed amount of land as inputs. Technological progress
is initially driven by rising population and later additionally by human capital investment.
Employing this framework, the paper makes two contributions to the literature. First,
it is the first paper bringing the quantity-quality decision of children on the one hand
and child labor on the other hand in an analytically tractable framework with uncertainty,
inspired by the seminal contribution of Kalemli-Ozcan (2003), together. Second, it provides
quantitative evidence on the contribution of falling mortality, rising schooling and the role
of child labor to the demographic transition. Using a calibrated version of the model it is
shown that the decrease of precautionary demand for children as a consequence of falling
mortality is able to explain a small drop in fertility but it is unlikely to be the main driving
force of the demographic transition. The reversal of the relationship between income,
mortality and population growth is ultimately triggered by the quantity-quality trade off
which forces parents to curb fertility in order to endow children with schooling. We find that
child labor is a potential obstacle to development in a sense that the more children can earn
on the labor market, the higher is fertility and the lower is schooling. Moreover, the model
is able to generate the historically observed sequencing and qualitative behavior of fertility,
population growth, child labor and schooling. Initially, sending children to school is not
optimal but children work and fertility is declining whereas population growth is rising.
Later – with falling mortality – fertility and child labor decrease and schooling becomes
optimal. This fuels technological progress which further rises survival rates, decreases
fertility and child labor. Eventually, parents choose not to send their children to work but
invest only into their education.
Recently, the link between child labor and human capital accumulation has shifted into
the focus of growth and development economics. Basu and Van (1998) present a model in
which parents are not selfishly exploiting their children but let their children work because
additional income close to subsistence levels is the welfare maximizing household solution.
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They also discuss the possibility of multiple equilibria. Hazan and Berdugo (2002) develop
a model with child labor and schooling decision. Their central result is that technological
progress increases the wage differential between children and adults leading to reduced
child labor and more education. Baland and Robinson (2000) investigate the role of capital
market imperfections and the role of bequests for child labor. They find that child labor
is inefficient if parents can use children’s income as a substitute for negative bequests
or are credit constrained. Dessy (2000) argues that child labor may be the obstacle to
development: if the economy is sufficiently close to a critical value of per capita human
capital, the presence of child labor may pull the economy into a poverty trap which can be
avoided by introducing compulsory schooling. Strulik (2004a) presents a model with child
mortality and child labor and Strulik (2004b) additionally includes child health affecting
child survival. Depending on the child survival rate, the economy can be stuck in a high-
fertility and low growth regime with child labor or in a low fertility and perpetual growth
environment. The demographic transition is generated by a quantity-quality mechanism
pioneered by Becker and Lewis (1973) and Becker (1960).
The choice of human capital investment under uncertain survival has been considered in
Kalemli-Ozcan (2003) and in a general equilibrium setup in Kalemli-Ozcan (2002). Par-
ents have a “precautionary” demand for children. As a consequence of this, high mortality
rates and thus high uncertainty about the survival of offspring will induce parents to have
more children but endow them with little education. Lowering the risk will decrease pre-
cautionary demand and accelerate investment into schooling. In the same spirit, Tamura
(2006) presents numerical evidence showing that this family of models can be used to gen-
erate realistic results for important macro- and microeconomic variables (life expectancy,
fertility, population, mortality, etc.). Using a perpetual youth model Kalemli-Ozcan, Ry-
der, and Weil (2000) show that a reduction in the mortality rate at any age significantly
increases investment into human capital. Empirical studies confirm these findings. In an
econometric analysis using Swedish fertility data, Eckstein, Mira, and Wolpin (1999) find
that both increases in real wages and reductions in infant and child mortality significantly
contributed to the fertility decline. Most important was, however, the decline in mortality.
Similar findings are confirmed for India by Ram and Schultz (1979) who argue that falling
mortality was an important incentive to invest into education.
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There is an enormous amount of literature offering a wide range of alternative explana-
tions for the demographic transition and the rise of human capital investment. The seminal
paper by Galor and Weil (2000) generates the transition from a Malthusian development
stage to a growing economy by endogenously raising the rate of technological progress and
thereby human capital investment. Hansen and Prescott (2002) examine a model with an
agricultural sector with a fixed factor (land) and a modern technology with constant re-
turns. Assuming exogenous technological progress in both sectors, the modern sector will
eventually be more productive and pull the economy out of the Malthusian trap. Galor
and Weil (1996) derive the fertility decline from a narrowing wage gap between men and
women. By increasing the value of female labor, the costs of child rearing increase and thus
the transition from a high fertility to a low fertility regime is achieved. In the model of
Cervellati and Sunde (2005) the driving force of development is the rising life expectancy.
Assuming that education incurs a fixed (time) cost, rising life expectancy makes education
more attractive and thus agents will engage into education as their planning horizon ex-
pands. Jones (2001) is proposing a mechanism in which the introduction of property rights
plays the key role in explaining growth and the demographic transition over long periods.
Other explanations for the demographic transition are rooted in evolutionary economics
with people having a preference for child quality eventually dominating (Galor and Moav
(2002)) or changes in marriage institutions with an increasing share of women with higher
human capital (Gould, Moav, and Simhon (2008)).
Stylized facts motivating this research are presented in section 2.2. Section 2.3 introduces
the model environment and outlines the household’s maximization problem. Section 2.4
describes the macroeconomic setup. Section 2.5 closes the model by establishing the links
between household decisions and aggregate behavior on the one hand and the dynamic
behavior of the model on the other hand. In the same section we also present the results
from a calibration exercise. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Stylized Facts
This section presents stylized facts motivating this research in some more detail. Note
that all facts hold true for the modern world with poor and rich countries (i.e. for the
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cross section) and in a time series perspective using historical data for today’s developed
countries.
Figure 2.1 plots the percentage of working children against GDP per capita. The data refers
to the period 1960-2002, revealing that child labor is still a widely spread phenomenon in
today’s world. In countries like Mali, Bhutan and Burundi almost 50% of the children
aged 10-14 participate in the labor market and are thus an important source of family
income. In the 1960s and 1970s, the share of working children was even higher. In Mali,
Nepal and Burkina Faso more than half of all children had to work in order to contribute
to family income. Using income per capita as a benchmark, these numbers are comparable
to historical statistics. According to Lebergott (1964) at the end of the 19th century
between 13 and 18 percent of all children aged 10-15 in the US were actively participating
in the labor market, working even in industries like mining or manufacturing and a ten
year old boy employed in agriculture had the earning capacity of about one quarter of
an adult. The second empirical regularity observed in the data is the strong negative
Figure 2.1: GDP per Capita and Child Labor
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correlation of child or infant mortality and income per capita.1 Figure 2.2 shows that as
income approaches very low (subsistence) levels, child mortality rises dramatically. Income
1There is a strong positive correlation (ρ >0.8, based on data from The World Bank (2004)) between
adult and infant mortality suggesting that high child mortality is also a good proxy for health conditions
over the entire life span.
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Figure 2.2: GDP per Capita and Child Mortality
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beyond this threshold has a relatively minor influence. As a glance on on the graph reveals,
there has been no large gain in child survival probabilities for some low income countries
despite the huge gains in medical knowledge worldwide which suggests that income seems
to be the most important factor determining child mortality. Historical statistics from
Sweden (Wolpin (1997)) and England (Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006)) confirm
this result. Infant mortality was high and the chance to survive age 15 were as low as 60-
70%. Survival probabilities conditional on having survived childhood were much higher.
Due to high mortality rates earlier in life, life expectancy at birth around 1850 in England
was 40 years, conditional on being 10 years old 55 years and close to 70 years at the age
of 45. Thus, the dramatic increase in life expectancy came first from eliminating the risks
early in life. Huge improvements in life expectancy later in life were achieved only in more
recent times.
The trade off between quality and quantity is another regularity present in the data and
shown in figure 2.3. There is a clear negative correlation between the enrolment rate at
any schooling level and the total number of births per woman. Again, the same conclusion
can be obtained from a time series perspective. French enrolment rates of children (aged
5-14) to primary school increased from 30% in 1830 to almost 90% in 1900. In England,
the fraction of children with primary education was about 20% in 1860 and reached 80%
in 1900. At the same time the number of birth per woman declined dramatically (Flora,
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Kraus, and Pfenning (1983)). The “corollary” of the higher survival rates and rising
schooling is that the pattern of population growth has changed too. Initially, rising survival
rates increased population growth but for rising income this relationship turned negative.
As can be seen in figure 2.4, population growth for the Less Developed Countries is hump-
shaped, peaked at 2.7% around 1965 and has been declining since then. The same hump-
shaped pattern can be verified for today’s developed countries with the peak roughly 100
years earlier.
Figure 2.3: Fertility and Enrollment Rate
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2.3 The Model
Consider an OLG economy where agents live for two periods and survival to the second
period is uncertain. In the first period they are children and can work, receive some educa-
tion (which enhances their adult human capital) or do both at the same time. Uncertainty
concerning their survival is unraveled at the end of the first period (childhood). The earn-
ings from their labor supply accrues to the parents. If they survive they become adults,
they consume their total income and make a one-time fertility decision about the desired
number of children, children’s labor supply and educational attainment. Adults do not
leave any bequests. Time is discrete and is extending into the infinite future. The econ-
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Figure 2.4: Population Growth in LDCs and Western Europe
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omy produces a single consumption good using two factors of production: human capital
and land.
2.3.1 Household Behavior
In this setup households choose consumption ct, the number of newborns nt, child labor
supply `t and schooling investment st they give to each child. Preferences are defined over
adult consumption ct, the future earnings of the surviving children qtntht+1wt+1 where qt
is the probability to survive to adulthood, nt is the number of children, ht+1 is the human
capital of each child and wt+1 is the wage per unit of human capital. Parents also derive
utility from child leisure (1 − `t) where `t is child labor supply. For simplicity we assume
that nt is continuous, or, we deal with an average individual in the economy. The utility
function of generation t can be thus written as
Ut = γ1 log (ct) + γ2{E[ln (qtntht+1wt+1)]}+ γ3 ln (1− `t) (2.1)
where expectations are taken with respect to the child survival rate qt. This modeling
strategy is commonly used in the literature. Having children and their human capital in
the utility function can be interpreted either as pure parental altruism or as an implicit
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old-age pension system if children are likely to support their parents.2 In this model,
the survival probability refers to the chances to survive to the age until children start
making own economic decisions. Due to this simple setup it is not possible to distinguish
between infant, early and late childhood mortality. Assuming that children’s survival rate is
binomially distributed and using the method of Kalemli-Ozcan (2003), the above expected
utility maximization can be approximated3 by
Ut = γ1 ln(ct) + γ2
[
ln(qtntht+1wt+1)− 1− qt
2ntqt
]
+ γ3 ln(1− `t). (2.2)
The difference to a standard maximization problem without uncertain child survival is
the remainder term in the parentheses. Low survival probability generates large disutility
which can be minimized by having more children. The economic consequence of this
additional term is that it generates a “precautionary” demand for offspring.4 An intuitive
justification why precautionary demand may be important is that replacement of children
is not possible any more once mothers leave their fertile years. This problem is not present
in modern economies but is certainly of importance in a high mortality environment. Note
that this additional term vanishes if the survival probability approaches unity. Naturally,
with qt = 1 there is no more risk and we are back in the certainty case.
Human capital is produced according to
ht+1 = (s
¯
+ st)
ξ (2.3)
where s
¯
and ξ are parameters and st is schooling investment into the children’s human
capital.5 Investment in schooling has – from the households’ point of view – only pri-
2The modeling alternative in which agents derive utility from the utility of their children (i.e. the
dynastic approach by Becker and Barro (1988) or Barro and Becker (1989)) requires the debatable as-
sumption that the agents know what their children will do. For models where the old-age security motive
is made explicit see e.g. Boldrin and Jones (2002) and Ehrlich and Lui (1991).
3This is basically a third order approximation of the log-function evaluated at the mean of the distri-
bution. See appendix 2.A for a derivation of the approximation.
4See also Sah (1991) for an application of a similar idea to parental welfare.
5There is no interaction between working and school. Some authors (e.g. Strulik (2004a)) assume
that if children work, the efficiency of schooling is diminished and the accumulation process of human
capital is less efficient. Although there is empirical evidence that labor has a negative effect on school
achievement (Psacharopoulos (1997)), we ignore this issue here since it alters only the quantitative but
not the qualitative aspects of the model.
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vate benefits and households do not take possible externalities of schooling into account.
Without investment into schooling, the stock of human capital is a constant scaling factor.
Adults supply labor inelastically and use a portion of their remaining time – here standard-
ized to unity – on rearing children and (if optimal) educating them. There are no tuition
fees: the cost of education are only parent’s opportunity costs.6 Each child consumes a
fixed share v ∈ (0, 1) of the parents’ time which is independent of the number of children.
This fixed cost per child is assumed to capture forgone wages, nutrition, clothing or other
relevant expenditures. On the other hand, children can be sent to work and earn a fraction
θ < 1 of an adult’s wage. The budget constraint is then
ct = wtht[1− (v + st)nt] + θwtht`tnt. (2.4)
Additional constraints are the (natural) “birth limit” restriction nt ≤ 1/v7, non-negative
consumption, non-negative schooling investment, and non-negative child labor supply. Ad-
ditionally, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 2.1. v > θ.
Assumption 2.2. vξ − s
¯
> 0
Assumption 2.3. v − s
¯
− θ > 0
Assumption 2.1 is needed to ensure that children are always a monetary cost to parents.
Assumption 2.2 guarantees that parents will invest into schooling in an environment with-
out mortality risk. Finally, assumption 2.3 guarantees that there is always an interior
solution.
6The introduction of tuition fees does not affect the qualitative results as long as they are proportional
to income. For a model with schooling costs depending on parents’ human capital see de la Croix and
Doepke (2003).
7An alternative interpretation is that 1/v is a social norm for the maximum number of children.
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2.3.2 Solution to the Household’s Problem
Solving the household’s decision problem gives the following first order conditions for the
schooling decision, child labor supply and the number of offspring
∆(st, λ) ≡ γ2ξ
s
¯
+ st
− λwthtnt, (2.5a)
= 0 if st > 0
< 0 if st = 0
∆(`t, λ) ≡ γ3
1− `t − λwthtntθ, (2.5b)
= 0 if `t ∈ (0, 1)
> 0 if `t = 0
∆(nt, λ) ≡ λwtht(v + st − θ`t)− γ2
[
1
nt
+
(1− qt)
2n2t qt
]
(2.5c)
= 0 if nt ∈ (0, 1
v
)
< 0 if nt =
1
v
,
where λ is the multiplier attached to the budget constraint and ∆(xt, λ) is the derivative
of the Lagrangian with respect to xt and equals zero for any interior solution. Conditions
(2.5a) and (2.5b) require that the marginal utility of schooling or child labor supply is
larger or equal than the marginal utility of (forgone) consumption. The third equation
(2.5c) requires that the marginal utility of children (quantity) is larger or equal to the lost
income in terms of consumption.
Because of the various constraints these conditions need not be satisfied always with equal-
ity. In fact, some of the binding constraints and the associated corner solutions will be
defining features of different stages of development. The inequality signs below the FOC’s
for the interior solutions provide the intuition for the corner solutions. Obviously, schooling
and labor supply have always a unique solution (either interior or corner solution). The
equation for the optimal number of children is nonlinear in nt. Nevertheless, it can be
shown that there is either a corner or a unique interior solution with a strictly positive
number of children.8 The intuition behind these results is that marginal utility is bounded
8In fact , this is a quadratic equation and in appendix 2.A it is shown that it has always a positive and
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for corner solutions in (2.5a) and (2.5b) but unbounded from below for the number of
newborns. Thus, parents will avoid zero children at any cost but corner solutions with
zero schooling or zero child labor are possible. We will discuss the solution to the model
in detail further below.
Since each adult has nt children but only a share qt survives to the next period, the
population growth rate is given by
gN = Lt+1/Lt − 1 = ntqt − 1, (2.6)
where Lt is the size of the adult population at period t.
Equations (2.5a), (2.5b) and (2.5c) can be solved analytically to obtain closed form solu-
tions. We do this for schooling and labor supply but show the optimal number of children
only as an implicit function of the survival rate.9 Assume that the survival rate is low and
parents do not invest into human capital but have working children. Then parents only
choose child labor supply and the number of children:
`t =
γ1
γ1 + γ3
− (1− ntv)γ3
ntθ(γ1 + γ3)
(2.7a)
nt
[
nt(v − θ)γ1 + γ3
1− nt(v − θ) − γ2
]
= γ2
1− qt
2qt
(2.7b)
After some time, the survival rate may have increased sufficiently to induce parents to
invest into schooling. The optimal choice of schooling, child labor and number of children
is given by:
st =
ξγ2
nt(γ1 + ξγ2 + γ3)
− (v − θ)ξγ2 + s¯(γ1 + γ3)
(γ1 + ξγ2 + γ3)
(2.8a)
`t =
γ1 + ξγ2
(γ1 + ξγ2 + γ3)
− (1− nt(v − s¯))γ3
ntθ(γ1 + ξγ2 + γ3)
(2.8b)
nt
[
nt(v − s
¯
− θ)γ1 + ξγ2 + γ3
1− nt(v − s
¯
− θ) − γ2
]
= γ2
1− qt
2qt
(2.8c)
If for some survival rate child labor is endogenously abandoned, parents decide about
a negative root.
9Since nt is a quadratic equation it is possible to obtain a closed form solution. However, the result is
rather cumbersome and is of no use for the remainder of the paper.
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optimal schooling and children according to:
st =
ξγ2
nt(γ1 + ξγ2)
− vξγ2 + s¯γ1
(γ1 + ξγ2)
(2.9a)
nt
[
nt(v − s
¯
)γ1 + ξγ2
1− nt(v − s
¯
)
− γ2
]
= γ2
1− qt
2qt
(2.9b)
Assume that qt and preferences are such that neither schooling nor child labor supply are
positive at the optimal solution. Then parents face only a fertility-consumption trade off.
The number of children is then implicitly defined by
nt
[
vγ1nt
1− ntv − γ2
]
= γ2
1− qt
2qt
(2.10)
In principle there is also one “pathological” solution to the household problem. Assume
that s
¯
= 0 and that parents’ valuation of child leisure γ3 is very low. For a low survival rate
it is possible that the number of children equals the maximum fertility limit 1/v with child
labor and schooling being both positive. Put differently, due to high uncertainty parents
wish to have as many children as possible but then children finance parents’ consumption
and their own schooling by working. We exclude this case by a restriction on the model’s
parameters (assumption 2.3).
The solution to the households’ maximization problem reveals that the nature of household
solution does not change qualitatively during the different stages of development. Schooling
decreases with the number of children (quantity-quality trade off) and child labor is higher
if the number of children is higher. Which regime prevails thus depends on the parameter
constellation. By the choice of the parameters (mainly θ, s
¯
and γ3) one can obtain all
possible solutions ranging from no child labor and no schooling to an interior solution with
simultaneous working and schooling or a realistic solution for low mortality environments
without child labor but schooling investment.
The optimal reaction of the household to exogenous changes in the survival rate are sum-
marized in the following propositions.
Proposition 2.1. If the survival rate is increasing the number of newborns nt is decreasing.
Proof. See appendix 2.A.
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Proposition 2.2. If the survival rate is increasing schooling is increasing (if positive) and
child labor is decreasing (if positive).
Proof. See appendix 2.A.
Proposition 2.3. There exists always a survival rate q˜l low enough such that optimal
schooling is zero if ∂ht+1/∂st <∞. If preferences and relative child productivity θ are such
that child labor is optimal for qt < q˜l, then the threshold value q˜l is an increasing function
of θ.
Proof. See appendix 2.A.
Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 are the results of the interaction of lower precautionary child
demand and a quantity-quality trade off. If child survival risk is falling, the number
of children will decrease – even without schooling. This is the consequence of falling
uncertainty and thus falling precautionary demand for children. With a decreasing number
of children, parents move out from the corner solution and will endow each offspring with
education. Proposition 2.3 states that if the chance of children to survive to adulthood
is low enough, parents will rather invest into quantity and will not endow their offspring
with human capital. Moreover, the higher relative child labor productivity, the more likely
is that parents will have many children and schooling will be delayed. The intuition is
that if the child survival rate is at very low levels, parents would like to have a very high
number of offspring to make sure that at least some of them survive. Since they also have
a quantity-quality trade off, they will opt for zero schooling. On the other hand the more
children can earn, the less costly they are. Thus, high child productivity increases the
opportunity costs of schooling which explains why the number of children at the threshold
q˜t is higher (∂n˜t/∂θ > 0) and schooling will be delayed (∂q˜t/∂θ > 0).
The behavior of the population growth rate gN is a nonlinear and non-monotonic function
of the survival rate which is summarized below:
Proposition 2.4. Population growth is hump-shaped and has exactly one local maximum
if there is no solution to the household problem with `t > 0 and st > 0 simultaneously (i.e.
no interior solution). If there exists an interior solution, then the population growth rate
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has the above property only if the population growth rate with child labor and schooling (i.e.
interior solution) satisfies
∂gN
∂q
∣∣∣∣
nt=n˜t
≥ 0, (2.11)
or if the regime without child labor but schooling satisfies
∂gN
∂q
∣∣∣∣
nt=n˜t
≤ 0, (2.12)
where n˜t =
γ3
γ3(v−s
¯
)+θ(γ1+ξγ2)
is the number of children where child labor is endogenously
abandoned. If one of the two conditions is violated, then the population growth rate has
two local maxima.
Proof. See appendix 2.A.
For low qt, rising survival probability dominates the drop in the number of children and
population growth increases. Intuitively, for large survival risk small changes in the survival
probability will not change the optimal solution for nt much. For vanishing survival risk
we have the opposite effect. If the incentive to educate children is strong enough, parents
will decrease precautionary demand for children and additionally invest more time into
each child. Therefore, population growth will decrease at high levels of qt. The possible
“complications” are caused by the fact that at n˜t the slope of ∂nt/∂qt becomes less steep
(the number of children is still falling but at a lower pace). This is counterbalanced by
rising survival probabilities which increases the population growth rate. Which effect will
dominate in the end depends on the parameters of the model.
Lemma 2.1. If relative child productivity increases, the number of newborns increases.
Proof. See appendix 2.A.
Lemma 2.2. If relative child productivity increases child labor increases and schooling
decreases.
Proof. See appendix 2.A.
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The economic interpretation is quite intuitive. If children become relatively more produc-
tive on the labor market, the opportunity cost of child leisure goes up and thus child labor
supply should rise. At the same time, the cost of children decreases. This is why the num-
ber of offspring rises. Schooling decreases because parents are engaged in a quantity-quality
trade off.
2.3.3 The Steady State Solution
Assume that the economy grew out from poverty, the child survival rate approaches unity
and child labor is abandoned. Then, we are back in a standard Becker-type model with
a quantity-quality decision of the parents where only preferences (and some parameters
from the human capital production function) determine the solution. Optimal education
and number of children are then
nss =
(1− ξ)γ2
(v − s
¯
)(γ1 + γ2)
(2.13a)
sss =
(1− nssv)ξγ2
nss(γ1 + ξγ2)
− s¯γ1
γ1 + ξγ2
(2.13b)
=
vξ − s
¯
1− ξ
The results confirm the intuition behind the model. Higher fixed costs of children v, higher
education productivity ξ increases education, higher fixed costs of education s
¯
, decrease
education. Obviously, the opposite is true for the number of children.10
2.4 The Macroeconomy
There is one sector producing a homogenous good used for consumption. The production
technology uses human capital and an exogenously given amount of land. Output is then
10Note that with certain survival, mortality does not play a role for the optimal number of children and
therefore population growth will monotonically increase with qt. In such a setup, the number of children
will be constant trough time and only a quantity-quality trade off is able to generate a demographic
transition.
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produced according to
Yt = AtH
α
t T
1−α (2.14)
where Ht is human capital, T is the fixed amount of land and At is the level of TFP which
grows over time. The fixed amount of land captures the Malthusian nature of the model.
In absence of growth in Ht or At, a growing population will obviously drive down income
per capita. Aggregate human capital is the sum of inelastic adult labor supply and the
endogenously determined labor supply of children. I assume that children’s and adults’
labor are perfect substitutes. Aggregate human capital is then
Ht = ht(Lt + Ltθ`tnt) (2.15)
where Lt is the number of adults at time t and θ`tnt is the effective labor supply of children.
Substituting into equation (2.14) and rearranging we have
Yt = Ath
α
t (LtL˜t)
αT 1−α (2.16)
where L˜t ≡ 1 + θ`tnt. Thus, LtL˜t is total labor supply in the economy. Following the
literature (Galor and Weil (2000), Ko¨gel and Prskawetz (2001)), the return to land is zero
and income equals average labor productivity with
yt = Yt/(LtL˜t) = Ath
α
t (LtL˜t)
α−1T 1−α. (2.17)
Here, yt is also the income of a family unit consisting of one adult and the children con-
tributing ntθ`t to total labor supply.
11 In a developed economy without child labor, family
and per capita income are identical (L˜t = 1). The growth rate of efficiency wages is
gyt = g
A
t + αg
h
t − (1− α)(gLt + gL˜t ). (2.18)
Note that in steady state without child labor and stationary population the solution col-
lapses to gy = gA as in any growth model. During the transition, growth of human capital,
changes in child labor supply and population dynamics affect the growth rate of wages.
11Income per capita would be smaller than yt since θ and `t are both smaller than unity.
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Equivalently, we can express the dynamics of income per family as
yt+1 = yt(1 + g
A
t )(s¯
+ st)
ξα(ntqt)
α−1
(
1 + θnt+1`t+1
1 + θnt`t
)α−1
(2.19)
where we have substituted ht+1, population growth and L˜t+1 out.
2.5 General Equilibrium
This section puts the household solution and the macroeconomic production side together.
To close the model we develop the relationships and feedback effects between income,
population, technological progress and survival rates. The last subsection presents the
simulation results from a calibration exercise using realistic parameter values and data.
2.5.1 Technological Progress
The level of technology At is evolving according to
At = At−1(1 + gAt−1) (2.20)
where gAt−1 is the growth rate of technology. Technological progress is determined by the
size of the adult population Lt and the schooling investment st with
12
gAt = g(Lt, st) g
A
t,L > 0 g
A
t,s > 0 g
A
t (Lt, 0) > 0. (2.21)
Technological progress depends here on the size of the population which introduces a
strong scale effect. Although there is no clear empirical evidence for this specification in
modern economies (Jones (1995)), the assumption seems to be true for a large part of
human history (Kremer (1993), Galor and Weil (2000), Diamond (1998)).13 Alternative
specifications imposing some exogenous minimum gAt if there is no schooling investment
and population is below a threshold level lead to similar results. Note that this specification
12One could also assume that gA depends on the level of human capital which is the same as to assume
that it depends on education since human capital is a function of education.
13On the other hand see Crafts and Mills (2007) for the opposite evidence.
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allows for a transitory effect of a larger population on technological progress in a sense that
a growing population leads to an acceleration of gA. In the case of a stationary population
technological progress can further accelerate if investment into human capital is positive.
2.5.2 Survival Law
We assume that idiosyncratic survival risk washes out and the survival rate evolves deter-
ministically on the aggregate level . The survival rate of children qt ∈ (0, 1] is a function
of income per capita yt−1 and is given by
qt = q(yt−1) (2.22)
with positive first and negative second derivatives and lim
yt→∞
qt → 1. Income per capita
enters the survival law in a Malthusian fashion. Falling income per capita decreases the
survival probability of children which decreases population (growth) in the next period.
By including yt−1 instead of yt excludes contemporaneous feedback effects of the number
of children on the survival law.14
2.5.3 The Dynamical System
The solution to the household problem is the foundation of the dynamic simulation. Given
an initial child survival rate q0 we can solve the household problem. Then, given an
initial adult population L0 and initial technological level A0 we can feed in the households’
decisions into the macroeconomic framework to calculate wages, population, technological
progress and survival rates for the next period. Given these values, the entire system can be
simulated. Before presenting the simulation results, we first derive some analytical results
describing the dynamic behavior of the system. Using equation (2.19) and expressing all
14This simplifying assumption is needed because otherwise child labor, income and hence survival rates
are jointly determined in general equilibrium. Although this is certainly the more realistic assumption, we
abstract from this complication since it does not add any additional insights.
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endogenous variables in terms of yt and yt−1 we have
yt+1 = yt[1 + g
A
t (Lt, st(yt−1))][s¯
+ st(yt−1)]ξα × (2.23)
[nt(yt−1)qt(yt−1)]α−1
[
1 + θnt+1(yt)`t+1(yt)
1 + θnt(yt−1)`t(yt−1)
]α−1
Lt+1 = Ltnt(yt−1)qt(yt−1)
where st = st(nt(qt(yt−1))), nt(qt(yt−1)) and `t(nt(qt(yt−1))). This is a two dimensional
(L, y) second order non-linear difference equation which is analytically not tractable. The
“non-tractability” comes from the fact that the population growth rate is not a monotone
function of yt−1. It can be seen that ∂yt+1/∂yt > 0, ∂gAt /∂yt−1 > 0 and ∂`t/∂yt−1 < 0. This
is all increasing next period’s income. The fact that ∂nt/∂yt−1 < 0 but ∂ qt/∂ yt−1 > 0
makes a statement about the qualitative behavior of the system impossible. Assume that
the population growth rate is rising as a consequence of rising survival rates which lowers
income. This is counterbalanced by technological progress, rising human capital and falling
child labor which pushes available resources per worker up. Thus, if the three factors con-
tributing to rising productivity outweigh the diluting effect of population growth, income
will grow, otherwise fall.
Figure 2.5(a) shows three possible functional forms for the relationship between today’s
and tomorrow’s income per capita.15 As can be seen, the strictly concave function has
only one solution allowing only for a low income equilibrium (y1s). Thus, in absence of
shifts in technology, income will always converge back to this stable solution. In the case
of a strictly convex function, there are two solutions. If the economy starts out below the
threshold y2g , income will converge to zero without technological progress. Otherwise, the
economy will transit into a regime with endogenous growth. The S-shaped function allows
also for two solutions: one stable Malthusian equilibrium (y2s) and a growing economy
(yt > y
1
g). Changes in the size of the population and the induced change in the pace
of technological progress causes a shift of the curves. As shown in figure 2.5(b) a rising
population shifts the curves outward. Note that due to the dependence of q on income
and gA on the population size, the economy can be in a situation with temporarily falling
15There is a fourth solution which is slightly less interesting. If yt+1 is strictly convex in yt−1 (and the
slope is larger than unity at the origin) income is growing without bound for all initial values of income,
population, and technological progress.
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Figure 2.5: Solutions to the Difference Equation
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(b) gA(Lt) varying
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income, falling survival rates but accelerating technological progress. In this case there is a
“horse-race” between the diluting effect of population size on income on the one hand and
positive effect on technological progress on the other hand. In the figure, we simultaneously
move along the y-schedule to the left and shift the curve outwards due to higher technical
progress. The net effect may go in either direction. Such a situation can happen if a
country has an initial income per capita (and thus qt) such that population is growing
but the country is not large enough to generate a sufficiently high level of technological
progress. Income and survival rates fall reducing gL further and thus slowing down the
growth rate of gA. If technological progress does not catch up with population growth, the
economy falls back to the Malthusian equilibrium. However, even if income temporarily
falls back to the Malthusian level, the economy will not necessarily stay there forever.
Proposition 2.5. If technological progress depends positively on the population size, the
economy stays in the Malthusian equilibrium if
−∂
2gA(Lt, 0)/∂L
2
t
∂gA(Lt, 0)/∂Lt
Lt = 1,
which is nothing else than requiring the elasticity of the marginal product of population with
respect to population size to be unity.
Proof. See appendix 2.A
30 CHAPTER 2. FROM MALTHUS TO MODERN GROWTH
The previous proposition states that the growth rate of TFP should not accelerate “to
fast”, or the rate of increase has to decrease fast enough to just counterbalance popula-
tion growth.16 Then, income per capita will stay constant and so will the survival rate.
Note that if we impose an exogenous growth rate g¯A for TFP or alternatively we put an
upper bound on gAt (Lt, 0) = g¯
A for all Lt > L¯ then there is a threshold value for g¯
A or
for the population size L¯ which will determine whether the economy will grow or stay
underdeveloped.
The fact whether child labor or schooling are optimal changes only the slope of the curves
at the regime switching point. If schooling becomes optimal the slope increases, a regime
change to zero child labor flattens the slope at all income levels. Shocks to income per
capita (and implicitly survival rate) or relative child productivity have thus the potential
to lift the economy out of a development trap.
However, if mortality rates are sufficiently high, a ban of child labor (by setting θ = 0) is
not a guarantee for a kickoff of the development process. As suggested in proposition 2.3
the value of qt beyond which parents invest into education decreases with θ but if qt < q˜t
then education will be nevertheless zero.17 Thinking in dynamic terms, eradicating child
labor has a positive effect on average wages, survival rates and therefore the number of
future newborns will drop which induces parents to send children to school earlier. Thus,
abolishing child labor may not have immediate benefits for growth but will pay off only in
the future.
2.5.4 A Calibration Exercise
This subsection contains a calibrated version of the model and discusses the dynamic
development of the economy. Obviously, this highly stylized model will not be able to
capture the complexity of the real world. Due to the simple structure we can only focus on
a limited number of calibration targets. Therefore, the primary target of this section is to
demonstrate that this type of model is able to track observed historical developments and
provide some quantitative guidance. For an easier comparison with real data the model’s
16Note that for this to hold as Lt goes to infinity, the marginal product of Lt has to go to zero.
17See Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997) on this issue who also argue that due to income effects, not
working does not automatically imply that children are attending school.
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predictions are transformed into annualized growth rates according to gxr = (1+ g
x
m)
1/J − 1
where gxr,m are the growth rates for real (r) and model time (m) for variable x and J is
a proxy for the length of a period and chosen to be 20. Although this choice is common
in the literature (Lagerlo¨f (2006), Boldrin and Jones (2002)) one has to keep in mind that
this has a a large effect on the growth rates when transformed from the generational time
dimension to yearly growth rates.
In order to simulate the entire system we need to fix parametric forms for the equations
determining the evolution of the survival rate and technological progress. We choose
qt+1 = 1− ϕ1
yϕ2t
(2.24)
gAt = ω1L
λ1
t + ω2s
λ2
t . (2.25)
These functional forms satisfy the conditions outlined above and the parameters were
calibrated to provide realistic time paths for the endogenous variables. The exact functional
form is not important for the qualitative behavior of the system.
The calibration targets on the household level were the number of children (fertility) and
income share generated by working children. Total fertility rate in the 19th century fluc-
tuated around 5 in European countries (Galor (2005)) and according to Patrinos and
Psacharopoulos (1997) working children in Peru contributed around 14% to family income.
Historical numbers are less reliable but are in the same order of magnitude. Assuming that
woman’s wages are around 50% of men (Galor (2005), p. 233), children contribute in our
model about 14% to family income at the beginning of the development process. The
human capital production function was calibrated by choosing s
¯
such that there is a corner
solution and ξ was taken from Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999). The weights in
the utility function were calibrated such that there is a regime with child labor but no
schooling, an intermediate regime with working and learning children and finally a situa-
tion without child labor. Further, we choose the parameters of the household model such
that population is stationary in steady state.
On the macroeconomic level we want to generate the typical inverted U-shape for pop-
ulation growth, initially low growth of wages but accelerating growth rate of TFP (and
equivalently of wages) as soon as schooling becomes optimal and asymptotic convergence
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of child mortality to zero. For growth of wages we use the numbers from Hansen and
Prescott (2002) as a calibration target. The share of human capital in the production
function is also taken from the same source. The remaining parameters of equation (2.25)
and (2.24) have no empirical counterparts18 but were calibrated such that the model is
able to generate an economic and demographic transition within a sensible time period of
about 20 generations. As can be seen in the graphs, the largest part of the decrease in mor-
tality risk and the demographic transition is achieved within this time window. Also the
adjustment of schooling, wage growth and number of children from initial to near steady
state levels is completed within a reasonable period. All parameters and initial conditions
are summarized in table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Summary of Parameters and Initial Conditions
Households v 0.33 γ1 0.30
s
¯
0.20 γ2 0.60
ξ 0.80 γ3 0.10
θ 0.09
Survival Rate ϕ1 0.24
ϕ2 0.90
TFP Growth ω1 0.06 ω2 1.80
λ1 0.20 λ2 1.50
Production Function α 0.60
Initial Conditions A0 1 T 40
L0 10 q0(y0) 0.5
As a first step, in figure 2.6 we look at the household solutions generated by the baseline
calibration from table 2.1. The number of children is high but decreasing due to falling
mortality.19 Due to rising survival rates, parents decrease their precautionary demand
for children. At this stage of development this is the only reason why fertility is falling.
18We only know from several studies (Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006), Kalemli-Ozcan (2003))
that there is a concave relationship between income and survival probabilities which dictates ϕ2 < 1.
19In this graph the number of children is shown as per family which is twice the number from the model
solution where each individual is allowed to have children.
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Obviously, this is not the main source of the demographic transition.20 Education is
initially not zero and child labor supply is positive. Later, the survival rate approaches the
critical threshold above which educational investment becomes positive. From this point
in time onwards parents face also an additional quantity-quality trade off. The falling
precautionary demand is now augmented by the quantity-quality trade off. Thus, the
optimal number of offsprings starts to drop dramatically. Simultaneously, child labor is
decreasing and later endogenously abandoned. The entire adjustment process from high
fertility, high child labor and no schooling environment to a situation without child labor,
low fertility and schooling investment is completed in less than 15 generations. The panel
in the south-east of the graph shows the share of income spent on consumption. During
the development process, parents not only decrease fertility but increase spending on the
quality of children but are also able to increase own consumption.
Figure 2.6: General Equilibrium Simulation - Household
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20This result is also confirmed by Doepke (2005) who finds that a reduction in survival risk reduces total
fertility but eventually concludes that the dramatic fall in the net reproduction rate (number of surviving
daughters) must have been caused by other factors than declining child or infant morality.
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Figure 2.7 shows the time paths of several macroeconomic variables. Initially, the popula-
tion growth rate is around 1% but starts rising as mortality (panel to the right) falls, reaches
the maximum level at 1.7% and drops then monotonically to the steady state value of no
population growth (by construction). The reason for the accelerating population growth
is the insufficient drop in the number of children. As can be seen in the household solution
the number of children is falling as the survival rate increases. However, this drop is not
enough to counterbalance falling mortality. Thus, the total effect is that population growth
is rising. The demographic transition starts to unfold only as parents start to invest into
schooling. This can also be seen from the panel displaying the evolution of wage and TFP
growth. Initially, the growth rate of TFP is just enough to counterbalance the growth of
population and hence income per capita is growing only slowly.21 This is also reflected in
only small increases of the survival rate. However, as the survival rate passes the critical
threshold value agents start to educate children which boosts growth of TFP and wages.
This feeds back into falling mortality and falling population growth. Eventually, child
mortality is almost eliminated and the model converges to its steady state solution with a
constant household decisions and constant growth rates. In this calibration, the contribu-
tion of the scale effect (Lt) and of schooling to technological progress is approximately the
same.
Figure 2.6 shows that the number of newborns decreases only slightly if schooling is zero.
The falling fertility is only due to falling survival risk. However, it is rather obvious that this
effect is not strong enough to bring fertility down to levels low enough generating a genuine
demographic transition. Observe that in figure 2.7 for low values of q the population is
growing even with falling fertility. This result is not driven by the choice of parameters but
it is rather a general feature of the model. Figure 2.8 shows the elasticity of the number of
birth with respect to the survival rate for different parameter constellations.22 We generate
three different scenarios ranging from a situation where child labor and schooling do no not
overlap (labeled “no interior solution”) to the situation in which children attend school and
work at the same time (labeled “interior solution”) and a parameter constellation without
child labor but positive schooling over the entire range of q (labeled “no child labor”).
To generate this solutions we have to adjust some parameters of the model but leave the
21Initially TFP growth is only fueled by rising population since educational investment is zero.
22Note that these graphs have the survival rate q on the horizontal axis.
2.5. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 35
Figure 2.7: General Equilibrium Simulation - Macro
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0
0.48
0.95
1.4
1.9
Time
g L
 
(in
 %
)
Population Growth
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0
0.75
1.5
2.2
3
Time
gA
 
(in
 %
)
Decomposition of gA
 
 
Total
Population
Schooling
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0.5
0.65
0.8
0.95
Time
q t
Survival Rate
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0
0.75
1.5
2.2
3
Time
g W
 
(in
 %
)
Wage Growth
initial conditions unchanged. We set θ = 0 in order to obtain the solution without child
labor. The graph without an interior solution is created by setting s
¯
= 0.24 and θ = 0.068
and re-calibrating γ1, γ2, and γ3 such that fertility for q = 1 is identical in all graphs. This
corresponds to a situation in which child labor is abandoned early, followed by a situation
without child labor (but still no schooling) and positive schooling investment only later.
It can be seen that without schooling, the elasticity is rather small (and always well below
unity) without the potential to generate a demographic transition. The necessary condition
is the introduction of a quantity-quality trade off via the investment into schooling. This
result is rather insensitive to the parameter choice.
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Figure 2.8: Elasticity of Children w.r.t. Mortality
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the dynamic co-movement of fertility, schooling and child labor as-
suming that child survival is uncertain. In early stages of development the economy is
characterized by low income, high mortality, high fertility and child labor. Due to rising
technological progress, however, income starts to grow and so will the survival probabil-
ity of children. Therefore parents will start to decrease their precautionary demand for
children. Because the pure effect of falling mortality is not sufficient to generate a large
quantitative change in the number of children, the population growth rate is still accel-
erating and thus the growth rate of resources per capita is rather low. At some point,
however, parents will start to invest into schooling accelerating the development process.
This change will induce a sizable drop in fertility which is the trigger of a demographic
transition. Eventually population growth starts to decline and the economy converges to
a balanced growth equilibrium. Along the development process child labor will be aban-
doned as parents decide to shift more resources to child quality and the need for many
offsprings (caused by high mortality) vanishes.
We show that child labor has an adverse effect on development in a sense that even if
parents value child leisure, child labor will delay investment into schooling. If the survival
2.6. CONCLUSION 37
chances of children are sufficiently low a ban of child labor, however, does not necessarily
induce parents to invest into schooling. On the other hand, the model’s prediction is that
the effect of falling mortality alone is not sufficient to induce a large behavioral change.
Thus, the demographic transition can only be explained by the rise of education and thus
a quantity-quality trade off.
On the macroeconomic side we analyze the conditions for stagnation and endogenous
growth. Without a link between population size and technological progress (or an upper
bound on technological progress) the economy can be stuck in a Malthusian equilibrium
with low income, high fertility, child labor and no human capital investment or transit
into an endogenous growth regime which characterizes modern economies. The outcome
depends on the parameters of the model and therefore multiple equilibria are possible. If
technological progress depends on the size of the population the economy is likely to escape
from the domain of attraction of the Malthusian “trap” except a knife-edge condition is
satisfied.
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2.A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of proposition 2.1. Rewriting the first order conditions from the text and rearranging
them gives
F (nt, qt) = nt
[
nt(v − s
¯
− θ)γ1 + ξγ2 + γ3
1− nt(v − s
¯
− θ) − γ2
]
− γ21− qt
2qt
`t > 0, st > 0 (2.26a)
F (nt, qt) = nt
[
nt(v − θ)γ1 + γ3
1− nt(v − θ) − γ2
]
− γ21− qt
2qt
`t > 0, st = 0 (2.26b)
F (nt, qt) = nt
[
nt(v − s
¯
)γ1 + ξγ2
1− nt(v − s
¯
)
− γ2
]
− γ21− qt
2qt
`t = 0, st > 0 (2.26c)
F (nt, qt) = nt
[
vγ1nt
1− ntv − γ2
]
− γ21− qt
2qt
`t = 0, st = 0 (2.26d)
Each of these equations implicitly defines nt = nt(qt). Note that the left part (the left
hand side in the FOC) is only a function of nt and the the right part (the right hand side
in the FOC) is only a function of qt. Thus, the effect of changing survival probabilities on
the optimal number of children is given by
∂nt
∂qt
= − ∂F (·)/∂qt
∂F (·)/∂nt (2.27)
Further, the behavior of the RSH for limiting cases of qt is given by
lim
qt→1
RHS = 0 (2.28a)
lim
qt→0
RHS =∞ (2.28b)
The LHS deserves more discussion. First observe that it holds that
lim
nt→0
LHS = 0 (2.29a)
lim
nt→1/v
LHS
=∞ if `t = 0, st = 0<∞ else (2.29b)
This implies that for all cases limnt→1/v LHS <∞ (i.e. the birth limit is binding) there is
a lower bound q˜t which satisfies F (nt, qt) = 0. For all qt < q˜t the solution is nt = 1/v.
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To determine the sign of ∂nt/∂qt we need to evaluate the derivatives of RHS and LHS. The
RHS of all cases is identical. Taking the derivative with respect to qt gives
∂F (nt, qt)
∂qt
= γ2
1
2q2t
> 0 ∀ qt ∈ (0, 1). (2.30)
The derivative of the LHS depends on the scenarios and is given by the following equations
∂F (nt, qt)
∂nt
=
ntv˜γ1(2− ntv˜) + ξγ2 + γ3
(1− ntv˜)2 − γ2 `t > 0, st > 0 (2.31a)
v˜ ≡ v − s
¯
− θ
∂F (nt, qt)
∂nt
=
ntv˜γ1(2− ntv˜) + γ3
(1− ntv˜)2 − γ2 `t > 0, st = 0 (2.31b)
v˜ ≡ v − θ
∂F (nt, qt)
∂nt
=
ntv˜γ1(2− ntv˜) + ξγ2
(1− ntv˜)2 − γ2 `t = 0, st > 0 (2.31c)
v˜ ≡ v − s
¯
∂F (nt, qt)
∂nt
=
ntvγ1(2− ntv)
(1− ntv)2 − γ2 `t = 0, st = 0 (2.31d)
We have now to evaluate each of the cases in the range of all possible solutions for nt. For
the case of interior solutions we have
∂F (nt, qt)
∂nt
∣∣∣∣
nt=0
= γ3 − γ2(1− ξ) (2.32a)
∂F (nt, qt)
∂nt
∣∣∣∣
nt=
1
v
=
(
1− (α+θ
v
)2)
γ1 + γ3(
α+θ
v
)2 + γ2
(
ξ(
α+θ
v
)2 − 1
)
(2.32b)
For the case without schooling but child labor
∂F (nt, qt)
∂nt
∣∣∣∣
nt=0
= γ3 − γ2 (2.32c)
∂F (nt, qt)
∂nt
∣∣∣∣
nt=
1
v
=
(
1− ( θ
v
)2)
γ1 + γ3(
θ
v
)2 − γ2 (2.32d)
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For the case without child labor but schooling
∂F (nt, qt)
∂nt
∣∣∣∣
nt=0
= γ2(ξ − 1) (2.32e)
∂F (nt, qt)
∂nt
∣∣∣∣
nt=
1
v
=
(
1− (α
v
)2)
γ1(
α
v
)2 + γ2
(
ξ(
α
v
)2 − 1
)
(2.32f)
However, if the model’s parameters are such that there is a steady state with qt = 1 and
schooling but no child labor, then the parameter restriction ξ > α
v
has to hold. Using this
it is clear that the second parenthesis is positive. And for the case with zero schooling but
also no child labor
∂F (nt, qt)
∂nt
∣∣∣∣
nt=0
= −γ2 (2.32g)
∂F (nt, qt)
∂nt
∣∣∣∣
nt=
1
v
=∞ (2.32h)
Further, it can be shown under the parameter restrictions (essentially assumptions 2.1 and
2.3) the following holds
∂F (nt, qt)
∂nt
∣∣∣∣
nt=
1
v
>
∂F (nt, qt)
∂nt
∣∣∣∣
nt=0
(2.33)
∂2F (nt, qt)
∂n2t
=
2(v − s
¯
− θ)(γ1 + ξγ2 + γ3)
(−1 + n(v − s
¯
− θ))3 < 0 (2.34)
This ensures monotonicity of the derivatives. If assumptions 2.1 or 2.3 are violated then
∂F/∂n may turn positive leading to two possible positive solutions.
Proof of proposition 2.2. Use equations (2.8a) and (2.9a), take the derivative with respect
to qt and use the result ∂nt/∂qt < 0 from proposition 2.1. Then the claim
∂st
∂qt
=
ξγ2
γ1 + ξγ2 + γ3
−∂nt/∂qt
n2t
> 0, (2.35)
is established where for the solution without child labor the parameter γ3 is set to zero.
To prove that child labor is decreasing if the survival probability increases use equations
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(2.8b) and (2.7a) and take the derivative with respect to qt. The result is
∂`t
∂qt
= − γ3
γ1 + γ3 + ξγ2
−∂nt/∂qt
n2t
< 0 (2.36)
where we again use the result ∂nt/∂qt < 0 from proposition 2.1. In case of a solution
without schooling we have to set ξγ2 = 0 which does not change the sign.
Proof of proposition 2.3. From equations (2.8a) or (2.9a) we see that schooling is a negative
function of the number of children. Thus, there is threshold value n˜t such that schooling
is zero. Using proposition 2.1 we can conclude that there is a survival rate low enough
such that nt ≥ n˜t and thus ensuring st ≤ 0. The second part can be proven by using that
∂n˜t/∂θ > 0. The claim ∂q˜t/∂θ > 0 follows then from the fact that the cross derivative
of the left hand side of (2.8c) or (2.7b) with respect to {nt, θ} ∀nt ∈ (0, 1/v] is negative
and the derivative of the right hand side is decreasing in qt. Thus, with rising θ and
consequently rising nt for st = 0 to hold, we need a higher survival rate.
Proof of proposition 2.4. Rewriting equations (2.8c), (2.7b), (2.9b) and (2.10) as
F (nt, qt) ≡ nt
(
ntv˜γ1 + ξγ2 + γ3
1− ntv˜ − γ2
)
− γ21− qt
2qt
= 0 (2.37)
where v˜, ξγ2 and γ3 depend on the optimal regime (see equations in the text). Denoting
the population growth factor as Lt+1/Lt ≡ gN and using Lt+1/Lt = ntqt gives nt = gN/q.
Inserting this into the above equation and rearranging gives
F (gN , qt) ≡ 2g2N v˜γ1 + (gN v˜ − q)(1 + 2gN − q)γ2 + 2gNq(γ3 + ξγ2) (2.38)
The change in population growth as a function of the survival rate is then
∂gN
∂q
= − ∂F/∂q
∂F/∂gN
=
−γ2 + (2q − gN(v˜ + 2))γ2 + gN2(γ3 + ξγ2)
−γ2v˜(1 + 2gN − q) + 2(γ2q − 2gN v˜γ1)− 2q(γ3 + ξγ2) . (2.39)
At q = 0 and gN = 0 this gives 1/v˜ which is always positive.
23 However, if q = 1 we have
gN =
(1−ξ)γ2
(v−s
¯
)(γ1+γ2)
from the steady state solution with positive schooling and no child labor.
23This does not imply that the population growth rate is positive. It only means that it is increasing.
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Using this gives
∂gN
∂q
=
(gN(2 + v˜)− 1)γ2 − 2gNξγ2
4gN v˜γ1 − 2(1− 2v˜gN)γ2 + 2ξγ2 (2.40)
Assuming that schooling has high returns, i.e. ξ is approaching unity, the derivative is
unambiguously negative. However, for all ξ the condition ensuring declining population
growth at high survival rates is
(1− ξ)γ2
v˜(γ1 + γ2)
(2(1− ξ) + v˜) < 1. (2.41)
where we have used gN as specified as above.
The proof for the non-monotonic behavior of the shape (i.e. second derivative) involves
two steps. First, observe that the population growth rate is a strictly concave function
of the survival rate (and therefore for all regimes). Assume now that we have parameter
values and a qt such that we have an interior solution with positive schooling and child
labor. Thus, if ∂gN/∂q < 0 evaluated at n˜t
24 holds, then then gN at this point must be
below the local maximum. Further note that we can rewrite
∂gN
∂qt
=
∂nt
∂qt
qt + nt (2.42)
which implies that
∂gN
∂qt
∣∣∣∣
`,s>0
<
∂gN
∂qt
∣∣∣∣
`=0,s>0
. (2.43)
Second, it follows that if ∂gN/∂q < 0 evaluated at n˜t is negative for the solution without
child labor but positive schooling (i.e. after the regime switch), then this derivative must
be smaller (i.e. more negative). Due to strict concavity, gN drops monotonically to the
steady state value. If the derivative is positive, then there will be a second local maximum
because the population growth rate will rise to a second local maximum.
On the other hand, if ∂gN/∂q > 0 holds for the interior solution then the population growth
rate will continue to rise after the endogenous regime switch (see derivative above) and
24Recall that n˜t is the point where the household endogenously switches from the interior regime to the
regime without child labor but schooling.
2.A. APPENDIX: PROOFS 43
eventually start to decline after a local maximum converging monotonically to the steady
state value.
Proof of lemma 2.1. Use equations (2.8c) and (2.7b), redefine v˜ ≡ v− α and ϕ ≡ ξγ2 + γ3
if schooling and labor are interior and v˜ ≡ v and ϕ ≡ γ3 if only child labor is optimal.
Then, the first order condition for children can be written as
F (nt, θ) = nt
[
nt(v˜ − θ)γ1 + ϕ
1− nt(v˜ − θ) − γ2
]
− γ221− qt
qt
(2.44)
The result can be established by showing that
∂nt
∂θ
= − ∂F/∂θ
∂F/∂nt
> 0. (2.45)
Proof of lemma 2.2. Use equations (2.8b) and (2.7a), redefine v˜ ≡ v − s
¯
and ϕ ≡ ξγ2 if
schooling and labor supply are interior. Otherwise v˜ ≡ v and ϕ ≡ 0. Taking then the
derivative with respect to θ is
∂`t
∂θ
= − γ3
γ1 + ϕ+ γ3
(
−∂nt
∂θ
θ − (1− ntv˜)nt
(ntθ)2
)
> 0, (2.46)
where we use the fact that ∂nt/∂θ > 0 from proposition 2.1. To show the relationship
between schooling and relative productivity use equation (2.8a) and take the derivative
with respect to θ. The result is
∂st
∂θ
=
ξγ2
γ1 + ξγ2 + γ3
(
1− ∂nt/∂θ
n2t
)
≷ 0 (2.47)
where ∂nt/∂θ > 0 from proposition 2.1. The result that
∂st
∂θ
< 0 cannot be established
analytically since it depends on the equilibrium value of nt. However, in the numerical
simulations it turns out that the equilibrium solution is always such that the claim above
always holds.
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Proof that nt has always a positive and a negative root. Using equation (2.5c) and replac-
ing λ with γ1/ct gives
γ1
ct
wtht(v + st − θ`t) = γ2
[
1
nt
+
(1− qt)
2n2t qt
]
. (2.48)
Rearrange this equation to obtain
−γ1
γ2
wtht(v + st − θ`t)
ct
n2t + nt +
1− qt
2qt
= 0. (2.49)
Solving this quadratic equation for nt proves the claim.
Proof of proposition 2.5. Start with equation (2.18), assume that schooling is zero (which
implies gh = 0) and use the fact that child labor supply is constant (gL˜ = 0). Due to the
Malthusian steady state assumption we have gy = 0 implying gA(Lt−1(1+gL), 0) = (1−α)gL
where we have used Lt = Lt−1(1 + gL). Taking the derivative with respect to population
growth gives
∂gA
∂Lt
Lt−1 = 1− α.
With positive population growth this can only hold for all Lt if gA is strictly concave in
the population size and
∂2gA
∂Lt
Lt +
∂gA
∂Lt
= 0
holds. Rearranging this equation proves the claim.
Approximation of Expected Utility Maximization. The 3rd order Taylor series approxima-
tion of the utility function U(ntqt) = log ntqt around the mean n¯t is
U(ntqt) = log n¯t + (n¯t − ntqt) 1
n¯t
− (n¯t − ntqt)
2
2!
1
n¯2t
+
(n¯t − ntqt)3
3!
2
n¯3t
. (2.50)
Taking expectations gives then the result in the paper. The first term is evaluated at the
mean, the second term vanishes due to E[n¯t − ntqt] = 0, the third term is just E[(n¯t −
ntqt)
2] = V ar(ntqt) = ntqt(1−qt) and the last term is also zero because of the symmetry of
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the binomial distribution. Since we use a utility function which is unbounded from below
and a distribution with mass on zero, we would have to include an arbitrary small constant
into the utility function. However, this would not affect any of the results.
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Chapter 3
Human Capital and the Demographic
Transition: Why Schooling Became
Optimal
3.1 Introduction and Motivation
The history of humanity was – until recently – characterized by dismal economic conditions:
low income, low life expectancy, low investment into human capital and high fertility.
Briefly summarized, “the life of man [used to be], solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and
short” (Hobbes (1651), p. 78). In modern Western economies we observe the opposite:
high income, high life expectancy, highly educated individuals and low fertility. In this
paper we develop a model which is able to rationalize the monotonic increase in human
capital investment, the hump-shaped relationship between fertility and life expectancy and
the endogenous appearance of a public schooling system. We argue that it is important to
account for the change in the nature of the costs of child education: from time costs in an
underdeveloped economy to monetary costs in a developed economy.
The driving force of the model is rising adult life expectancy. We use a simple life-cycle
setup in which adults differ with respect to their productivity on the labor market and
decide about consumption, investment into adult and child human capital and the number
of children. They also chose whether they educate their children at home or whether they
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endow them with human capital by sending them to a school and paying tuition fees. If
parents increase children’s human capital using their own time, rising adult life expectancy
will unambiguously increase fertility. On the contrary, if children are educated in the public
schooling system, agents’ reaction to rising life expectancy is ambiguous. We show that
if adult human capital is sufficiently productive and parents’ preferences for children are
sufficiently concave, fertility falls as parents’ life expectancy rises. Furthermore, parents
deciding to send their children to a school have – for any life expectancy – fewer children
and invest more in their human capital.
The decision which educational system to choose depends on parents’ life expectancy and
ability level. Given tuition fees, more productive agents choose the public schooling system
whereas less productive agents decide to spend own time on children’s human capital. As
life expectancy – and thus lifetime income – increases, also less productive agents will
opt for the schooling system. Thus, rising adult life expectancy induces a composition
effect (public vs. private schooling) and a behavioral effect (effect of life expectancy can
increase or decrease fertility if children are educated in schools). For initially low life
expectancy, the share of agents participating in the public schooling system is low. Higher
life expectancy thereby pushes economy-wide fertility up. With rising life expectancy
during the development process, public schooling becomes efficient for more and more
people generating a drop in aggregate fertility and an increase in human capital investment.
Thus, the key contribution of this paper is to provide a novel explanation for the fertility
transition and the endogenous appearance of a mass schooling system in an otherwise
rather standard model. The explanation is based on a change in the nature of investment
in child quality from time costs to monetary costs. We thus propose a theory why a
public schooling system emerged endogenously without a state intervention on a large scale.
What we do not explain is why eventually schooling become free, i.e. why the society –
via government and parliament – decided to first heavily subsidize primary schooling and
then set up a schooling system financed by taxes. This would require to develop a theory
in which political decisions (tax system, educational institutions, etc.) are determined
endogenously within the model. We leave this extension for further research.
This paper is not the first to provide a possible explanation for the dramatic economic
and demographic change occurring in the second half of the 19th century. Possible causes
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for declining fertility are declining child mortality rates (Kalemli-Ozcan (2002), Kalemli-
Ozcan (2003), Tamura (2006)), natural selection favoring parents with a higher preference
for child quality than quantity (Galor and Moav (2002)) and the narrowing of the gender
wage gap making children more expensive (Galor and Weil (1996)). Further explanations
are changing marriage institutions with a rising proportion of better educated women
(Gould, Moav, and Simhon (2008)), structural change and an increasing share of people
investing into human capital (Doepke (2004)) or the introduction of compulsory schooling
(Sugimoto and Nakagawa (2010)). In Cervellati and Sunde (2005), Cervellati and Sunde
(2007), and Soares (2005) rising adult life expectancy serves as the key explanatory variable
for the observed economic development.1 Particularly, higher life expectancy induces agents
to invest more into human capital and decrease fertility. The driving mechanisms are
the increasing opportunity costs of fertility as adult’s human capital investment rises.
Empirical evidence for the differential impact of life expectancy on population growth
is provided by Cervellati and Sunde (2009). They show that before the demographic
transition, improvements in life expectancy primarily increased fertility. Using historical
time series, Clark (2005b) agues that fertility is not monotonically related to income or life
expectancy. This hypothesis is supported by Lehr (2009) based on data from contemporary
developing countries.
More recently, the literature started to deal with the question why schooling systems came
into existence. Galor and Moav (2006) explain the rise of a general schooling system
(and thus of mass education) with a regulatory intervention by a ruling capitalist class.
If skills and capital are complementary in production, diminishing marginal returns to
capital accumulation can be counteracted by increasing workers’ human capital. They
argue, that capitalists lobbied for the introduction of compulsory schooling out of a profit
maximizing rationale. In Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Peeters (2007) the appearance
of a public schooling system emerges from profit maximizing behavior of municipalities.
As population density increased, more and more schools were constructed decreasing the
distance (transportation costs) of each agent to the next school which increased school
1There is an enormous amount of papers not explicitly targeting to explain the demographic transition
but provide explanations for various other aspects of the development process. Prominent papers are
Galor and Weil (2000), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Jones (2001), Kremer (1993), Strulik (2004a), Ko¨gel
and Prskawetz (2001), Ehrlich and Lui (1991), Ngai (2004), Lagerlo¨f (2003), Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2001),
Tamura (2002). An excellent overview is provided by Galor (2005).
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attendance rates.2
Section 3.2 provides stylized facts and section 3.3 contains a detailed description of the
model and the solution to the individual choice problem. The dynamic behavior of the
economy with a discussion of the development path and an illustrative simulation exercise
can be found in section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes the paper. All proofs are relegated to
the appendix.
3.2 Life Expectancy, Schooling and Fertility
After a stagnation of living standards over centuries, the 19th century was the starting
point of an unprecedented change in almost all aspects of economic and social life.3 GDP
per capita and population entered steep growth paths (Fig. 3.1d). Simultaneously we
can observe that a lengthening of life become a trend rather than an occasionally lucky
event. Although increases in life expectancy at birth were initially driven by falling child
mortality, survival probabilities for adults also increased substantially (Fig. 3.1a). These
improvements in living conditions of daily life were initially reflected in higher fertility.
Crude birth rates and net reproduction rates reached their historical peaks around 1820
and started to fall soon thereafter.4
At the same time, acquisition of formal human capital started to gain momentum for the
first time in history. The earliest statistics indicate that in 1850 around 10% of the children
of age 5-14 attended primary school. Secondary school (10-19 years) did not enter official
statistics before 1900 when the demographic transition was already well under way. Human
capital measured by the ability to sign marriage contracts was, however, considerably
higher. In the early 19th century, around 30% of all brides and 60% of grooms signed
their marriage contracts with their names instead of using an “X” (Fig. 3.1c).5 Note that
2For instance, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Bertocchi and Spagat (2004) and Grossman and Kim
(2003) argue that providing eduction to the masses decreases the potential for social conflict and civic
disorder. According to these papers, the introduction of a free (and compulsory) education system was
not necessarily an altruistic act but served rather the interests of the ruling class.
3In this paper we use data for England and Wales but the same pattern can be also observed in other
countries around the same time with good data; one prominent and often studied example being Sweden.
4There is no data available on total fertility rates before 1850. However, the few data points available
show that TFR peaked around 1870 at 5 children per woman and started to decrease afterwards.
5Whether literacy was a useful skill before and during the industrial revolution is hotly debated in the
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the timing of the fertility reversal is closer to the introduction of primary schooling than
to rising secondary school enrollment rates. It is also remarkable that primary schooling
enrollment rates started to increase before the introduction of a compulsory schooling.
The Elementary Education Act 1870 (also known as Forster’s Education Act) provided
only partial funding for schools in underdeveloped regions but fees were still charged. The
Elementary Education Act of 1880 made schooling compulsory for children aged 5-10 (but
was never aggressively enforced) and only the Free Education Act of 1891 made basic
education virtually free by heavily subsidizing primary schooling.
Initially, education was thus not free but financed by parents. Data for 1834 Manchester
show that up to 80% of children’s education was paid for only by parents (West (1970),
p. 84). On the aggregate level approximately 1% of Net National Income in 1833 was
spent on day-schools (West (1970), p. 87). The development of fees relative to wages is
shown in figure 3.1b demonstrating that the rise of tuition fees kept pace with the general
wage increase and even outpaced it shortly before the Free Education Act was enacted.
This suggests that education became relatively more expensive with a, ceteris paribus,
detrimental effect on educational investment. Nevertheless, we observe that some parents
decided to send their children to costly schools. These families were most likely not member
of the rich bourgeois (they could afford e.g. private tutors anyway) but rather from the
lower or middle class indicating that they recognized the value of education, were able and
willing to pay for it.
3.3 The Model
In this section we describe the setup and solution to the model. The first subsection
deals with the timing and notational conventions, followed by the description of aggregate
production, production of human capital and the pricing of public schooling. Then we move
on to the households’ preferences and constraints and solve the individual maximization
problem. Finally, we solve for the general equilibrium and discuss the dynamic behavior
literature. After the seminal paper by Galor and Weil (2000) human capital has been accepted as the key
ingredient of any unified growth theory. Mokyr (2004), however, claims that literacy was restricted to a
small share of the population (government officials, military personnel or members of the aristocracy) and
is unlikely to serve as a good explanatory variable.
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Figure 3.1: Stylized Facts
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of the economy.
3.3.1 Timing and Conventions
Consider an overlapping generations economy in which adults live for T + aB years. T
is the life expectancy of an adult agent who enters adulthood at age aB which may be
regarded as the “economic” birth.6 As a child, the agent may receive some education from
her parents but is otherwise passive and does not make any own decisions. The agent can
decide about consumption, number and education of children, and investment into adult
human capital. Children are born right after parents enter adulthood at aB. Parents can
decide to educate children at home (“private system”) or they can decide to send their
children to school and pay tuition fees (“public system”).7 Time investment into adult
human capital increases productivity on the labor market and agents differ with respect
to their labor productivity.
The economy is populated by a discrete number of overlapping generations and each gen-
eration (cohort) is indexed by τ . The new household born at time t has a life expectancy
of Tt + aB where the length of childhood aB is time invariant whereas life expectancy will
change during the development process. Life expectancy is identical across agents and
determined by exogenous forces outside of the households’ control. Population size is the
number of agents (including children) at any time t. Investment into adult human capital,
child human capital and the number of children are continuous variables.8 Reproduction
is asexual, one agent can be interpreted as a family making joint decisions. The notation
in the paper is as follows: the subscripts τ and t denote cohort and calendar time, an
individual’s ability (type) is denoted by µ, a prime indicates a partial derivative, and the
6Some papers, e.g. de la Croix and Licandro (2009) refer to this as puberty. In the context of this
paper this could also be understood as marriage, see Voigtla¨nder and Voth (2009) on the link of marriage
and fertility.
7We use the terminology private and public to distinguish between education at home and education
in some institution not requiring parents’ time but money to “buy” the time of a teacher. Thus, private
and public does not refer to the modern notion of private and public schools. See de la Croix and Doepke
(2004) who model such a framework and examine the long-run effects in the educational system on growth
and inequality.
8See Doepke (2005) for a model with discrete and sequential fertility decision. Although in presence
of uncertainty the indivisibility assumption has an effect on the fertility behavior, he states that the
“quantitative predictions of the models are remarkably similar”.
54 CHAPTER 3. WHY SCHOOLING BECAME OPTIMAL
superscripts j ∈ {pr, pu} refer to the private and respectively public schooling system.
Variables with a bar (e.g. x¯) denote averages and a tilde (e.g. x˜) indicates some threshold
value for a variable. When no misunderstanding is expected, we omit indexes.
3.3.2 Aggregate Production
Human capital is the only productive factor in this economy and there is only one sector
producing a homogeneous consumption good. We use a simple vintage model in which
technological vintages are characterized by cohort specific productivity levels and each
generation can operate only its cohort specific technology (each newborn generation au-
tomatically uses the new vintage).9 Thus, agents earn over their entire working life the
output (wage) of that vintage. This allows us to concentrate only on the labor market
equilibrium at one point in time for one generation and avoids making assumptions about
the substitutability of agents over different ages and vintages of human capital. Aggregate
production for a generation τ is given by the linear technology
Yτ = AτHτ , (3.1)
where Aτ denotes cohort specific productivity and Hτ is the aggregate stock of effective
labor supply, respectively. Effective labor supply is defined as Hτ = PτLτ where Pτ is the
number of workers, and Lτ is average effective labor supply per worker. To exhaust total
production, wages per unit of human capital and per capita income are
ωτ = Aτ , (3.2)
wτ = ωτLτ . (3.3)
Hence, wages per unit of human capital increase in the general level of productivity and
income per capita increases with higher individual effective labor supply. As will become
clear later, nothing hinges on the absolute level of income per capita or wages. In order
to focus on the main predictions of the model, we abstain therefore from including a
9See Cervellati and Sunde (2005) for similar assumptions. Chari and Hopenhayn (1991) develop a model
showing that new technologies are not immediately adopted. In an empirical study Weinberg (2004) shows
that older workers are more likely to operate old machines and new entrants into the labor market (young
workers) will operate the most recent vintage.
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Malthusian element by introducing a concave production function with a fixed factor.
3.3.3 Human Capital of Adults
Upon becoming adults, agents may decide to spend h units of time on the acquisition of
adult human capital. Agents’ heterogeneity translates into different productivity on the
labor market where we assume that ability µ is distributed uniformly on the [0, 1] interval
and shifts individual productivity linearly. Then, adults’ human capital is given by
f(h) = µ
hθ
θ
, (3.4)
with θ < 1.10 The implicit assumption here is that human capital is embodied in people and
therefore it has to be built up from zero by every new generation. Technological progress
caused by human capital therefore shows up only in the level of aggregate productivity Aτ .
3.3.4 The Price of Education
We do not model a detailed education sector, the main reason being the lack of consensus
in the literature how a realistic modeling environment might look like. It is, for instance,
conceivable that private schools are selfish profit maximizing organizations hiring teachers
on the market and selling educational services but it is also equally plausible that schools
are managed by non-profit organizations or run by a government attempting to recover
only their costs (i.e. operating on a zero-profit basis). To begin with, we assume that
each agent working in the education sector can produce one unit of educational services by
using its human capital and one unit of time. This corresponds to the assumption made
for education at home: each parent has to spend one unit of time and its human capital to
produce one unit of “time input” into production of human capital of children. Further,
we assume that the efficiency of this unit of time spent educating children increases with
the average level of human capital f¯(h) in the economy. Using these assumptions, we have
epu(µ) = m(f¯(h))`pu(µ) where epu and `pu are education services produced and time spent
10The uniform distribution is not crucial for the main argument of the paper. Further, the choice of this
production function implies that it is never optimal for agents to choose h = 0. This can be relaxed at the
cost of having corner solutions which would endogenously vanish once life expectancy is high enough.
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teaching of an agent of ability µ. m(·) is an increasing function mapping average human
capital into a positive externality.11 Agents are indifferent between working in schools
or in the production sector and we assume that that they are randomly drawn from the
population. Then, a teacher is just a representative (average) agent. Since competition on
the labor market requires wages per unit of human capital ω to be identical, the price of
schooling is
p = ω
f¯(h)
m(f¯(h))
. (3.5)
The price of education is increasing with the wage level and the average educational at-
tainment of the adult population but decreasing with the externality created by a better
educated population. Since this element will turn out to be crucial for the development
path, we will come back to this issue in section 3.4.2.
3.3.5 Household Preferences and Constraints
The agent’s utility function follows rather standard assumptions. An agent likes con-
sumption over the life-cycle and values educated children. Conditional on the decision
j ∈ {pr, pu} how to educate the offspring the agent from cohort τ maximizes the utility
function
U j =
∫ T
0
e−ρada log c(a)j + βu(njz(ej)) (3.6)
where log c is the period utility obtained from consumption at age a, ρ is discounting future
utility and u(nz(e)) is the intrinsic value of the quality-quantity composite weighted by β.
The utility function u takes the number n of children times their quality which is captured
by their human capital z(e). This is a common assumption in the literature and can be
understood as pure parental altruism or an implicit old-age pension system.12 Human
11A similar assumption concerning externalities is common in endogenous growth models with knowledge
externalities, see e.g. Romer (1986). The main conclusion would not change if we required that teachers
posses some minimum skill level (see also de la Croix and Doepke (2003) for a setup where teachers are
average agents).
12The alternative formulation in which agents derive utility from the utility of their children (i.e. the
dynastic approach in the spirit of Becker and Barro (1988) or Barro and Becker (1989)) requires that
agents know (or form expectations) what their children will do. This would render the model intractable
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capital of children increases with investment e. The input into the production function is
either parental time or teachers’ time bought on the market for the price p per unit of time
(tuition fees). Children survive with probability one until adulthood.13 The timing of the
agents’ decisions is kept as simple as possible: agents first complete their schooling and
fertility and start working afterwards. Working on the labor market is an absorbing state
and there is no retirement.
Since this paper does not focus on life-cycle dynamics or precise life-cycle profiles but
rather on the trade-off between human capital investment (child and adult) and fertility,
we assume that the discount rate and the interest rate are both zero.14 This simplifying
assumption obviously eliminates the traditional life-cycle elements for consumption, saving
and labor supply. However, the “qualitative” structure of the problem is not altered:
rising life expectancy has exactly the same effect as in a more realistic setup. Using the
assumptions from above, the problem can now be written as
{j, cj, hj, nj, ej} = argmax T log cj + βu(njz(ej)) (3.7)
subject to the constraints
Tcj ≤ ωf(hj)(T − φnj − hj)− pejnj, if j = pu. (3.8)
in the public system where the educations costs are monetary costs. In the private system
and would probably not change the main message. For models where the old-age security motive is made
explicit see e.g. Boldrin and Jones (2002) and Ehrlich and Lui (1991).
13We ignore uncertainty about child survival. See e.g. Kalemli-Ozcan (2003) and Strulik (2004a) on
the theoretical and Eckstein, Mira, and Wolpin (1999) or Ram and Schultz (1979) empirical relationship
between child survival and investment into human capital.
14Since marginal utility from consumption and the quantity-quality composite are independent, pro-
ceeding with ρ = r 6= 0 would not change the results (only the slope of the consumption profile would
change), see the identical assumptions in e.g. de la Croix and Licandro (2009), Soares (2005) or Cervellati
and Sunde (2005).
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the constraint is15
Tcj ≤ ωf(hj)(T − (ej + φ)nj − hj), if j = pr. (3.9)
In both constraints fixed time costs per child are identical and denoted by φ. The problem
is in general analytically not tractable. Therefore we make the following assumptions about
functional forms
Assumption 3.1.
u(n, e) =
(nz(e))1−σ
1− σ (3.10)
z(e) =
eγ
γ
(3.11)
with γ < 1, σ > 0.16
3.3.6 Individual Maximization Problem
The strategy is to solve the individual maximization problem – given wages and the price
of schooling – conditional on the choice of the schooling system. This should highlight
the conditional dynamics of fertility, investment into child, and adult human capital as life
expectancy increases. Then we will analyze the effect of rising life expectancy on the choice
of the parents’ utility maximizing educational system. Using this two-stage procedure we
can isolate the effect of rising life expectancy on the composition of the economy, i.e.
private vs. public schooling and then the change in individual behavior conditional on
this choices. Finally, we will put the individuals into a general equilibrium framework to
allow for feedback effects and examine the dynamics of the aggregate economy. That is,
15In this setup we ignore the important issue of child labor. See e.g. Basu and Van (1998), Hazan
and Berdugo (2002) or Baland and Robinson (2000) for models incorporating a child labor decision into
growth models. However, note that we can rewrite the budget constraint by assuming that children can
earn nϕωf(h) where ϕ represents the relative wage of child labor. Then, p = pg−ωf(h) and φ = φg(1−ϕ)
where φg and pg are gross and p and φ are net costs of schooling.
16We use the log-function for sub-utility from consumption to keep fertility independent from the level
of ω – for a given T – as the economy is growing. A non-neutral effect of wages on fertility can be brought
back into the model by choosing a utility function which does not balance income and substitution effects.
See Jones, Schoonbroodt, and Tertilt (2008) for an excelling literature overview how in theoretical models
income is related to fertility.
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we examine the simultaneous interaction of the behavioral and compositional change.
Household Solution in the Private Education System
In this subsection we solve the household’s problem assuming that agents educate their
children at home. At this stage, we do not ask which schooling system is optimal for parents
but examine their behavior given that they decided to stay in the private system. This
is essentially an environment without public schooling where all investment into human
capital is done at home by the parents. Thus, children consume a share of their parents’
time which is not available for productive work.
Using λ to denote the multiplier attached to the resource constraint, the first order condi-
tions17 of the problem (skipping the index j = pr) are
βu′z − λωf(h)(e+ φ) = 0 (3.12)
βu′z′ − λωf(h) = 0 (3.13)
f ′(h)(T − (e+ φ)n− h)− f(h) = 0 (3.14)
where a prime denotes partial derivatives. Note that the optimality condition for adult
human capital h is independent of the marginal utility of consumption λ. Thus, without any
further restrictions, adult human capital will just maximize lifetime income. Furthermore,
combining the FOC’s for fertility and child schooling capital we obtain
z
z′
= φ+ e (3.15)
implying that optimal investment into children’s human capital is independent of adult life
expectancy, parents’ human capital (and skill level) or wages. It is a constant determined
by the relative time cost of children φ, and the properties of the human capital production
function z(e). Solving the entire household problem with private education leads to the
following proposition:
Proposition 3.1. Assume that children are educated in the private system. If adult life ex-
17To economize on notation we will not spell out the solution using the specified functional forms but
rather use the general notation. For the proofs in the appendix we will, of course, switch to the specific
functional forms whenever necessary.
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pectancy increases, adult schooling and fertility will increase. Investment into child human
capital is constant.
Proof. See appendix 3.A.
The intuition behind this result is rather simple. Adult schooling is rising since the time
over which the benefits of educational investment can be reaped is increasing.18 The result
is based on the trade-off between the opportunity costs of schooling today and future
benefits. Child human capital is constant since the assumption made on u implies that the
agent maximizes quasi-linear utility. Under this assumption marginal utility from child
schooling and marginal costs are proportional in n. However, the price of one additional
unit of fertility or child schooling is linearly increasing in f(h) whereas returns to child
schooling are concave. Thus, investment into child human capital does not change and
income effects are absorbed by (rising) fertility. Fertility, on the other hand, is rising
because of the intratemporal optimality between consumption and fertility. Rising life
expectancy implies rising total lifetime income and the agent will – by concavity of both
utility functions - distribute some of the additional “free” income to increase consumption
and fertility.19
Household Solution in the Public Education System
Parents could also have their children educated by teachers (j = pu) for tuition fees p per
unit of time. The crucial difference to the private system is that the opportunity costs of
child human capital are not valued by forgone adult wages but purely by monetary costs.
18This is the Ben-Porath (1967) mechanism. See however Hazan (2009) and Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil
(2002) for opposite views on the link between life expectancy, human capital investment and lifetime labor
supply (including the timing of retirement).
19An alternative way is to consider one equilibrium allocation of consumption c∗ and time {n∗, h∗} given
a life expectancy T ∗. Assume now that life expectancy rises but we hold fertility and adult schooling at
{n∗, h∗} constant. Then, per period consumption will always rise since at the given equilibrium allocation,
the propensity to spend out of an additional unit of income is smaller than one but holding {n∗, h∗}
constant implies that the entire additional income is available for consumption. On the other hand, rising
life expectancy makes investment into education more profitable introducing an additional “multiplier”
effect increasing total lifetime income even more. Thus, marginal utility of consumption will decrease even
further requiring a rise in fertility to equate marginal utilities. Consequently, the agent will sacrifice some
income when young and thereby equate marginal utility from consumption and fertility. This result can
also be established by assuming concavity of the production function f(h) and concave utility functions
u(·) and z(e) only and does not hinge on any functional form.
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Formally, the first order conditions associated with the problem are
βu′z − λ(ep+ ωf(h)φ) = 0 (3.16)
βu′z′ − λp = 0 (3.17)
f ′(h)(T − h− φn)− f(h) = 0 (3.18)
In contrast to the setup with private education, child schooling costs are no time costs any
more. Thus, they do not enter the equation determining the optimal solution for adult
human capital but are only monetary costs valued by the marginal utility of consumption.
Combining again the first order conditions for quantity and quality of children we obtain
z
z′
=
ep+ ωf(h)φ
p
(3.19)
e = ωf(h)
φ
p
γ
1− γ (3.20)
where now adult human capital increases also investment in child quality. This is an income
effect stemming from the fact that the scarce factor time competing for labor supply and
adult human capital accumulation is freed up. Thus, the “production function” for child
human capital becomes linear instead of the convex costs caused by concave utility and
concave production of adult human capital. However, the fact that child schooling is
now purely a monetary cost implies also that the price of fertility relative to the price
of schooling is rising in adult human capital (see FOC). Thus, it is not straightforward
any more how fertility is changing if life expectancy (and h) is changing. Note that the
introduction of a free public schooling system is still compatible with this setup. It is
reasonable to assume that even without tuition fees the costs of schooling are bounded
away from zero. This ensures that the household has a well defined demand for child
education.
Solving the household problem now allows us to state the following proposition
Proposition 3.2. Assume that children are educated in the public system. If adult life
expectancy increases, adult schooling and child schooling will increase. Fertility is always
rising for σ ≤ 1 but may fall for σ > 1.
Proof. See appendix 3.A.
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Again, investment into adult human capital rises because of the horizon effect. Child
human capital rises because the price of schooling does not increase in f(h) and therefore
only the positive income effect is left over. Whether fertility increases or decreases depends
on the coefficient of relative risk aversion with respect to the quantity-quality composite.
Intuitively, if σ ≤ 1, then the income effect of higher adult human capital will dominate
(i.e. marginal utility from the quality-quantity composite is “less convex”). However, if
σ > 1, then the effect of higher price of fertility may dominate. Given σ > 1, the reaction
of fertility with respect to change in life expectancy depends mainly on the properties of
the adult human capital production function. The more adult human capital increases,
the more expensive fertility becomes and therefore fertility is likely to decline.
We can draw two main conclusions from analyzing household behavior under the two
schooling regimes. Firstly, if there is no public schooling system and the only input into
children’s human capital is parental time we will not observe a decrease in fertility if adult
life expectancy is increasing. Secondly, if there is a public schooling system, a decrease in
fertility is more likely but will not necessarily happen. If the agents are less risk averse
with respect to fertility than with respect to consumption, fertility will not decline as life
expectancy increases. Then, there is no change in behavior with respect to fertility either.
If σ > 1, then fertility may decrease if f(h) is increasing sufficiently as a consequence of
more investment into adult human capital h. In either case, child schooling will (given p
and ω) rise in the public system as parental human capital increases. Aggregate fertility
may decrease if the compositional effect is strong enough, i.e. sufficiently many agents
decide to switch to the public system. Being able to match the stylized facts, we proceed
for the rest of the paper with
Assumption 3.2.
σ > 1 (3.21)
While interpreting the results, we have to keep in mind that we have operated in a highly
stylized environment without any frictions. Returns to education are not affected by tech-
nological progress, an assumption frequently made in the literature.20 We also implicitly
20See e.g. Schultz (1964), Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) or Bartel and Sicherman (1998) on the link
between technological progress and investment into human capital.
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assumed that parents and teachers are equally efficient in teaching children. This may be
true if we deal with educated parents (who could also be teachers) or the level of knowledge
is rather low. Our assumption may be of limited use if parents are unskilled laborers or
illiterate. Further, the choice of the log-utility for consumption implies that income effects
– by simply raising wages (and p proportionally) – does not affect households’ allocations.
The purpose of these assumptions was to isolate the effect of different time allocation
schemes on individual decisions. The quantitative relevance of this mechanism relative to
competing explanations is ultimately an empirical question.
3.3.7 The Choice of Private vs. Public Schooling
Agents’ optimal choice includes the decision in which education system their children are
educated. For their decision, parents take their ability µ, wages ω, and the price of edu-
cation p as given. One would expect that more able parents find it optimal to send their
children to school and pay the tuition fees by spending more time on the labor market. The
decision which schooling system to chose depends only on the potential income of parents.
If they decide to send their children to a school, they do this because income earned on
the labor market outweighs the costs of tuition fees. This is the sorting mechanism the
model relies upon. The determinant is the wage-price ratio (ω/p) relative to potential
earnings. Potential earnings are determined by individual ability and life expectancy. The
more able agents are and the higher their life expectancy is, the cheaper and more efficient
is education for their children in a public system. Note that by assuming that ability is
bounded from above, there may be such a vector {p, ω} that even the most able agents
decide not to participate in the public schooling system.21 Then, we can state the following
proposition:
Proposition 3.3. If there is a vector {p, ω} such that agents are indifferent between the
private and public system, agents with µ ≥ µ˜ will decide to educate their children in the
public system whereas agents with µ < µ˜ will decide to educate their children at home. This
threshold ability level µ˜ is decreasing with rising life expectancy.
21The standardization with the upper bound of µ = 1 does not matter. It is obvious that for any finite
bounded ability, there is a sufficiently high price to deter even the most able agent from participating in
the public school system.
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Proof. See appendix 3.A.
Proposition 3.3 means that for a given relative price structure, also less able agents find it
optimal to switch to the public system as life expectancy is rising. The economic explana-
tion is that lower ability is partly compensated by higher investment into human capital. In
turn, rising life expectancy increases optimal investment into adult human capital thereby
raising the opportunity costs of educating children at home also for less able agents. And
obviously, if for an agent with ability µ = µ˜ it was optimal to join the public system given
T , this will be optimal for higher life expectancy too: the price of schooling is constant
and not increasing in h, thus the agent is always better off in the public system. Rising
life expectancy therefore implies that the indifferent agent becomes less able as T rises.
However, whether this happens on the aggregate level once we allow for feedback effects
of rising adult human capital investment on the price of education is not clear (see next
section). Further, switching from the private to the public education system means that
households’ investment into human capital and fertility will change discontinuously.
Lemma 3.1. If agents decide to educate their children in the public system, they will
increase investment in both types of human capital and decrease fertility.
Proof. See appendix 3.A.
This change in the optimal education system causes a change in educational attainment
and fertility due to a changing composition but does not necessarily involve a behavioral
change. Families choosing the public system still could increase their fertility as their
life expectancy increases. Moreover, heterogeneity in ability is now also reflected in the
heterogeneity of decisions.
Lemma 3.2. If children are educated in the private system, ability does not change the
solution to the households’ problem. If children are educated in the public system, higher
ability increases adult and child human capital investment and decreases fertility.
Proof. See appendix 3.A.
The negative correlation between parental education (ability) and fertility is a well docu-
mented and widely accepted fact (Skirbekk (2008)). Note that for this pattern to emerge
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we need that the price of children is partly decoupled from parents’ own human capi-
tal. Without the adoption of a public schooling system, agents’ allocations are identical
despite different ability levels. Higher ability introduces an effect which proportionally
raises prices of fertility and both types of human capital. Thus, more able agents enjoy
only higher lifetime utility (due to higher consumption) without changing their allocation
of time. Heterogenous behavior as a consequence of heterogeneity of skills requires that
higher ability “buys” more time. This is, however, only the case if the price of child
schooling is not perfectly linked to parents human capital.22
3.3.8 Aggregation
Aggregate human capital in goods’ production for a given generation τ is given by
Hτ = Pτ
[
µ˜τf(h
pr
τ )`
pr
τ +
∫ 1
µ˜τ
f(hpuτ (a))`
pu
τ (a)da− Eτ
]
(3.22)
where the first term measures effective labor supply of agents educating their children at
home. The second term measures total labor supply of agents educating their children
in the public system and the last term is the labor supply of teachers not available for
producing consumption goods. Total education time purchased on the market is given by
Eτ = f¯τ (h)
∫ 1
µ˜τ
npuτ (a)e
pu
τ (a)da. (3.23)
Using the assumption of uniformly distributed ability in the population, average human
capital in the economy and fertility for any cohort τ are
f¯τ (h) = µ˜τf(h
pr
τ ) +
∫ 1
µ˜τ
f(hpuτ (a))da (3.24)
n¯τ = µ˜τn
pr
τ +
∫ 1
µ˜τ
npuτ (a)da. (3.25)
The first term is human capital and fertility of agents educating their children at home
and the second term denotes the corresponding value for the families participating in the
22We could also allow for both – monetary and time costs – of child human capital with obviously
identical qualitatively conclusions.
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public system.
3.4 The Dynamic System
The development process is shaped by the interaction of individually optimal decisions
and macroeconomic externalities. Having solved the households’ problem with fixed prices
and for a given life expectancy, we will trace out the dynamics of simultaneous changes in
prices and life expectancy. First, we study how the driving force of the model, adult life
expectancy, is linked to the agents’ individual decisions and how it evolves over time. Then,
we will analyze the adjustment process of tuition fees when life expectancy is endogenous.
Finally, we look at the dynamics of demographic variables.
3.4.1 Life Expectancy
Research has led to mainly two competing explanations why life has increased over the
last centuries: improvements in nutrition and progress in medical knowledge. Whereas e.g.
Fogel (1997) argues that the increases in the intake of calories is responsible for decreasing
mortality, Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006) object in their survey that it was
mainly progress of medical knowledge.23 Although is seems reasonable that life expectancy
at some time will reach a biological upper bound, there are no signs that this will happen
within the next generations. On the contrary, Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) show that record
(“best-practice”) life expectancy has risen for 150 years at a pace of 2.4 years per decade
making it impossible to derive a sensible prediction about maximum life expectancy. Using
the insights from this literature we assume that life expectancy is a positive function of the
available human capital in the economy capturing both effects. Particularly, we link the
next cohort’s life expectancy to the average human capital of the current cohort, implicitly
assuming that parents’ knowledge, health behavior, etc. determines the life expectancy of
23Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006) show that there was no health-income gradient before the
Age of Enlightenment and assert that ideas like germ theory, boiling water or simply washing hands are
independent of the level of income. Mokyr (1993) takes a stand between the two theories writing that
“...knowledge is believed to respond to market signals, social and political pressures, changes in incentives,
institutions, and so on.” In other words, as people escape from a state of mere subsistence, they can afford
to spend resources on the advancement of knowledge.
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their children. We formalize this by writing
Tτ+1 = Ψ(f¯(h(Tτ ))), (3.26)
where Ψ is a strictly concave and non-decreasing function capturing the positive externality
of average human capital on life expectancy. To escape from a trivial solution we make
Assumption 3.3.
Tτ+1 − Tτ = ∆(Tτ ) = Ψ(f¯(h(Tτ )))− Tτ ≥ 0 ∀ Tτ > 0. (3.27)
This is a simple nonlinear difference equation leading to an arbitrary high but finite life
expectancy. By imposing the restriction that Ψ is non-decreasing and strictly concave we
rule out possible non-monotonicities on the development path. We do this for the sake
of clarity of the paper’s argument: the implications of a less restrictive specification of Ψ
are that we may end up with no or more than one steady-state without gaining additional
insights.
3.4.2 Schooling Choice in General Equilibrium
It is clear that as life expectancy rises, agents invest more into human capital and thus
p will increase. What matters, however, is the evolution of p relative to the evolution
of potential income. Rising tuition fees do not matter as long as they are outweighed
by sufficiently large increases in life expectancy. Put it differently: for any increase in
potential income, there is a corresponding surge in the price of education such that the
indifferent agent is characterized by exactly the same ability level. If prices increase by
less, also less able agents will decide to join the public system and µ˜ will decrease. If the
price of education rises faster then some less able agents will withdraw their offspring from
public schools. That is, the threshold ability level will increase undoing the positive effect
of a higher potential income on children’s education.
Proposition 3.4. If life expectancy rises, the share of agents participating in the public
schooling system may, depending on the strength of the externality increase or decrease.
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Without externalities, µ˜ will monotonically increase and may hit the upper bound of ability
for sufficiently large life expectancy.
Proof. See appendix 3.A.
For the sake of simplicity, assume for the moment that agents are homogenous or that each
agents hires a teacher from her own ability group. The equilibrium price of education is
then given by p = ωf(h(µ)). Plugging this price into the households’ solution for optimal
education (3.19) leads to a straightforward result: educational investment in the private
and public system are identical. The ratio of potential parental earnings ωf(h) and p is
unity in both cases. However, the absolute price of schooling in the public system is higher
since agents invest more into adult human capital (see lemma 3.1). In this case utility in
the public system is always lower than in the private system: agents in the public system
neglect the (negative) externality on the price of schooling they generate by investing more
into human capital. Hence, Upr > Upu holds for all T and optimizing agents will never
chose the public schooling system.24 This is the very reason why we need some positive
externality of higher human capital. Intuitively, if average human capital increases but
there is no externality, the average will increase faster than the human capital of the agent
with µ = µ˜.25 The agent indifferent between public and private schooling must therefore be
more skilled in order to compensate the higher price of education and make her indifferent
between the two options.
3.4.3 Population Dynamics
The dynamics of average (aggregate) fertility is ambiguous and depends on the strengths
of the different mechanisms at work. Simplifying (3.25) leads to
n¯τ = µ˜τ n¯
pr
τ + (1− µ˜τ )n¯puτ . (3.28)
24See e.g. Bagnoud (1999) for Switzerland, Birchenough (1914) for England and Wales and Becker,
Cinnirella, and Woessmann (2009) for Prussia for evidence on the reluctance of people (especially peasants
and poor workers) to send their children to school despite compulsory schooling.
25Recall from lemma 3.2 that human capital investment is a positive function of µ. Then, human capital
of agents participating in the public system will raise by more than f(h(µ˜)pu).
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We know that a rising share of parents participating in the public system decreases fertility
via the composition effect. However, if the weight of these families is initially small, this
effect is likely to be dominated by the agents choosing the private system. Secondly, even
fertility of agents participating in the public system may rise for a while as T rises. While
the composition effect is then still working towards lower aggregate fertility, fertility of each
subgroup will increase as life expectancy rises. Only if the share of the public schooling
is high enough and these agents also have fewer children as T goes up, will aggregate
fertility of a cohort decrease unambiguously. Total population Pt and cohort size Pτ evolve
according to
Pt+1 = Pt +Nt(a) |a=aB
∫ 1
0
n(Tt−aB , µ)dµ−Nt(a) |a=Tm , (3.29)
Pτ+1 = Pτ (n¯τ − 1), (3.30)
where Tm = T (t−Tm) denotes the life expectancy of the oldest agent in t−1 (who dies in t)
born Tm years ago. Nt(a) is the number of adults in t who either are of childbearing age
(a = aB) or die (a = Tm) this period.
26 The number of newborns per agent of childbearing
age is determined by its life expectancy Tt−aB and ability µ, and is denoted by n(Tt−aB , µ).
Population growth rate for any stationary life expectancy T is implicitly defined by
gP =
n(T )
T
[
(1 + gP )
T − 1
(1 + gP )T
]
(3.31)
The following corollary is rather obvious.
Corollary 3.1. If fertility is a hump-shaped function of adult life expectancy, the population
growth rate is also hump-shaped.
Proof. See appendix 3.A.
Population dynamics is slightly more complicated if we start from a stationary population
and let life expectancy increase. Then we have initially a positive effect on the population
growth rate due to higher fertility and a (delayed) positive effect due to the fact that old
agents are now living longer. However, the second effect is only transitory and vanishes
26Alternatively, population can be also written as the integral over all living cohorts Pt =
∫ t+aB
t−Tm Nt(a)da.
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as life expectancy settles at a constant value. Whether in the new steady state popula-
tion is growing or shrinking depends on the fertility associated with the steady-state life
expectancy.
3.4.4 Technological Progress
As outlined in the introduction, technological progress occurs through the invention of
better and more productive machines which can be operated only by the cohort entering
the labor force at the time of the introduction of the new vintage. Following the literature,
we assume that higher level of human capital facilitates invention of more productive
technologies27 and model this by assuming
Aτ
Aτ−1
= g(f¯τ−1(h)), (3.32)
with g increasing and concave. After having defined the static solution to the households’
problem and specified how aggregate variables change over time, we are ready to define
the equilibrium development path of the economy.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). Given an initial population P0 and initial life expectancy
T0, an equilibrium consists of a sequence of aggregate variables {Hτ , Yτ , Aτ , Tτ}, prices
{pτ , ωτ}, and individual decision rules {cjτ , njτ , hjτ , ejτ , j}, j ∈ {pu, pr}, such that
1. households optimality conditions given by equations (3.12) and (3.16) and subject to
the constraints (3.8) or (3.9) are satisfied,
2. aggregate variables are given by (3.1), (3.22), (3.26), and (3.32), prices by (3.3) and
(3.5), and
3. life expectancy, total population, and cohort size evolve according to (3.26), (3.29),
and (3.30).
27See e.g. Lucas (1988) or the excellent literature reviews by Jones (2005) and Klenow and Rodr´ıgues-
Clare (2005).
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3.4.5 An Illustrative Simulation
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate the qualitative change in the behavior of agents
as they endogenously decide to invest into the human capital of their children via a formal
schooling system. In this subsection we provide therefore only an illustrative simulation
without any ambition to exactly match historical time series. Since the model lacks many
realistic features, it would require a lot of “twisting and tweaking” of model parameters
and a very lenient attitude with respect to the choice of functional forms which is of limited
use as far as further insights is concerned. Especially, the model is not able to explain the
drop in tuition fees caused by the introduction of the Free Education Act from 1891 see
(Fig. 3.1b). We therefore restrict ourselves to the choice of rather simple functional forms
and have to keep in mind that at some point of the development process, a more or less
exogenous drop in p took place. Our choices for Ψ and m are
Tτ+1 = δTτ + (f¯τ (h))
α, (3.33)
m = (f¯τ (h))
κ. (3.34)
The parameters of the simulated model can be found in table 3.1. To simulate a situation
without positive human capital externalities on the price of schooling, we set κ = 0 and
change the values for σ and δ in order to keep fertility and life expectancy within reasonable
bounds.
Table 3.1: Model Parameters for Simulation
κ β γ σ φ ρ θ κ α δ
With Externality 0.8 20 0.6 1.8 1.0 0.01 0.8 0.2 0.95 0.90
No Externality 0.0 20 0.6 1.2 1.0 0.01 0.8 1.0 0.95 0.85
Figure 3.2 shows the basic patterns of the development process. Initially, life expectancy is
low and only the most able agents invest into human capital of their children via the public
system. As life expectancy increases, despite a rising price of education the ability threshold
µ˜ decreases and more and more agents switch to the public schooling system. Note that life
expectancy and aggregate fertility are still rising. At this stage, average fertility in both
systems is still rising and the composition effect is not sufficient to bring aggregate fertility
down. However, this relationship changes during the development process. Despite the
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rising fertility of agents in the private system, aggregate fertility is falling: the economy
is now dominated by agents choosing the public system and their fertility is falling as life
expectancy keeps rising. On top of the compositional effect now also the behavioral effect
works towards lower fertility.
Figure 3.2: A Simulation Exercise: Human Capital Externalities
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Data sources: Own simulations. See text and table 3.1 for functional forms and parameter values.
In figure 3.3 we simulate an economy without a positive human capital externality in
the schooling system. The price of schooling for the indifferent agent is determined only
by its human capital relative to the average. As claimed in proposition 3.4, without
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Figure 3.3: A Simulation Exercise: No Human Capital Externality
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Data sources: Own simulations. See text and table 3.1 for functional forms and parameter values.
externalities the ability threshold µ˜ increases, and economy-wide fertility increases although
life expectancy is rising.
3.5 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper proposed a simple model arguing that to understand the change in agents’s
behavior during the demographic transition, it is crucial to account for changing nature of
the costs of child quality. We show that if the input in children’s human capital production
is only parental time, increasing life expectancy always increases fertility. This is because
the price of child quality and quantity rise simultaneously with higher life expectancy.
A behavioral change can only occur if parents decide to educate their children in the
public system. This transforms time costs into monetary costs. Then, higher lifetime
income “buys” also more time. In other words, if parents spend their own time to enhance
children’s human capital, rising life expectancy increases the price of quality and quantity.
With investment into child human capital via a school, increasing labor supply and adult
human capital increases only the opportunity costs of quantity but leaves the price of
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education unchanged. Hence, if parental human capital is sufficiently productive and the
marginal valuation of an additional child is sufficiently low, the rising relative price of
quantity will bias the parental decision towards more investment into quality and lower
quantity.
Since at early stages of development, the share of people deciding to educate their children
at home is high, gains in adult life expectancy initially increase fertility. As life expectancy
rises, more agents decide to send their children to schools, thereby strengthening the com-
position effect but at the same time also reinforcing the negative effect of a higher life
expectancy on fertility by a potential behavioral change. Once the share of parents partic-
ipating the public system is high enough, fertility will fall. Furthermore, in this paper we
have proposed a theory why a formal schooling system may emerge endogenously without
intervention by the state. We do not, however, make the next step and model why the
society – via government and parliament – decided set up a free public schooling system
financed by taxes. The extension by such a political economy element is left for future
research.
3.A. APPENDIX: PROOFS 75
3.A Appendix: Proofs
Since the problem has in general no closed form solution, we compute the comparative
statics by implicitly differentiating the system of first order conditions. Then, for a change
in variable X, the partial derivatives of n and h are given by
[
hX
nX
]
= −
[
Fhh Fhn
Fnh Fnn
]−1 [
FhX
FnX
]
= −|A|−1
[
FnnFhX −FhnFnX
−FnhFhX FhhFnX
]
(3.35)
Proof of proposition 3.1. From (3.15) we have that epr is constant. Then we can write the
household problem in terms of only n and h.
Fh =
1
c
(
f(h)− µhθ−1`) Fn = β
n
(nz(e))1−σ − T (e+ φ)
`
(3.36)
with ` ≡ T − h− n(e+ φ) and c ≡ ωf(h)`T−1. Partial derivatives are given by
[
hT
nT
]
= −
− Th2 (θ + h2`2 ) −T e+φ`2
−T e+φ
`2
−σβ
n2
(nz(e))1−σ − T (e+φ)2
`2
−1 [ θh + T−``2
(e+φ)(T−`)
`2
]
(3.37)
and the determinant |A| = FhhFnn − FhnFnh > 0 can be shown to be positve implying
that we have a maximum. Combining the elements from above establishes nT > 0 and
hT > 0.
Proof of proposition 3.2. The system of first order conditions is
Fh =
1
c
(
f(h)− µhθ−1`) Fn = β
n
(nz(e))1−σ − 1
c
(pe+ φωf(h)) (3.38)
Fs = n
(
βsγ−1(nz(e))−σ − p
c
)
(3.39)
with ` ≡ T − h − φn and c ≡ (ωf(h)` − npe)T−1. Combining Fs and Fn one obtains
e = f(h)φ
p
γ
1−γ . Substituting this into the FOCs reduces the dimension of the system by
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one equation. We proceed by using Fh and Fn. For the comparative statics we have
[
hT
nT
]
= −
 −1c (ωµhθ−1 1+θθ ) −1cωµhθ−1φ
−
(
ωf(h)
c
)2
φ
T (1−γ) + (1− σ)βγθ (nz(e))
1−σ
nh
−βσ(nz(e))1−σ
n2
+
(
ωf(h)
c
φ
1−γ
)2
1
T
−1
×
 ωµhθ−1c(
ωf(h)
T (1−γ)c
)2
φ(h(1− γ) + φn)
 (3.40)
It can be again shown that |A| = FhhFnn − FhnFnh > 0. Further we have
hT = |A|−1
[
βσ
(nz(e))1−σ
n2
(
ωf(h)φ
(1− γ)cT
)2
ωf(h)(1 + γθ)
]
(3.41)
nT = |A|−1
[(
φωf(h)
c(1− γ)T
)2
n
h
ωf(h)(1 + γθ) + βγθ2(1− σ)ωf(h)(nz(e))
1−σ
nc
]
(3.42)
where hT is always positive. nT is positive for σ ≤ 1 but may be negative otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Substituting optimal choices for e and n into the utility function,
utility of agents conditional on their education system choice is
Upr = T log
(
ωµ
h1+θ
Tθ2
)
+
β (nz(e))1−σ
1− σ e =
φγ
1− γ (3.43)
Upu = T log
(
ωµ
hθ(h+ (h− T )γθ)
(1− γ)Tθ2
)
+
β (nz(e))1−σ
1− σ e =
ω
p
µφγhθ
θ(1− γ) . (3.44)
and for a given vector {p, ω} the threshold ability level µ˜ is implicitly defined by setting
Upr = Upu. Since relative sub-utility from consumption is not affected directly by ω or µ
(shift consumption proportionally), the decision which system to adopt depends only µ and
{p, ω} to via investment into education (income effect). Note that a higher (lower) price
p requires a proportionally higher (lower) ability µ to restore indifference (the allocation
does not change for j = pr). Write the indifference condition as
T log
(
cpu
cpr
)
= β [u(nprz(epr))− u(npuz(epu))] . (3.45)
Since the decision to join the public system is based purely on a sufficiently large income
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effect, it holds that cpu ≥ cpr for all solutions. For T →∞ we have
npr =
(
β(1− γ)z(epr)1−σ
(1 + θ)φ
) 1
σ
hpr = T
θ
1 + θ
(3.46)
with epr as defined above. For indifference it must always hold that u(nprz(epr))−u(npuz(epu)) ≥
0. Given constant u(·)pr in the limit, we need that u(·)pu is also constant28 with the dif-
ference approaching zero. We also know that ∂hpu/∂T > 0 and hence ∂epu/∂T > 0. Using
npr > npu and epu > epr we know that it must hold that npu approaches npr from below and
npu approaches epr from above. For given p and ω, this can only happen if the threshold
ability level µ˜ is decreasing. Since utility is non-decreasing in µ, this must hold for all µ
and T .
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Assume that we have found a vector {p, ω, µ˜} such that Upr = Upu
holds. Further, we can rewrite the FOC Fn for both schooling systems to
(1− γ)σTφθ
β
= z(e)1−σ
h(1− γ)
n(h)σ
if j = pr, (3.47)
Tφθ
β
= z(e(h))1−σ
h+ (h− T )γθ
n(h)σ
if j = pu. (3.48)
The LHS if j = pr is always smaller than the LHS if j = pu and the same ordering must
hold for the RHS in equilibrium. Since RHS is increasing in h, agents switching to the
public system have lower fertility and invest more in child human capital.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Differentiating FOCs with respect to ability gives
Fhµ = 0 Fnµ = 0 if j = pr (3.49)
Fhµ = 0 Fnµ =
βγ(1− σ)
nµ
(nz(e))1−σ if j = pu (3.50)
Combining this with the Hessian from above proves that ability does not change households’
allocations. For j = pu and assumption 3.2 more able agents invest more into adult human
28Obviously, epu and/or npu cannot keep growing monotonically otherwise the condition u(·)pr−u(·)pu ≥
0 would be violated for some T .
78 CHAPTER 3. WHY SCHOOLING BECAME OPTIMAL
capital and lower fertility. Higher e follows trivially from (3.19).
Proof of Proposition 3.4. First, use the price of education from (3.5) to express the equi-
librium investment into education by parents choosing the public system. This gives
e = φ
γ
1− γ
f(h(µ˜))
f¯(h(T ))
m(f¯(h(T ))) (3.51)
Consider now the trivial case with m(f¯(h(T ))) = f¯(h(T )). Then, the price of education
relative to potential earnings is always one which brings us back to the partial equilibrium
situation from proposition 3.3: µ˜ decreases in T , the share of agents participating in the
public system increases. Consider now the polar case without any externalities (m(·) = 1)
implying that the dynamics of p is determined by the evolution of f(h(µ˜)pu) relative to the
average f¯(h). Substituting this into (3.45) gives
T log
(
cpu
cpr
)
= β
z(epr)1−σ
1− σ
[
(npr)1−σ − (npuz(Φ(µ˜, T )))1−σ] (3.52)
Φ(µ˜, T ) ≡ f(h(µ˜, T )
pu)
µ˜f(h(T )pr) +
∫ 1
µ˜
f(h(a, T )pu)da
(3.53)
We know that the LHS is positive for all T . Since npr is converging to a constant, the
same must hold for u(npuz(epu)). With npu approaching npr from below, Φ(µ˜, T ) must
converge to a constant. Further, we have ∂µ˜/∂T = −(∂Φ/∂T )/(∂Φ/∂µ˜) < 0 implying
that the ability level is increasing. By monotonicity of the RHS in µ˜ this is holds for all T .
The result hinges on the fact that p is determined by the human capital of the indifferent
agent relative to the average. As T and h rise, human capital of the j = pu agent rises
slower than the average (note that the agent in the numerator is the first agent in the
integral in the denominator). Hence, the ability level of the indifferent agent has to rise.
This increases potential earnings of agent µ = µ˜ and decreases the f¯(h) by shifting agents
from the pr to pu (composition effect). Thus, µ˜ will get arbitrarily close to 1 for large T
(depends on fixed point of Ψ).
Proof of Corollary 3.1. If fertility is a concave function of T , there are two life expectancies
Tl and Th at which fertility per family equals 2 and there must be an intermediate life
expectancy Tim which maximizes fertility (above 2 children per couple) and population
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growth rate. Concavity gives us ∂n(Tl)
∂Tl
> 0 and ∂
2n(Th)
∂T 2h
< 0 resulting in rising and falling
population growth rate at the two stationary population levels (gP = 0).
∂gP
∂Tt
∣∣∣∣
gP=0
=
∂n(Tt)/∂Tt
1 + Tt
(3.54)
Maximum population growth is defined by (3.55) and the derivative of gP at that point is
given by (3.56). Thus, gP increases at Tl, attains a maximum at Tim and starts to decrease
thereafter and becomes even negative at Th.
29
1− (1 + gP )Tim + Tim log (1 + gP )Tim = 0 (3.55)
∂gP
∂Tim
∣∣∣∣
gP>0
= −(1 + gP ) log (1 + gP )
Tim
< 0 (3.56)
29This can be also trivially proven by applying the mean-value theorem since aggregate fertility is
continuous and differentiable in T .
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Chapter 4
Mortality, Fertility, Education and
Capital Accumulation in a Simple
OLG Economy
4.1 Introduction
Important aspects of economic history are the decline in mortality, the associated increase
in life expectancy and a notable rise in investment into human capital. Life expectancy at
birth in the UK was about 40 years in 1850, 65 years in 1950 and rose by 10 more years
until the year 2000 (Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006)). The share of children aged
10-14 attending primary schools rose from 10% in 1820 to 80% in 1930 (Flora, Kraus, and
Pfenning (1983)). Universal schooling was reached soon thereafter. The same develop-
ment took place for secondary and tertiary education. Net enrollment rates for secondary
schooling increased from 67% in 1970 to 95% in 2000 (The World Bank (2004)). As can
be seen, these processes of rising life expectancy, falling birth rates and rising investment
into human capital are still going on in modern economies. The combined effect is that
the population structure of developed countries is changing rapidly with a rising share of
elderly people. This rise of the old-age dependency ratio and the associated rise in social
security contributions have shifted the “aging problem” into the focus of the academic
literature as well as public policy.
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In this paper we develop an analytically tractable two generations OLG model in the spirit
of Diamond (1965) in order to study the effects of demographic change on educational
investment decisions and capital accumulation. We augment the simple textbook model
with endogenous human capital formation. Population dynamics – the exogenous driving
force of our model – are modeled by considering uncertain survival to old age and birth
rates separately. Additionally, we look at the effects of changing lifetime labor supply. The
strength of our setup is that we can analyze the general equilibrium effects of population
dynamics using closed form solutions. The contribution of our paper is that using this rich
setup, we are able to show that changes in life expectancy, population growth and lifetime
labor supply have, in general, ambiguous effects on the capital stock and education. We
demonstrate that it is key to consider the interactions between annuity markets, the pension
system and productivity of education for understanding the qualitative and quantitative
effects of variations in the population structure on changes in physical and human capital
accumulation.
The relationship between mortality and investment into human capital has been investi-
gated is a number of theoretical and empirical studies. Empirical studies find that falling
mortality and the associated rise in life expectancy increase investment into human capital.
Using data for post-war India, Ram and Schultz (1979) find that improvements in mortal-
ity played a major role in the rise of educational attainment. Eckstein, Mira, and Wolpin
(1999) provide evidence for Sweden that the fall in child mortality was the most important
factor for the demographic transition and the rising educational attainment. On the other
hand, Mincer (1995) and Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) present empirical evidence that
rising education premia have a positive effect on schooling.
Theoretical work dealing with the ageing-education nexus by Boucekkine, de la Croix, and
Licandro (2002), de la Croix and Licandro (1999), Echevarria and Iza (2006) and Heijdra
and Romp (2009) use variations of a Blanchard (1985) type of perpetual youth setup.
By employing this model family the authors obtain closed form solutions and derive a
number of insights by relying entirely on analytical results. These papers assume that the
production processes use only labor (human capital) as an input or they consider only small
open economies. Thus, the general equilibrium feedback effect of population dynamics on
relative prices is ruled out by construction. A general conclusion of this literature is that
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increasing life expectancy increases investment into human and physical capital.
The papers by Hu (1999) and Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil (2000) are closest in spirit
to our work. They also employ a perpetual youth setup but overcome the limitations of
the above mentioned papers by developing tractable general equilibrium models. Our con-
tributions to their work are threefold. First, we do not only study the effects of changes
in mortality but also the effects of changing fertility on investment in education and hu-
man as well as physical capital accumulation. Second, we also analyze how changes in
the lifetime working horizon affect educational decisions and capital accumulation. This
additional channel in our model stands in for a lifelong learning motive and is increas-
ingly important in aging societies which reform their PAYG financed pension systems by
increasing retirement ages. Third, by using an OLG rather than a perpetual youth model,
we reconfirm some of the findings of the above mentioned authors: Rising survival rates
may lead to increasing educational efforts and capital accumulation. However, we empha-
size that there are potentially important offsetting effects. The lower degree of analytical
tractability of our OLG model – in comparison to the perpetual youth model – buys us
the possibility to include and to understand several interaction effects and to show how
these may change results. For example, using an equilibrium relationship of their model,
Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil (2000) argue that the interest rate varies positively with
mortality, “as would be expected from the simple intuition that shorter lives lead to lower
wealth accumulation” (p. 11). We show that this positive effect is smaller when annuity
markets are larger and that, by interpreting an equilibrium condition only, Kalemli-Ozcan,
Ryder, and Weil (2000) ignore two important and potentially offsetting effects: increasing
mortality (i) decreases the workforce and (ii) may decrease educational efforts and both
effects ceteris paribus lead to a negative variation of mortality and the interest rate.
Finally, Zhang, Zhang, and Lee (2001) add to this literature by modeling endogenous
fertility and child education employing a two-generations OLG setup as we do but using
a dynastic framework. These differences in the two approaches makes their work less
suitable as a benchmark for comparison. Furthermore, as a consequence of the endogenous
nature of fertility decisions, these authors cannot study the impact of changing fertility
and mortality in isolation as we do.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the model. The
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results of the comparative static analysis are derived in section 4.3. In the same section we
also show the results of our calibration exercise where we perform an extensive sensitivity
analysis. Some concluding remarks are in section 4.4. Separate appendices contain proofs
and additional results.
4.2 The Model
We develop a simple OLGmodel with endogenous education decisions and a PAYG financed
social security system. The setup is as follows: agents live for two periods whereby survival
to the second period is uncertain. In the first period agents choose time investment into
education, saving and consumption. In the second period they consume their entire wealth
and work only an exogenously given fraction ω of their time. The rest of their time (1 -
ω) they are retired and receive a lump-sum pension, pt+1. We make this assumption for
analytical tractability; it allows us to analyze the effects of different social security regimes
in a model of human capital accumulation a` la Ben-Porath (1967) within a 2-generations
model. In this setup, the parameter ω reflects a motive for life-long learning which can be
affected by policy, e.g., by increasing the retirement age.
4.2.1 Demographics
Each period, there are Nt,0 young households and Nt,1 old. Let γ
N
t be the birth rate so that
Nt,0 = γ
N
t Nt−1,0 and st be the survival rate, hence Nt,1 = stNt−1,0. Using these definitions,
the old-age dependency ratio (oadrt) – the fraction of the old to the young – in the economy
is given by
oadrt =
Nt,1
Nt,0
=
st
γNt
. (4.1)
4.2.2 Markets for Annuities
We assume the existence of (imperfect) annuity markets for insurance against survival risk.
Let at,0 be savings of the period t young. Period t+1 asset holdings are consequently given
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by
at,0 + λat,0
1− st+1
st+1
= at,0
ζt+1
st+1
(4.2)
where
ζt+1 ≡ st+1 + λ(1− st+1) (4.3)
is an annuity factor introduced here for convenience and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 is the degree of
annuitization, also see Hansen and Imrohorog˘lu (2008). Notice that, in the case of no
annuitization, we have λ = 0 and ζt+1 = st+1 and for complete (perfect) annuity markets
we have λ = 1 and ζt+1 = 1. Full annuitization implies that the assets of the deceased
agents are distributed uniformly among the surviving old agents which is an insurance
against longevity (Yaari (1965)).
Without annuity markets there is no “insurance effect” but agents receive a lump-sum
payment trt+1 from the government. To keep the analysis analytically tractable we assume
that in the case of incomplete annuitization the government distributes the accidental
bequests to the old.1 Accidental bequests are then redistributed to households as lump-
sum transfers and given by
trt+1 = (1− λ)at,0(1 + rt+1)(1− st+1)Nt,0
Nt+1,1
. (4.4)
and, using the fact that
Nt+1,1 = Nt,ost+1,
we have
trt+1 = (1− λ)at,0(1 + rt+1)(1− st+1)
st+1
. (4.5)
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4.2.3 Household Optimization
Households maximize expected lifetime utility
max
ct,0,ct+1,1
log ct,0 + βst+1 log ct+1,1, (4.6)
subject to the constraints
ct,0 + at,0 = (1− et)h0wt(1− τt) (4.7a)
ct+1,1 =
(1 + rt+1)ζt+1
st+1
at,0 + ωht+1,1wt+1(1− τt+1) + (1− ω)pt+1 + trt+1, (4.7b)
where β is the raw time discount factor, et is investment into education when young, h0 is
the stock of human capital given at birth (taken as exogenous and constant over cohorts),
wt is the wage rate per unit of human capital, rt+1 is the return on financial assets, τt
denotes the social security contribution rate, pt+1 are lump-sum pension payments, and
trt+1 are the distributed accidental bequests.
Due to the representative agent setup, two interpretations of ω are conceivable. In the
first interpretation ω is the fraction of time the representative agent of age 1 works. In the
second, it is the fraction in the population of age 1 that works. Either way, ω works like
a policy variable and a change in ω could be interpreted, e.g., as a change in retirement
legislation or labor market incentives affecting participation rates.
The present value budget constraint is accordingly given by
ct,0 + st+1
ct+1,1
ζt+1(1 + rt+1)
=
(1− et)h0wt(1− τt) + st+1ωht+1,1wt+1(1− τt+1) + (1− ω)pt+1 + trt+1
ζt+1(1 + rt+1)
. (4.8)
The education technology is
ht+1,1 = (1 + g(et))h0, (4.9)
with g being a function mapping educational investment into formation of human capital.
We choose g such that it is increasing, concave in e and fulfills the lower Inada condi-
4.2. THE MODEL 87
tion. These are standard assumptions about the education function (see Willis (1986)).1
Later, we specify a parametric form for g(et) to obtain a closed form solution. Solving the
maximization problem gives the Euler equation
ct+1,1 = βζt+1(1 + rt+1)ct,0. (4.10)
Solving for the optimal educational investment gives
g′(et) =
ζt+1(1 + rt+1)
st+1
wt(1− τt)
ωwt+1(1− τt+1) . (4.11)
This condition says that an individual invests into schooling until the marginal return of
schooling equals the return on net wages relative to the effective interest rate. Following
Bouzahzah, de la Croix, and Docquier (2002), we define the education function g(et) in
(4.9) as
g(et) = ξe
ψ
t , where 0 < ψ < 1, ξ > 0. (4.12)
Optimal education is then given by
et =
[
ωξψ
wt+1(1− τt+1)
wt(1− τt)
st+1
ζt+1(1 + rt+1)
] 1
1−ψ
. (4.13)
It can be seen that educational decisions depend positively on the ratio of net wage growth
to the return on capital holdings. This is the key general equilibrium effect we are interested
in. The scarcity of raw labor resulting from demographic change will lead to rising wages
and falling interest rates. According to equation (4.13) this will induce general equilibrium
feedback effects by leading to increases in education and thereby to an increase in the
second period human capital.
In addition to these general equilibrium effects, equation (4.13) shows direct effects on edu-
cational efforts through the educational productivity, ξ and ψ, the fraction of time working
in the second period, ω and the probability of survival if there is some annuitization, i.e.,
1For analytical reasons, we assume zero depreciation of human capital and we do not make h an
argument of g as in the standard Ben-Porath (1967) technology. This parametric restriction is also super-
imposed in some empirical studies, see the review in Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999).
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if λ > 0. The direct effect of survival on educational decisions has in part been labeled
as an effect due to an extension of the adult planning horizon, e.g., by Heijdra and Romp
(2009). This is a misleading interpretation because the direct effect of survival is in fact a
result of the induced adjustment of the rate of return to physical capital if there is some
annuitization.2 In the absence of annuitization, there is no adjustment of the rate of return
to physical capital to the survival rate and changes in the survival rate have a direct effect
only on the inter-temporal allocation of consumption (via the changing effective discount
rate st+1β). In our model, the “pure” effect of extending the planing horizon is represented
by an increase in ω.
Finally, households’ optimal consumption follows from using (4.10) in (4.8) as
ct,0 =
1
1 + βst+1
(
(1− et)h0wt(1− τt) + st+1ωht+1,1wt+1(1− τt+1) + (1− ω)pt+1 + trt+1
ζt+1(1 + rt+1)
)
and using the above in (4.7a) gives savings as
at,0 =
1
1 + βst+1
(βst+1(1− et)h0wt(1− τt)−
st+1
ωht+1,1wt+1(1− τt+1) + (1− ω)pt+1 + trt+1
ζt+1(1 + rt+1)
)
. (4.14)
4.2.4 Firms
Firms produce output using a standard Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = K
α
t (AtLt)
1−α. (4.15)
At is the firm’s technology level which is determined by
At+1 = Atγ
A, (4.16)
2This has already been shown by Hu (1999).
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where γA is the exogenous gross growth rate. Lt is effective labor input which is the sum
of human capital weighted labor supply of the young and of the old and accordingly given
by
Lt = (1− et)h0Nt,0 + ωht,1Nt,1. (4.17)
Competitive markets ensure that factors get paid their marginal products. We assume that
capital depreciates fully after one period so that
1 + rt = αk
α−1
t (4.18a)
wt = (1− α)Atkαt , (4.18b)
where kt ≡ KtAtLt .
4.2.5 Government
The role of the government is twofold. First, the government taxes accidental bequests in
the case of incomplete annuitization at a confiscatory rate and redistributes them as lump-
sum payments to the old. Second, the government runs a PAYG financed social security
system with a balanced budget in all periods requiring that total contributions by workers
equal total pension payments.3 By equation (4.17) we then have
wtτt ((1− et)h0Nt,0 + ωht,1Nt,1) = (1− ω)ptNt,1. (4.19)
Notice that the above, using equation (4.1), implies that
(1− ω)pt = wtτt
(
(1− et)h0γ
N
t
st
+ ωht,1
)
. (4.20)
Changes in the population structure require adjustments of the social security policy. Let
%t denote the replacement rate, i.e., the ratio of pension income to average net wage income.
3While we explicitly model this inter-generational transfer system as a pension system, it may also be
interpreted as a metaphor for a more general intergenerational transfer system, e.g., a health care system.
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Then pension income can be expressed as
pt = %t
(1− τt)wt ((1− et)h0Nt,0 + ωht,1Nt,1)
Nt,0 + ωNt,1
.
Using the above definition in (4.19) and simplifying then links contribution and replacement
rates by
τt =
(1− ω)%t
γNt /st + ω + (1− ω)%t
. (4.21)
It can be readily observed that τt increases in the fraction of pensioners, 1−ω, the generosity
of the pension system, %t, and in the old-age dependency ratio, st/γ
N
t . Using this setup,
fixing τt = τ¯ corresponds to a fixed contribution rate system and holding %t = %¯ corresponds
to a fixed replacement rate system.4
4.2.6 Equilibrium
In equilibrium all markets clear, households maximize utility and firms make zero profits.
Market clearing on the capital market requires that
Kt+1 = at,0Nt,0. (4.22)
Using (4.1) in (4.17), aggregate labor supply can be rewritten as
Lt = Nt,0h0
(
(1− et) + ω st
γNt
(1 + g(et−1))
)
. (4.23)
Collecting elements, the following proposition gives the law of motion of the aggregate
economy.
Proposition 4.1. For given k0 the aggregate dynamics of the economy are described by
the system of first-order difference equations in {kt, et} given by
kt+1 =
ϕtα(1− α)(1− τt)
φt
kαt (4.24a)
4Notice that these definitions are not the same as what is referred to as defined contribution and defined
benefit systems in the literature.
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et =
(
st+1
ζt+1
ωξψ
γA(1− τt+1)kt+1
α(1− τt)kαt
) 1
1−ψ
, (4.24b)
where
φt ≡ γA
((
α(2 + ρˆt+1) + ϕt
(1− α)τt+1
ζt+1
(1 + ρˆt+1)
)
1− et+1
1− et γ
N
t+1
+ωst+1
(
α(2 + ρˆt+1) + ϕt
1− α
ζt+1
(1 + ρˆt+1)
)
1 + g(et)
1− et
)
(4.25a)
ϕt ≡ (2 + ρˆt+1)ζt+1
(2 + ρˆt+1)ζt+1 + (1− st+1)(1− λ)) (4.25b)
and ρˆt+1 =
1
st+1β
− 1.
Proof. See appendix 4.A.
Proposition 4.2. If there is an equilibrium, education et is always interior on the interval
(0, 1). Further, education converges always to its steady state value.
Proof. See appendix 4.A.
4.2.7 Steady State Analysis
Definition 2. Along the balanced growth path (steady state) of the economy, all variables
grow at constant rates so that k = kt+1 = kt and e = et+1 = et ∀ t.
Proposition 4.3. For 0 < α < 1 and 0 ≤ τ < 1, the unique steady state of the economy
is given by
k =
(
ϕα(1− α)(1− τ)
φ
) 1
1−α
(4.26a)
e =
(
ωξψ
γA
α
) 1
1−ψ
(
s
ζ
) 1
1−ψ
k
1−α
1−ψ (4.26b)
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where
φ ≡ γA
((
α(2 + ρˆ) + ϕ
(1− α)τ
ζ
(1 + ρˆ)
)
γN+
+ωs
(
α(2 + ρˆ) + ϕ
1− α
ζ
(1 + ρˆ)
)
1 + g(e)
1− e
)
, (4.27a)
ϕ ≡ (2 + ρˆ)ζ
(2 + ρˆ)ζ + (1− s)(1− λ) (4.27b)
and ρˆ = 1
sβ
− 1.
Proof. See appendix 4.A.
4.3 Comparative Statics
In this section, we use our framework to study the effects of demographic change on the
economy by conducting a comparative statics analysis in steady state. In this respect our
model is a useful laboratory to provide intuition for the results of much of the quantitative
work, e.g., by Fouge`re and Me´rette (1999), Sadahiro and Shimasawa (2002), Bouzahzah,
de la Croix, and Docquier (2002) and Ludwig, Schelkle, and Vogel (2008). To this end, we
analyze – by looking at partial derivatives – the effects of changing fertility, mortality and
working time on the capital stock and education. We first do so in a social security sce-
nario with constant contributions rates and then consider the opposite extreme by holding
replacement rates constant. While we can uniquely determine the signs of many partially
derivatives, we fail to do so in some cases. In these cases, our closed form solutions help
us to understand the various offsetting effects at work and to detect the sources of inde-
terminacy. Finally, we use a calibrated version of our model to illustrate how the signs of
partial derivatives depend on the parametrization of the model in the ambiguous cases.
4.3.1 Analytical Results
We drop the time indices to indicate steady state values. To begin with, we provide
analytical results followed by an interpretation.
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Proposition 4.4. In the steady state of the economy we have
1. for τ = τ¯ that
∂k
∂γN
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
< 0 and
∂e
∂γN
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
< 0, (4.28a)
∂k
∂s
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
≷ 0 and ∂e
∂s
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
≷ 0. (4.28b)
∂k
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
< 0 and
∂e
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
≷ 0, (4.28c)
2. For the relationship between the cases τ = τ¯ and % = %¯ we have that
∂k
∂γN
∣∣∣∣
%=%¯
>
∂k
∂γN
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
and
∂e
∂γN
∣∣∣∣
%=%¯
>
∂e
∂γN
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
(4.29a)
∂k
∂s
∣∣∣∣
%=%¯
<
∂k
∂s
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
and
∂e
∂s
∣∣∣∣
%=%¯
<
∂e
∂s
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
, (4.29b)
∂k
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
%=%¯
>
∂k
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
and
∂e
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
%=%¯
>
∂e
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
, (4.29c)
Proof. See appendix 4.A.
Interpretation of the partial derivatives of the capital stock and education in equation
(4.28a) is rather straightforward. First, observe from (4.26b) that there is no direct effect
of the birth rate, γN , on the education decision, e. Second, an increase of the birth
rate increases the effective supply of labor in the economy which decreases k, cf. (4.26a)
and (4.27a). Therefore, a change in the birth rate affects the relative prices of physical
and human capital through its effect on k. An increase of k increases the wage rate, w,
and decreases the return on physical capital, r. While the growth rate of wages (wt+1
wt
)
is unchanged in our steady state comparison, the return on physical capital decreases.
Consequently, optimal education goes up, cf. (4.13).
As stated in the proposition, the signs of the partial derivatives in (4.28b) cannot be
determined unambiguously. First, notice that there are various effects from increases of
s on savings and thus k at work, cf. (4.27a): (i) an increase of s decreases the effective
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discount rate ρˆ which increases k. This is so because an increase of the survival rate
increases savings via its effect on current period income, cf. the first term in the brackets
of (4.14). (ii), however, an increase in the survival rate also increases the value of second
period income as long as λ > 0 (so that st+1/ζt+1 < 1) which dampens the increase of
savings. This dampening effect is the stronger, the larger is the size of the annuity market,
i.e., the higher is λ.5 (iii) for λ > 0, there is a direct effect of survival on education, cf.
(4.26b), which varies positively with λ. This increases effective labor supply and thereby
tends to decrease k. (iv) as s increases, raw labor supply increases as long as ω > 0. Observe
that the last two effects are stronger when the average human capital productivity is high,
because ω interacts with ξ via the term 1+g(e)
1−e in (4.27a).
This discussion explains why the signs of the effects of s on k cannot be determined
unambiguously. It can only be said that the capital stock is likely to increase if ω, λ and
ξ are sufficiently small. For too high values of these parameters, the reaction of effective
labor supply is too strong and the capital stock kt may decrease (so that rt+1 increases).
Second, this ambiguity with respect to the effects of s on k translates into an ambiguous
effect of s on e, cf. (4.26b). However, even if k varies negatively with s, education may
still increase because of the direct effect of increasing survival on the education decision in
the presence of annuity markets (λ > 0). Indeed, in all of our simulations of subsection
4.3.3, schooling is found to increase if s rises, also in those cases in which k decreases when
annuity markets are perfect. On the contrary, with missing annuity markets, we never
find that k decreases in s so that there is also no ambiguity in the resulting educational
adjustments.
The effect of a changing lifetime labor supply ω given in equation (4.28c) is unambiguously
negative for the capital stock but ambiguous for the optimal education decision. First,
increasing ω increases total effective labor supply and thus decreases k. Second, an increase
of ω has a direct effect on education, cf. (4.13). This leads to an additional increase of
effective labor which further decreases k. However, third, a decrease of k also exerts a
dampening effect on education by increasing the return on physical capital. As this third
effect is only a second order general equilibrium feedback effect, it cannot offset the decrease
of k which explains the unambiguous sign for the partial derivative of k. However, the direct
5As can be immediately observed from (4.14), the overall effect of increasing survival on savings is
unambiguously positive. But it is larger for λ = 0 than for λ = 1.
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effect of ω on k and the resulting general equilibrium price effect could potentially be strong
enough to offset the direct effect of ω on education. This explains the ambiguous sign of
the partial derivative of e. While this is so analytically, we show below for a wide range of
parameter constellations of our simulations that education varies positively with ω.
The effect of an adjustment of the contribution rate τ is examined in the second part
of proposition 4.4. Recall that changing the contribution rate has only a direct effect
on capital accumulation but does not distort education decisions in steady state. Thus,
increasing the contribution rate only has an effect on steady state education to the extent
that it crowds out savings in physical capital. The uniform conclusion is therefore that a
rising (falling) contribution rate decreases (increases) the capital stock, thereby increases
(decreases) the interest rate and thus decreases (increases) the incentives to invest into
education. A brief verbal summary of the results is that the effect of falling birth rates,
rising survival rates, i.e., an aging of the population, or an extension of the lifetime labor
supply has a larger effect (in absolute values) on the capital stock and on education if the
contribution rate τ is held constant. The results do not say, however, that the signs do not
change. Since we add one layer of complexity, it is even harder to pin down the direction
of change.
4.3.2 Role of Annuity Markets
This subsection discusses the role of the degree of annuitization in more detail. We show
in the appendix that
Proposition 4.5. In the steady state of the economy we have
1. for τ = τ¯ that
∂k
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
> 0 and
∂e
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
≷ 0, (4.30a)
2. For the relationship between the cases τ = τ¯ and % = %¯ we have that
∂k
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
%=%¯
=
∂k
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
and
∂e
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
%=%¯
=
∂e
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
. (4.31a)
Proof. See appendix 4.A.
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More complete annuity markets increase savings but have an ambiguous effect on the
education decision. Again, the ambiguity comes from the fact that the direct effect of
increasing annuitization on the interest rate – which reduces educational investments, c.f.
equation (4.26b)– may be offset by the indirect effect of rising capital – which decreases the
interest rate and thereby increases education. Furthermore, the effect of λ on capital and
education is the same in both social security scenarios. This is so because the adjustment
of the contribution or replacement rate does not interact with λ.
More interesting is, however, how the level of λ interacts with the derivatives of k and
e with respect to s, γN and ω. Unfortunately, due to the algebraic complexity of the
problem, it is not possible to obtain clear results for these cross-derivatives. However, as
is shown in appendix 4.A, a higher λ makes it more likely that ∂k/∂s < 0. Further results
on the importance of annuity markets are illustrated in our numerical simulations, cf., in
particular, the discussion in subsection 4.3.3.
4.3.3 Numerical Results
As stated in the previous subsection, there are cases in which the sign of the derivatives
are ambiguous. For these cases we here present results from numerical simulations of
our model to illustrate the sources for this ambiguity. Obviously, our stylized two period
model fails to capture many relevant aspects. This exercise is therefore an illustration
only and is not meant to provide exact quantitative results of population aging on the
economy. We first investigate the case with perfect annuity markets and then the case
without annuity markets. Furthermore, we redo the calculations for both scenarios with
constant contribution and constant replacement rates.
Perfect Annuity Markets
In this subsection we focus on the case with perfect annuity markets (λ = 1) where the
direct effects of changing survival rates on the education decision is strongest and con-
sequently the effects of changing survival are likely to be ambiguous, cf. our previous
discussion in subsection 4.3.1 and appendix 4.A. Furthermore, the case with perfect annu-
ity markets, although empirically doubtful, makes our results directly comparable to the
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perpetual youth model of Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil (2000).
We take the periodicity of the model such that each generation covers a maximum of 40 years.
Agents are assumed to become economically active at the actual age of 20. Correspond-
ingly, the maximum age agents can reach is 100. Our calibration targets for some of
the population parameters are for averages of the three core European countries France,
Germany and Italy.6 For the survival rate, s, we take as calibration target the remain-
ing life expectancy at the age of 20, LE20, which is currently (in 2004) 68 years. As
survival in our model is certain in the first period of life, the survival rate is given by
s = LE20/40 − 1.0 = 0.69. We calibrate γN using the implied γN to match the old-age
dependency ratio of 44%. Accordingly, we set γN = 1.5574.7 The long-run growth rate of
productivity in European countries is roughly 0.015 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) annu-
ally so that γA = 1.01540 = 1.81. We set the discount factor β = 0.9940 = 0.67 by reference
to other studies, e.g., Hurd (1990).
The most critical parameters are ω and ψ, and ξ. First, we calibrate ψ to medium value
of the estimates reported in Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) which is 0.6. Second,
there is no direct empirical counterpart of ω because it just reflects an auxiliary variable
in our model that simplifies the exposition. To calibrate this parameter we use the share
of agents obtaining higher education as the calibration target.8 Since the timing of the
model is such that the first (and economically passive) period is 20 years, education can
be also viewed as the share of people investing into higher education (university and post-
graduate education). We construct aggregate indices using data from OECD (2008).9 The
procedure is as follows. We compute the average graduation age of a typical student for
the two university (or equivalent) diploma categories (Type A and B). Then we use this
number to compute how many years a person spends in tertiary education in excess of the
economic starting age (which is set to 20). For example, the “average” French student (see
6Our population data are based on the Human Mortality Database (2008).
7The alternative would be to calibrate γN with the gross growth rate of the working age population
ratio. This would require to set γN = 1.06. The implied oadr is then 0.66 and hence this alternative would
overestimate the actual old-age dependency.
8Alternative calibration targets are e.g. the fraction of the old (age 60 and older) in the population
who work which is 5.4% in the data. In our model this implies ω = 0.12 and e = 0.0077 (0.31 years of
education). The choice of this alternative measure does not change our conclusions (results available upon
request).
9The data we use can be found in tables A1.1a, A1.3a and X1.1c. See also the same publication for
more detailed information on the educational systems and definitions.
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table 4.1) is obtaining a type A diploma at the age of 24.5 and a type B diploma at the age
of 22. We then weight the “excess years” (4.5 and 2) by the population weights (0.11 and
0.15) to obtain years of tertiary education of a representative French agent (0.775). Then,
we weight the country specific years by the population of the three countries to compute
years of education for the “representative European” (0.874). As a last step, we divide
this number by the duration of one period (40 years) to convert it into the model specific
equivalent and use it as a calibration target. Hence, our target for e is e = 0.01988. Third,
we calibrate ξ endogenously to match the ratio of peak life cycle wages to the wage rate
at labor market entry which is 1.6 Attanasio (1999). Since we set h0 = 1, this is the data
equivalent to human capital holdings of the old, h1, and our calibration target requires
ξ = 6.30. Parameters are summarized in table 4.2.
Table 4.1: Calibration Target for Time in Tertiary Education
Graduation Age Share in Population Weighted Years
Type of Diploma B A B A B+A
France 22.0 24.5 0.11 0.15 0.775
Germany 22.0 25.5 0.09 0.14 0.950
Italy 22.5 26.0 0.01 0.12 0.601
Total 0.795
Graduation age refers to the average within the particular type of diploma. The country weights (France
0.31, Germany 0.40 and Italy 0.39) are given by the relative population size in 2006 computed from the
Human Mortality Database (2008).
As our discussion of the analytical results in subsection 4.3.1 shows, the most critical
parameters in the case of perfect annuitization (λ = 1) are s, ω, ξ, ψ. We therefore consider
a range of alternative specifications around the benchmark specification in table 4.2 for all
these parameters. The graphs have ω ∈ (0, 1) on the horizontal axis. The different lines are
always drawn for a tuple from {ξ⊗s} for selected values for ξ and s where the intermediate
values (solid lines) are from the benchmark calibration. Finally, in order to address the
sensitivity of our results with respect to the concavity of the education technology we redo
all calculations for ψ = 0.3.10 We recalibrate the model when we change the value of ψ.
10For the sake of brevity, simulation results with varying α and β are not displayed but are available
upon request.
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Table 4.2: Calibration parameters
Firm sector ψ = 0.6 ψ = 0.3
Capital share, α 0.3 0.3
Technological progress, γA 1.81 1.81
Household sector
Discount factor, β 0.67 0.67
Average productivity of human capital investments, ξ 6.30 1.94
Coefficient in human capital production function, ψ 0.6 0.3
Fraction of the old working, ω 0.36 0.94
Social Security
Replacement rate, % 0.6 0.6
Demographics
Birth rate, γN 1.56 1.56
Survival rate, s 0.69 0.69
The vertical black line is the calibrated value of ω. Observe that with lower concavity of the
education technology (lower ψ), the calibrated value of ω is increased substantially to match
the same target. Instead of reporting the rather uninformative numbers for the derivatives,
in the figures we show elasticities which are better comparable across calibrations.
The effect of changing survival rates on the capital stock are displayed in figure 4.1. As
claimed in proposition 4.4, the sign is ambiguous. The sign is more likely to be negative
for high survival rates, high marginal productivity of education (ψ and ξ) and high labor
market participation in the second period (high ω). Obviously, the higher the marginal
product of education (as determined by ξ and ψ), the more will agents invest into education
and the less they will work and save. The effect of ω goes into the same direction since it
is reinforcing the effect of education.
Figure 4.2 shows the elasticity of education with respect to the survival rate. Although we
show in proposition 4.4 that the sign cannot be determined unambiguously, the elasticity
is always positive in our simulations. Rising survival rates always increase educational
attainment. The simulations also show that the elasticity is smaller for high values of ξ
and higher survival rates. The curvature of the human capital production function ψ has
only a minor influence.
Finally, figure 4.3 shows how education varies with the time spent on the labor market in
the second period. Although the sign cannot be determined analytically, the simulations
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Figure 4.1: Elasticity of k with respect to s
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Figure 4.2: Elasticity of e with respect to s
(a) Benchmark concavity (ψ = 0.6)
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show that education always increases if ω increases. Thus, the direct effect of a rising ω is
not overturned by a general equilibrium effect of rising interest rates. The factor having
the largest influence is ψ which governs the shape of the marginal productivity of schooling
investment and other parameters seem to have only a small effect on the behavior of the
model. Not surprisingly, with more concavity of the human capital production function
the (positive) effect of increasing lifetime labor supply on the education decision increases.
Figure 4.3: Elasticity of e with respect to ω
(a) Benchmark concavity (ψ = 0.6)
(i) constant τ
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No Annuity Markets
This subsection provides a sensitivity analysis with respect to changes in the degree of
annuitization. We set λ = 0 (corresponding to an economy without annuity markets),
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recalibrate the model using the same calibration targets as above and report the new
parameters in table 4.3, appendix 4.B. Since only the partial derivative ∂k/∂s changes its
sign if we vary λ we here only show this result in figure 4.4. The other figures can be found
in appendix 4.B.
Indeed with λ = 0 the reaction of the capital stock to changes in the survival rate is always
positive, whereas for λ = 1 it may also be negative. Thus, the degree of completeness of
annuity markets has an important effect on the reaction of the economy. The qualitative
effects of changes in the population growth rate, γN , and lifetime labor supply, ω, are not
affected by the choice of λ (see appendix 4.B).
Figure 4.4: Elasticity of k with respect to s: No Annuity Markets
(a) Benchmark concavity (ψ = 0.6)
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(b) Low concavity (ψ = 0.3)
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4.4 Conclusion
This paper investigates the effects of a changing population structure on capital accumula-
tion and educational investment in a tractable two period model in the spirit of Diamond
(1965). We vary the population structure by three dimensions, first, by the fertility rate,
second, by the survival rate and, third, by the degree of old-age labor supply. We show
that a decrease of the fertility rate and a corresponding increase of the old-age dependency
ratio unambiguously increases the capital intensity and education if contribution rates to
the pension system are held constant. An increase of the survival rate, on the other hand,
does not unambiguously vary with these variables. Our analytical results and our numeri-
cal illustrations shed light on the sources of this ambiguity by highlighting the various and
potentially offsetting interaction effects at work. Therefore, our tractable model is a useful
laboratory for understanding the magnitudes of the effects found in applied quantitative
work employing models with overlapping generations.
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4.A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of proposition 4.1. We have that
kt+1 =
Kt+1
At+1Lt+1
which, by (4.22), can be rewritten as
kt+1
Lt+1
Nt,0
=
at,0
At+1
(4.32)
We first work on the LHS of (4.32). Using (4.23) we get
kt+1
Lt+1
Nt,0
= kt+1h0
(
(1− et+1)γNt+1 + ωst+1(1 + g(et))
)
. (4.33)
Next, we focus on the RHS of (4.32). Using (4.5), (4.9) and (4.20) in (4.14) and bringing
the terms involving at,0 to the LHS of the resulting expression we get
at,0
(
1 +
(1− st+1)(1− λ)
(1 + βst+1)ζt+1
)
=
h0
1 + βst+1
(
βst+1(1− et)(1− τt)wt−
wt+1
ζt+1(1 + rt+1)
(
st+1ω(1 + g(et)) + τt+1(1− et+1)γNt+1
))
.
Bringing the term postmultiplying at,0 to the RHS, replacing rt and wt by their marginal
products from (4.18) and dividing by At+1 gives
at,0
At+1
= ϕt
h0
1 + βst+1
(
βst+1(1− et)(1− τt)(1− α)kαt
1
γA
−1− α
αζt+1
kt+1
(
st+1ω(1 + g(et)) + τt+1(1− et+1)γNt+1
))
. (4.34)
where
ϕt =
(1 + βst+1)ζt+1
(1 + βst+1)ζt+1 + (1− st+1)(1− λ) . (4.35)
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Next, use the equation above and combine it with (4.33) to get
kt+1
(
(1− et+1)γNt+1 + st+1ω(1 + g(et))+
ϕt
1− α
α(1 + βst+1)ζt+1
(
st+1ω(1 + g(et)) + τt+1(1− et+1)γNt+1
))
= ϕt
βst+1(1− α)
γA(1 + βst+1)
(1− et)(1− τt)kαt .
Multiply the above by α(1 + βst+1) and simplify to get
kt+1
(
(1− et+1)γNt+1
(
α(1 + βst+1) + ϕt
(1− α)τt+1
ζt+1
)
+
st+1ω(1 + g(et))
(
α(1 + βst+1) + ϕt
1− α
ζt+1
))
= ϕt
α(1− α)βst+1
γA
(1− et)(1− τt)kαt .
The expression for et immediately follows from replacing wages and interest rates by their
respective counterparts from equations (4.18a) and (4.18b). Using ρˆ = 1
βst+1
−1 proves the
claim in the proposition.
Proof of proposition 4.2. First, given that the function g(e) satisfies the lower Inada con-
dition with lime→0 g′(e) → ∞ the solution with zero education is excluded for ω ∈ (0, 1].
Second, having full educational investment (i.e. e = 1), labor supply and thus wage income
of the young generation is zero. By the lower Inada condition of the utility function, we
have that ct,0 > 0 for positive wages. Consequently, savings in the first period would be
negative and so will be the capital stock of the economy. Thus, if there is an equilibrium
with finite and positive capital stock, education will always be lower than unity.
To show that education always converges to the steady state solution use (4.24a) in (4.24b)
and rewrite the resulting expression as
e1−ψt =
st+1
ζt+1
ωξψ
(1− α)(1− τt+1)(
Γ1
1−et+1
1−et + Γ2
1+g(et)
1−et
)
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where
Γ1 ≡
(
α(2 + ρˆt+1) + ϕt
(1− α)τt+1
ζt+1
(1 + ρˆt+1)
)
γNt+1
Γ2 ≡ ωst+1
(
α(2 + ρˆt+1) + ϕt
1− α
ζt+1
(1 + ρˆt+1)
)
Defining ∆t ≡ et − et+1(k∗) as measuring the distance between et and et+1 which is ul-
timately a function of the steady state capital stock. Thus, ∆t measures the change in
education between t and t+ 1 outside the steady state. Rearranging gives
F (et,∆t) = e
1−ψ
t −
st+1
ζt+1
ωξψ
(1− α)(1− τt+1)(
Γ1
1−et+∆t
1−et + Γ2
1+g(et)
1−et
) . (4.36)
Taking the derivative of et with respect to the distance to the steady state gives
∂et
∂∆t
= −∂F/∂∆t
∂F/∂et
< 0 (4.37a)
∂2et
∂∆2t
> 0. (4.37b)
Therefore, if education is, e.g., below its new steady state level after an exogenous shock
(i.e., ∆t < 0), et will always converge monotonically to the new steady state value.
Proof of proposition 4.3. Existence:
Using equation (4.22) and the assumption of constant population growth we have
kt+1 =
1
γNγA
a˜t,0,
where a˜t,0 is equation (4.22) divided by At to transform at,0 into savings per efficient worker.
Define the function
d(wt, rt+1) = γ
AγNkt+1 − a˜(wt(kt), rt+1(kt+1), et(kt+1)). (4.38a)
Where d(·) is the change in the capital stock per effective worker. Given that we use
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log-utility, et ∈ (0, 1) and a Cobb-Douglas production function it holds that
0 < a˜(wt, rt+1, et) < w˜t, (4.38b)
0 <
a˜(wt, rt+1, et)
kt+1
<
w˜t
kt+1
. (4.38c)
where w˜t denotes wages scaled by the level of technology. All we have to show is that d(·)
has opposite signs for kt+1 going to zero and infinity. Then by continuity of d(·) there is
at least one capital stock satisfying d(·) = 0. This holds since
d(wt, rt+1)
kt+1
= γNγA − a˜(wt, rt+1, et)
kt+1
(4.38d)
and taking the limits gives
lim
kt+1→∞
d(wt, rt+1)
kt+1
= γNγA > 0 (4.38e)
lim
kt+1→0
d(wt, rt+1)
kt+1
= −∞ < 0 (4.38f)
for sufficiently small kt+1. For uniqueness it is sufficient to show that ∂d(wt, rt+1)/∂kt+1 > 0
for all k, i.e. that for a given wage rate d(wt, rt+1) is nondecreasing in the capital stock.
Taking equation (4.25a) and recalling that ∂e/∂k > 0 establishes the result. By using
equation (4.26b) it is clear that a unique solution for the capital stock automatically gives
a unique e.
Proof of proposition 4.4. From (4.26) define
F1(k, e; γ
N , s, λ, ω) = Ω(e, γN , s, λ, ω)
1
1−α − k = 0 (4.39a)
F2(k, e; γ
N , s, λ, ω) = c ·
(
s
ζ
) 1
1−ψ
· k 1−α1−ψ − e = 0 (4.39b)
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where
Ω(e, γN , s, λ, ω) ≡ ϕ
φ
(1− τ)α(1− α)β (4.40)
c ≡
[
ωξψ
γA
α
] 1
1−ψ
(4.41)
and φ is as in (4.27a) and ϕ as in (4.27b).
1. For the case where τ = τ¯ , we can ignore that τ is related to γN and s by the steady
state version of (4.21). The general problem with two implicitly defined endogenous
variables can be written as[
∂k
∂X
∂e
∂X
]
= −
[
∂F1
∂k
∂F1
∂e
∂F2
∂k
∂F2
∂e
]−1 [
∂F1
∂X
∂F2
∂X
]
= −A−1
[
∂F1
∂X
∂F2
∂X
]
(4.42)
where X is any variable from the vector of exogenous variables {γN , s, ω,} and there-
fore [
∂k
∂X
∂e
∂X
]
= −|A|−1
[
∂F2
∂e
−∂F1
∂e
−∂F2
∂k
∂F1
∂k
][
∂F1
∂X
∂F2
∂X
]
(4.43)
and rearranging gives [
∂k
∂X
∂e
∂X
]
= −|A|−1
[
∂F2
∂e
∂F1
∂X
−∂F1
∂e
∂F2
∂X
−∂F2
∂k
∂F1
∂X
+∂F1
∂k
∂F2
∂X
]
(4.44)
Since τ = τ¯ , we get
∂F1
∂k
= −1 < 0 (4.45a)
∂F1
∂e
=
1
1− αΩ
1/(1−α)−1∂Ω
∂e
< 0 (4.45b)
∂F2
∂k
= c
(
s
ζ
) 1
1−ψ 1− α
1− ψk
1−α
1−ψ−1 > 0 (4.45c)
∂F2
∂e
= −1 < 0 (4.45d)
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whereby the sign in (4.45b) follows from ∂Ω
∂e
< 0. Consequently,
|A| = ∂F1
∂k
∂F2
∂e︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
− ∂F1
∂e
∂F2
∂k︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0. (4.46)
(a) To determine the effect of a changing population growth rate γN on k and e we
have to replace X by γN in equation (4.42) which gives
∂F1
∂γN
=
1
1− αΩ
1/(1−α)−1 ∂Ω
∂γN
< 0 (4.47a)
∂F2
∂γN
= 0, (4.47b)
whereby (4.47a) follows from ∂Ω
∂γN
< 0, cf. equations (4.40) and (4.27a). To get
an intuitive idea what is determining the sign, note that we can write
∂Ω
∂γN
=
∂ϕ/∂γNφ− ϕ∂φ/∂γN
φ2
= −ϕ∂φ/∂γ
N
φ2
< 0 (4.48)
since ϕ is independent of γN and φ is a positive function of γN , cf. equa-
tions (4.26a) and (4.27). Thus, γN has a direct effect on k but only an indirect
effect on e via changing relative prices (this is the reason why ∂F2/∂γ
N = 0).
Formally, we have
∂k
∂γN
= −|A|−1
∂F2∂e ∂F1∂γN︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
− ∂F1
∂e
∂F2
∂γN︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
 < 0 (4.49a)
∂e
∂γN
= −|A|−1
− ∂F2∂k ∂F1∂γN︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
∂F1
∂k
∂F2
∂γN︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
 < 0. (4.49b)
(b) To derive the analogous steps for differentiation of (4.39) with respect to s,
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replace the terms in (4.47) by
∂F1
∂s
=
1
1− αΩ
1/(1−α)−1∂Ω
∂s
≷ 0 (4.50a)
∂F2
∂s
= ck
1−α
1−ψ
∂ s
ζ
∂s
≥ 0. (4.50b)
giving
∂k
∂s
= −|A|−1
∂F2∂e ∂F1∂s︸ ︷︷ ︸
≷0
− ∂F1
∂e
∂F2
∂s︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
 ≷ 0 (4.51a)
∂e
∂s
= −|A|−1
− ∂F2∂k ∂F1∂s︸ ︷︷ ︸
≷0
+
∂F1
∂k
∂F2
∂s︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
 ≷ 0. (4.51b)
Intuitively, the ambiguity of ∂e
∂s
results from the fact that, holding k constant,
e is increasing in s as long as λ > 0 (direct effect), but the capital stock may
increase or decrease in s for given education e. As e increases in k monotonically,
the ambiguity of ∂k
∂s
translates into the ambiguity of ∂e
∂s
(indirect effect of s on
e).
Arguing formally, the ambiguity of ∂k
∂s
comes from
∂Ω
∂s
=
∂(ϕ/φ)
∂s
= α(1− α)β(1− τ)ϕ
′φ− ϕφ′
φ2
≷ 0 (4.52)
where φ′ = ∂φ/∂s and ϕ′ = ∂ϕ/∂s, cf. equation (4.26a). It can be shown that
ϕ′ > 0. Consequently, the sign of ∂φ
∂s
determines the sign of ∂F1
∂s
(and thus ∂Ω
∂s
)
and therefore the sign of equation (4.50a) is unambiguous only if ∂φ
∂s
< 0.
To see what determines the sign of φ′, observe from (4.27a) that s enters in
three places: (i) s pre-multiplies the term ω 1+g(e)
1−e , (ii) s decreases the effective
discount rate ρˆ, and (iii) s increases the annuity factor, ζ, as long as λ < 1.
Consequently, φ increases in s by effect (i) whereas it decreases in s by the
effects (ii) and (iii). We can therefore study an upper bound of φ′ by setting
λ = 1 so that effect (iii) is not at work.
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This helps clarifying the interaction at the cost of introducing a special case.
Using ρˆ = 1
βs
− 1 in (4.27a) and taking the derivative of the resulting equation
with respect to s, gives
∂φ
∂s
1
γA
= ωα
1 + g(e)
1− e −
γN
s2β
[
1− (1− α) (1− τ)
]
≷ 0,
which is ambiguous.11 The right part of this equation consists only of exogenous
variables. The left part involves the endogenous education decision e for which
no closed form solution is available. Thus, it is not possible to show analytically
that the derivative has an unambiguous sign. However, constructing a few
special cases clarifies under which conditions ∂φ
∂s
< 0 may hold.
• For ω → 0 the left part converges to zero (e also converges to zero) and
thus ∂φ
∂s
< 0.
• For ω = 1, which implies that τ = 0, we have
∂φ
∂s
1
γA
= α
(
1 + g(e)
1− e −
γN
s2β
)
≷ 0.
• For ξ → 0 or ψ → 0 we have that e→ 0 which means that
∂φ
∂s
1
γA
= ωα− γ
N
s2β
[
1− (1− α) (1− τ)
]
≷ 0.
Summarizing the arguments made so far, the sign of ∂φ
∂s
is negative (implying
that k is increasing in s) if
• returns to education are low (low ξ and/or ψ)
• the horizon over which the benefits can be reaped is short (low ω)
• the discount factor β is low (i.e. high discount rate)
11To see what happens for λ 6= 1 define µ ≡ ϕ/ξ and µ′ ≡ ∂µ/∂s. Then the corresponding term is
∂φ
∂s
1
γA
= ω
1 + ge(e)
1− e
(
α+ µ′
1− α
β
)
− γ
N
s2β
(α+ (1− α)µτ) + µ′ γ
N (1− α)τ
sβ
where it is obvious that the last two terms are negative (µ > 0 and µ′ < 0) but the sign of term in the
first bracket is ambiguous again. Thus, by setting λ = 1 (perfect annuity markets) which implies ϕζ = 1
we know that φ′|0≤λ<1 < φ′|λ=1 holds.
4.A. APPENDIX: PROOFS 113
• the population growth rate γN is high
• and the survival probability s is low.
(c) Changing the planning horizon ω gives
∂F1
∂ω
=
∂Ω
∂ω
< 0 (4.53a)
∂F2
∂ω
=
1
1− ψω
ψ
1−ψ
(
ξψ
γA
α
) 1
1−ψ
(
s
ζ
) 1
1−ψ
k
1−α
1−ψ > 0. (4.53b)
and therefore
∂k
∂ω
= −|A|−1
∂F2
∂e
∂F1
∂ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
− ∂F1
∂e
∂F2
∂ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
 < 0 (4.54a)
∂e
∂ω
= −|A|−1
− ∂F2
∂k
∂F1
∂ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
∂F1
∂k
∂F2
∂ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
 ≷ 0. (4.54b)
Some intuition why the sign of ∂e/∂ω is indeterminate can be gained by writing
out (4.54b) and inserting the derivatives from above which gives
∂e
∂ω
= |A|−1
(
s
ζ
) 1
1−ψ k
1−α
1−ψ
1− ψ
(
(1− α)∂Ω
∂ω
k−1 + ω−1
)
.
Hence, the ambiguity is caused by the negative effect of rising labor market par-
ticipation on the capital stock (∂Ω/∂ω < 0) and the positive counterbalancing
effect of more education (ω−1) due to a higher lifetime labor supply ω.
On the contrary, the reason why the sign of ∂k/∂ω can always be determined is
that the effect of ω on k and e work into the same direction. Writing out (4.54a)
and simplifying yields
∂k
∂ω
= |A|−1
(
∂Ω
∂ω
− 1
1− ψω
−1e
)
< 0
where ∂Ω/∂ω < 0 captures the direct effect of more labor and the second part
captures the additional effect of changing education.
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2. In case % = %¯, there is a direct (d) and an indirect effect in the partial derivatives of
Ω, ∂Ω
∂X
= ( ∂Ω
∂X
)d + ∂Ω
∂τ
∂τ
∂X
. Observe from (4.21) that
∂τ
∂s
=
γN ρ¯(1− ω)
(s(ρ¯(1− ω) + ω) + γN)2 > 0 (4.55)
∂τ
∂γN
= − sρ¯(1− ω)
(s(ρ¯(1− ω) + ω) + γN)2 < 0 (4.56)
∂τ
∂ω
= − sρ¯(s+ γ
N)
(s(ρ¯(1− ω) + ω) + γN)2 < 0 (4.57)
Therefore, for given γN , s, and ω, the strength of the indirect effect increases in %¯.
Note that changing the adjustment rule of the social security system affects only F1
because there is no direct effect of τ on the education decision in steady state. Due
to the additional indirect effect, it is not possible any more to determine the sign
of the derivatives. We can only say, whether the effects become smaller or larger,
compared to the τ = τ¯ case.
(a) The difference between the two social security scenarios if γN changes and τ
adjusts is given by
∂F1
∂γN
= Ω1/(1−α)−1αβ
(
∂ϕ/φ
∂γN
(1− τ)− ϕ
φ
∂τ
∂γN
)
(4.58)
with
∂φ
∂γN
= γA
(
α(2 + ρˆ) + ϕ
(1− α)
ζ
(1 + ρˆ)
(
τ + γN
∂τ
∂γN
))
> 0 (4.59)
where the difference to the τ = τ¯ scenario is only the term γN ∂τ
∂γN
. Using
equation (4.56) implies that
∂F1
∂γN
∣∣∣∣
ρ=ρ¯
>
∂F1
∂γN
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
(4.60)
which proves that
∂k
∂γN
∣∣∣∣
%=%¯
>
∂k
∂γN
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
and
∂e
∂γN
∣∣∣∣
%=%¯
>
∂e
∂γN
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
. (4.61)
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(b) To see how changes in the survival rate affect k and e with fixed replacement
rate we have to evaluate
∂F1
∂s
= Ω1/(1−α)−1βα
(
∂ϕ/φ
∂s
(1− τ)− ϕ
φ
∂τ
∂s
)
. (4.62)
The right part in the parentheses is obviously negative. To obtain the total
effect we have to evaluate ∂(ϕ/φ)
∂s
. Since ϕ does not vary with τ , there is no
indirect effect. Thus we again only have to evaluate the change in φ including
now the change in the contribution rate τ . Again differentiating (4.27a) with
respect to s gives
∂φ
∂s
1
γA
= ωα
1 + g(e)
1− e −
γN
s2β
[
1− (1− α) (1− τ)
]
+ (1− α)γ
N
sβ
∂τ
∂s
< 0
where we see that the derivative is identical to the case with τ = τ¯ except for
the last positive term. Using (4.52) and knowing that ∂φ/∂s evaluated with
the indirect effect is larger (smaller in absolute value) gives
∂ϕ/φ
∂s
∣∣∣∣
ρ=ρ¯
<
∂ϕ/φ
∂s
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
⇒ ∂F1
∂s
∣∣∣∣
ρ=ρ¯
<
∂F1
∂s
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
(4.63)
which implies that
∂k
∂s
∣∣∣∣
%=%¯
<
∂k
∂s
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
and
∂e
∂s
∣∣∣∣
%=%¯
<
∂e
∂s
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
. (4.64)
(c) Differences between the two social security scenarios if ω changes are given by
∂F1
∂ω
= Ω1/(1−α)−1βα
(
∂ϕ/φ
∂ω
(1− τ)− ϕ
φ
∂τ
∂ω
)
. (4.65)
Differentiating equation (4.27a) with respect to ω gives
∂φ
∂ω
= γA
(
ϕ
(1− α)
ζ
(1 + ρˆ)γN
∂τ
∂ω
+s
(
α(2 + ρˆ) + ϕ
1− α
ζ
(1 + ρˆ)
)
1 + g(e)
1− e
)
, (4.66)
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where the difference being only the adjusting contribution rate ∂τ
∂ω
. Using equa-
tion (4.57) it holds that
∂F1
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
ρ=ρ¯
>
∂F1
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
(4.67)
proving that
∂k
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
%=%¯
>
∂k
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
and
∂e
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
%=%¯
>
∂e
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
. (4.68)
Proof of proposition 4.5. The effect of the degree of annuitization (λ) on the capital stock
and education decision is given by
∂F1
∂λ
=
∂Ω
∂λ
> 0 (4.69a)
∂F2
∂λ
= c · s 11−ψ k 1−α1−ψ ∂ζ
−1
∂λ
< 0. (4.69b)
Replacing the terms in (4.47) by the ones from above gives
∂k
∂λ
= −|A|−1
∂F2
∂e
∂F1
∂λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
− ∂F1
∂e
∂F2
∂λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 > 0 (4.70a)
∂e
∂λ
= −|A|−1
− ∂F2
∂k
∂F1
∂λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
∂F1
∂k
∂F2
∂λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 ≷ 0 (4.70b)
Qualitatively, changing λ has the same effects in both social security scenarios because the
availability of annuity markets does not interact with the adjustment of contribution or
replacement rates.
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4.B Appendix: Numerical Results without Annuity
Markets
Table 4.3: Calibration parameters: No Annuity Markets
Firm sector ψ = 0.6 ψ = 0.3
Capital share, α 0.3 0.3
Technological progress, γA 1.81 1.81
Household sector
Discount factor, β 0.67 0.67
Average productivity of human capital investments, ξ 6.30 1.94
Coefficient in human capital production function, ψ 0.6 0.3
Fraction of the old working, ω 0.33 0.86
Social Security
Replacement rate, % 0.6 0.6
Demographics
Birth rate, γN 1.56 1.56
Survival rate, s 0.69 0.69
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Figure 4.5: Elasticity of e with respect to s: No Annuity Markets
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Figure 4.6: Elasticity of e with respect to ω: No Annuity Markets
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Chapter 5
Demographic Change, Human
Capital and Welfare
5.1 Introduction
As in all major industrialized countries the population of the United States is aging over
time. This process is driven by increasing life-expectancy and a decline in birth rates from
the peak levels of the baby boom. Consequently, the fraction of the population in working-
age will decrease and the fraction of people in old-age will increase. Figure 5.1 presents
two summary measures of these demographic changes: The working-age population ratio
is predicted to decrease from 84% in 2005 to 75% in 2050 and the old-age dependency ratio
increases from 19% in 2005 to 34% in 2050.
These projected changes in the population structure will have important macroeconomic
effects on the balance between physical capital and labor. Specifically, labor is expected to
be scarce, relative to physical capital, with an ensuing decline in real returns on physical
capital and increases in gross wages. As shown in this paper, a strong incentive to invest
in human capital emanates from the combined effects of increasing life expectancy and
changes in relative prices particularly if social security systems are reformed so that con-
tribution rates are held constant. In general equilibrium, such endogenous human capital
adjustments substantially mitigate the effects of demographic change on macroeconomic
aggregates and individual welfare. The key contribution of our paper is to show that the
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Figure 5.1: Working age and old-age dependency ratio
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Notes: Working age population ratio (WAPR, left scale): ratio of population of age 16− 64 to
total adult population of age 16− 90. Old-age dependency ratio (OADR, right scale): ratio of
population of age 65− 90 to working age population.
Source: Own calculations based on Human Mortality Database (2008).
human capital adjustment mechanism is quantitatively important.
We add endogenous human capital accumulation to an otherwise standard large-scale OLG
model in the spirit of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). The central part of our analysis
is then to work out the differences between our model with endogenous human capital
adjustments and endogenous labor supply and the “standard” models in the literature
with a fixed (exogenous) productivity profile.
We find that as a consequence of demographic change the decrease of the return to physical
capital in our model with endogenous human capital is only one third of the decrease in
the standard model. Welfare consequences from increasing wages and declines in rates of
return can be substantial. Newborns in 2005 experience welfare gains in the order of up
to 0.8% of lifetime consumption when contribution rates to the pension system are held
constant and welfare losses worth −3% of lifetime consumption when the generosity of the
pension system is maintained. In contrast, asset-rich households currently alive lose from
the decline in rates of return and these losses can be large depending on the future evolution
of the pension system. But importantly, these losses are about 50− 70% higher when the
human capital adjustment mechanism is shut down. Ignoring this adjustment channel thus
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leads to quantitatively important biases of the welfare assessment of demographic change.
Our work relates to a vast number of papers that have analyzed the economic consequences
of population aging and possible adjustment mechanisms. Important examples in closed
economies with a focus on social security adjustments include Huang, Imrohoroglu, and
Sargent (1997), De Nardi, Imrohoroglu, and Sargent (1999) and, with respect to migration,
Storesletten (2000). In open economies, Bo¨sch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2006), Attana-
sio, Kitao, and Violante (2007) and Kru¨ger and Ludwig (2007), among others, investigate
the role of international capital flows during the demographic transition. We add to this
literature by highlighting an additional mechanism through which households can respond
to demographic change.
Our paper is closely related to the theoretical work on longevity, human capital, taxation
and growth1 and to Fouge`re and Me´rette (1999) and Sadahiro and Shimasawa (2002) who
also investigate demographic change in large-scale OLG models with individual human
capital decisions. In contrast to their work, we focus our analysis on the relative price
changes during the demographic transition and therefore consider an exogenous growth
specification.2 We also extend their analysis along various dimensions. We use realistic de-
mographic projections instead of stylized scenarios. More importantly, our model contains
a labor supply-human capital formation-leisure trade-off. It can thus capture effects from
changes in individual labor supply, i.e., human capital utilization, on the return of human
capital investments. As has already been stressed by Becker (1967) and Ben-Porath (1967)
it is important to model human capital and labor supply decisions jointly in a life-cycle
framework. Along this line, a key feature of our quantitative investigation, is to employ
a Ben-Porath (1967) human capital model and calibrate it to replicate realistic life-cycle
wage profiles.3 Furthermore, we put particular emphasis on the welfare consequences of
1See for example de la Croix and Licandro (1999), Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Licandro (2002),
Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil (2000) Echevarria and Iza (2006), Heijdra and Romp (2007) and Ludwig
and Vogel (2009). Our paper is also related to a literature emphasizing the role of endogenous human
capital accumulation for the analysis of changes to the tax or social security system as in Lord (1989),
Trostel (1993), Perroni (1995), Dupor, Lochner, Taber, and Wittekind (1996) and Lau and Poutvaara
(2006), among others.
2Whether the trend growth rate endogenously fluctuates during the demographic transition or is held
constant is of minor importance for the questions we are interested in. This is shown in our earlier
unpublished working paper. Results are available upon request.
3The Ben-Porath (1967) model of human capital accumulation is one of the workhorses in labor eco-
nomics used to understand such issues as educational attainment, on-the-job training, and wage growth
over the life cycle, among others, see Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) for a review. More re-
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population aging for households living through the demographic transition.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 5.2 we present the formal structure of our
quantitative model. Section 5.3 describes the calibration strategy and our computational
solution method. Our results are presented in section 5.4. Finally, section 5.5 concludes the
paper. Additional results, a description of our demographic model, and technical details
can be found in appendices 5.B and 5.A.
5.2 The Model
We employ a large scale OLG model a` la Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) with endogenous
labor supply and endogenous human capital formation. The population structure is ex-
ogenously determined by time varying demographic processes for fertility and mortality,
the main driving forces of our model.4 Firms produce with a standard constant returns
to scale production function in a perfectly competitive environment. We assume that the
U.S. is a closed economy.5 Agents contribute a share of their wage to the pension system
and retirees receive a share of current net wages as pensions. Technological progress is
exogenous.
5.2.1 Timing, Demographics and Notation
Time is discrete and one period corresponds to one calendar year t. Each year, a new
generation is born. Birth in this paper refers to the first time households make own
decisions and is set to real life age of 16 (model age j = 0). Agents retire at an exogenously
given age of 65 (model age jr = 49). Agents live at most until age 90 (model age j = J =
74). At a given point in time t, individuals of age j survive to age j + 1 with probability
cently, extended versions of the model have been applied to study the significant changes to the U.S. wage
distribution and inequality observed since the early 1970s by Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) and
Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009).
4Wemodel neither endogenous life-expectancy or fertility, nor endogenous migration and assume that all
exogenous migration is completed before agents start making economically relevant decisions (cf. appendix
5.A).
5For our question, the closed economy assumption is a valid approximation. As documented in Kru¨ger
and Ludwig (2007), demographically induced changes in the return to physical capital and wages from
the U.S. perspective do not differ much between small and open economy scenarios. The reason is that
demographic processes are correlated across countries and, in terms of speed of the aging processes, the
U.S. is somewhere in the middle when looking at all OECD countries.
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ϕt,j, where ϕt,J = 0. The number of agents of age j at time t is denoted by Nt,j and
Nt =
∑J
j=0Nt,j is total population in t.
5.2.2 Households
Each household comprises of one representative agent who decides about consumption and
saving, labor supply and human capital investment. The household maximizes lifetime
utility at the beginning of economic life (j = 0) in period t,
max
J∑
j=0
βjpit,j
1
1− σ{c
φ
t+j,j(1− `t+j,j − et+j,j)1−φ}1−σ, σ > 0, (5.1)
where the per period utility function is a function of individual consumption c, labor supply
` and time investment into formation of human capital, e. The agent is endowed with one
unit of time, so 1− l − e is leisure time. β is the pure time discount factor, φ determines
the weight of consumption in utility and σ is the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of
substitution with respect to the Cobb-Douglas aggregate of consumption and leisure time.
pit,j denotes the (unconditional) probability to survive until age j, pit,j =
∏j−1
i=0 ϕt+i,i, for
j > 0 and pit,0 = 1.
Agents earn labor income (pension income when retired) as well as interest payments on
their savings and receive accidental bequests. When working they pay a fraction τt from
their gross wages to the social security system. The net wage income in period t of an agent
of age j is given by wnt,j = `t,jht,jwt(1−τt), where wt is the (gross) wage per unit of supplied
human capital at time t. There are no annuity markets and households leave accidental
bequests. These are collected by the government and redistributed in a lump-sum fashion
to all households. Accordingly, the dynamic budget constraint is given by
at+1,j+1 =
(at,j + trt)(1 + rt) + wnt,j − ct,j if j < jr(at,j + trt)(1 + rt) + pt,j − ct,j if j ≥ jr, (5.2)
where at,j denotes assets, trt are transfers from accidental bequests, rt is the real interest
rate, the rate of return to physical capital, and pt,j is pension income. Initial household
assets are zero (at,0 = 0) and the transversality condition is at,J+1 = 0.
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5.2.3 Formation of Human Capital
The key element of our model is endogenous formation of human capital. Households enter
economic life with a predetermined and cohort invariant level of human capital ht,0 = h0.
Afterwards, they can invest a fraction of their time into acquiring additional human capital.
We adopt a version of the Ben-Porath (1967) human capital technology6 given by
ht+1,j+1 = ht,j(1− δh) + ξ(ht,jet,j)ψ ψ ∈ (0, 1), ξ > 0, δh ≥ 0, (5.3)
where ξ is a scaling factor, the average learning ability, ψ determines the curvature of the
human capital technology, δh is the depreciation rate of human capital and et,j is time
investment into human capital formation.
The costs of investing into human capital in this model are only the opportunity costs
of foregone wage income and leisure. We understand the process of accumulating human
capital as a mixture of knowledge acquired by formal schooling and on the job training
programs after schooling. Human capital can be accumulated until retirement age but
agents’ optimally chosen time investment converges to zero some time before retirement.
5.2.4 The Pension System
The pension system is a simple balanced budget pay-as-you-go system. Workers contribute
a fraction τt of their gross wages and pensioners receive a fraction ρt of the current average
net wages of workers.7 The level of pensions in each period is then given by pt,j = ρt(1−
τt)wth¯t, where h¯t =
Pjr−1
j=0 `t,jht,jNt,jPjr−1
j=0 `t,jNt,j
denotes average human capital of workers. Using the
formula for pt,j, the budget constraint of the pension system
8 simplifies to
τt
jr−1∑
j=0
`t,jNt,j = ρt(1− τt)
J∑
j=jr
Nt,j ∀t. (5.4)
6This functional form is widely used in the human capital literature, cf. Browning, Hansen, and
Heckman (1999) for a review.
7In the U.S. system, pension benefits are linked to individual monthly earnings which are indexed and
averaged over the life-cycle Diamond and Gruber (1999). The replacement rate, however, is a decreasing
function of monthly earnings so that the earnings related linkage is incomplete. By ignoring this earnings
related linkage, we somewhat overstate the distortion of the labor-human capital formation-leisure decision
induced by the pension system.
8The budget constraint is given by τtwt
∑jr−1
j=0 `t,jht,jNt,j =
∑J
j=jr pt,jNt,j ∀t.
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Below, we consider two polar scenarios of parametric adjustment of the pension system
to demographic change. In our first scenario (“const. τ”), we hold the contribution rate
constant, τt = τ¯ , and endogenously adjust the replacement rate to balance the budget of
the pension system. In the other extreme scenario (“const. ρ”), we hold the replacement
rate constant, ρt = ρ¯, and endogenously adjust the contribution rate.
5.2.5 Firms and Equilibrium
Firms operate in a perfectly competitive environment and produce one homogenous good
according to the Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = K
α
t (AtLt)
1−α, (5.5)
where α denotes the share of capital used in production. Kt, Lt and At are the stocks of
physical capital, effective labor and the level of technology, respectively. Output can be
either consumed or used as an investment good. We assume that labor inputs and human
capital of different agents are perfect substitutes and effective labor input Lt is accordingly
given by Lt =
∑jr−1
j=0 `t,jht,jNt,j. Factors of production are paid their marginal products,
i.e. wt = (1−α) YtLt and rt = α YtKt − δt, where wt is the gross wage per unit of efficient labor,
rt is the interest rate and δt denotes the depreciation rate of physical capital. Total factor
productivity, At, is growing at the exogenous rate of g
A
t : At+1 = At(1 + g
A
t ).
The definition of equilibrium is standard and relegated to appendix 5.A.
5.2.6 Thought Experiments
We take as exogenous driving process a time-varying demographic structure. Computations
start in year 1850 (t = 0) assuming an artificial initial steady state. We then compute the
model equilibrium from 1850 to 2400 (t = T = 551) – when the new steady state is assumed
and verified to be reached9 – and report simulation results for the main projection period
of interest, from 2005 (t = 156) to 2050 (t = 206). We use data during our calibration
period, 1960 − 2005 (from t0 = 111 to t1 = 156), to determine several structural model
parameters (cf. section 5.3).
9In fact, changes in variables which are constant in steady state are numerically irrelevant already
around the year 2300.
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Our main interest is to compare the time paths of aggregate variables and welfare across two
model variants for two social security scenarios. Our first model variant is one in which
households adjust their human capital and our second variant is one in which human
capital is held constant across cohorts. Therefore, our strategy is to first solve for the
transitional dynamics using the model as described above. Next, we use the endogenously
obtained profile of time investment into human capital formation to compute an average
time investment and associated human capital profile which is then fed into our alternative
model in which agents are restricted with respect to their time investment choice. We do
so separately for the two polar social security scenarios described in subsection 5.2.4. The
average time investment is computed as e¯j =
1
t1−t0+1
∑t1
t=t0
et,j for our calibration period
(t0 = 111 and t1 = 156). In the alternative model, we then add the constraint et,j = e¯j.
The human capital profile is then obtained from (5.3) by iterating forward on age.10
5.3 Calibration and Computation
To calibrate the model, we choose model parameters such that simulated moments match
selected moments in NIPA data and the endogenous wage profiles match the empirically
observed wage profile in the U.S. during the calibration period 1960 − 2005.11 The cali-
brated parameters are summarized in table 5.1 below.
5.3.1 Demographics
Actual population data from 1950 − 2005 are taken from the Human Mortality Database
(2008). Our demographic projections beyond 2004 are based on a population model that
10By imposing the restriction of identical time investment profiles for all cohorts (instead of, e.g., impos-
ing the restriction only on cohorts born after 2005) we shut down direct effects from changing mortality on
human capital and indirect anticipation effects of changing returns. This alternative model is a “standard”
model of endogenous labor supply and an exogenously given age-specific productivity profile – as used in
numerous studies on the consequences of demographic change – with the only exception being that the
time endowment is age-specific. By setting time endowment to 1− e¯j rather than 1 we avoid re-calibration
across model variants, further see below.
11We perform this moment matching in the endogenous human capital model and the constant con-
tribution rate scenario. We do not re-calibrate model parameters across social security scenarios or for
the alternative human capital model because simulated moments do not differ much. Furthermore, we
are interested in how our welfare conclusions are affected by imposing various constraints on the model –
either through our social security scenarios or by restricting human capital formation – and any parametric
change in this comparison would confound our welfare analysis.
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is described in detail in appendix 5.A.12
5.3.2 Household Behavior
The parameter σ, the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, is set to 2.
The time discount factor β is calibrated to match the empirically observed capital-output
ratio of 2.8 which requires β = 0.988. The weight of consumption in the utility function, φ,
is calibrated such that households spend one third of their time working on average which
requires φ = 0.411.
5.3.3 Individual Productivity Profiles
We choose values for the parameters of the human capital production function such that
average simulated wage profiles resulting from endogenous human capital formation repli-
cate empirically observed wage profiles. Data for age specific productivity are taken from
Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2007)13. We first normalize h0 = 1, and then determine the
values of the structural parameters {ξ, ψ, δh} by indirect inference methods (Smith (1993);
Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993)). To this end we run separate regressions of the
data and simulated wage profiles on a 3rd-order polynomial in age given by
logwj = η0 + η1j + η2j
2 + η3j
3 + ²j. (5.6)
Here, wj is the age specific productivity. Denote the coefficient vector determining the
slope of the polynomial estimated from the actual wage data by −→η = [η1, η2, η3]′ and
the one estimated from the simulated average human capital profile of cohorts born in
1960− 2004 by −→ˆη = [ηˆ1, ηˆ2, ηˆ3]′. The latter coefficient vector is a function of the structural
model parameters {ξ, ψ, δh}. Finally, the values of our structural model parameters are
determined by minimizing the distance ‖−→η −−→ˆη ‖, see subsection 5.3.6 for further details.
12The key assumptions of this model are as follows: First, the total fertility rate is constant at 2005
levels of 2.0185 until 2100 when fertility is adjusted slightly such as to keep the number of newborns
constant for the remainder of the simulation period. Second, life expectancy monotonically increases from
a current (2004) average life expectancy at birth of 77.06 years to 88.42 years in 2100 when it is held
constant. Third, total migration is constant at the average migration for 1950− 2005 for the remainder of
the simulation period. These assumptions imply that a stationary population is reached in about 2200.
13We thank Mark Huggett for sending us the data.
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Figure 5.2 presents the empirically observed productivity profile and the estimated polyno-
mials. Our coefficients14 and the shape of the wage profile are in line with others reported
in the literature, especially with those obtained by Hansen (1993) and Altig, Auerbach,
Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (2001). The estimate of δh = 0.011 is reasonable (Arra-
zola and de Hevia (2004), Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999)), and the estimate of
ψ = 0.67 is just in the middle of the range reported in Browning, Hansen, and Heckman
(1999).15
Figure 5.2: Wage Profiles
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Notes: Observed profile: average life-cycle wage profiles taken from Huggett, Ventura, and
Yaron (2007). Polynomials: predicted wage profile based on estimated polynomial coefficients
of (5.6). Both profiles were normalized by their respective means.
5.3.4 Production
We calibrate the capital share in production, α, to match the income share of labor in the
data which requires α = 0.33. The average growth rate of total factor productivity, g¯A, is
14The coefficient estimates from the data are η0: -1.6262, η1: 0.1054, η2: -0.0017 and η3: 7.83e-06. We
do not display the calibrated profiles in figure 5.2 because they perfectly track the polynomial obtained
from the data.
15In a sensitivity analysis we have shown that the estimate of the average time investment productivity,
ξ = 0.16, depends on the predetermined value of h0, whereas the other parameters are rather insensitive
to this choice. We have also found that parameterizations with a different value for h0 yield the same
results for the effects of demographic change on aggregate variables and welfare.
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calibrated to match the growth rate of the Solow residual in the data. Accordingly, g¯A =
0.018. Finally, we calibrate δ¯ (and thereby scale the exogenous time path of depreciation,
δt) such that our simulated data match an average investment output ratio of 20% which
requires δ¯ = 0.039.
5.3.5 The Pension System
In our first social security scenario (“const. τ”) we fix contribution rates and adjust
replacement rates of the pension system. We calculate contribution rates from NIPA data
for 1960−2004 and freeze the contribution rate at the year 2004 level for all following years.
When simulating the alternative social security scenario with constant replacement rates
(“const. ρ”) we feed the equilibrium replacement rate obtained in the “const. τ” scenario
into the model and hold it constant at the 2004 level for all the remaining years. Then, the
contribution rate endogenously adjusts to balance the budget of the social security system.
5.3.6 Computational Method
For a given set of structural model parameters, solution of the model is by outer and
inner loop iterations. On the aggregate level (outer loop), the model is solved by guessing
initial time paths of four variables: the capital intensity, the ratio of bequests to wages,
the replacement rate (or contribution rate) of the pension system and the average human
capital stock for all periods from t = 0 until T . On the individual level (inner loop), we start
each iteration by guessing the terminal values for consumption and human capital. Then
we proceed by backward induction and iterate over these terminal values until convergence
of the inner loop iterations.16 In each outer loop, disaggregated variables are aggregated
each period. We then update aggregate variables until convergence using the Gauss-Seidel-
Quasi-Newton algorithm suggested in Ludwig (2007).
To calibrate the model in the “const. τ” scenario, we consider additional “outer outer”
loops to determine structural model parameters by minimizing the distance between the
simulated average values and their respective calibration targets for the calibration period
16As described in appendix 5.B, we implement a check for uniqueness of the solution at each age when
computing optimal human capital decisions.
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1960 − 2004. To summarize the description above, parameter values determined in this
way are β, φ, δ, ξ, ψ and δh.
Table 5.1: Model Parameters
Preferences σ Inverse of Inter-Temporal Elasticity of Substitution 2.00
β Pure Time Discount Factor 0.988
φ Weight of Consumption 0.411
Human Capital ξ Scaling Factor 0.16
ψ Curvature Parameter 0.67
δh Depreciation Rate of Human Capital 1.1%
h0 Initial Human Capital Endowment 1.00
Production α Share of Physical Capital in Production 0.33
δ¯ Depreciation Rate of Physical Capital 3.9%
g¯A Exogenous Growth Rate 1.8%
5.4 Results
Before using our model to investigate the effects of future demographic change, we show
how well it can replicate observed aggregate variables and individual life-cycle profiles in
the past. Next, we turn to the analysis of the transitional dynamics for the period 2005 to
2050 whereby we focus especially on the developments of major macroeconomic variables
and the welfare effects of demographic change.
5.4.1 Backfitting
In order to backfit our model we do the following. First, we estimate series of TFP and
actual depreciation using NIPA data. We HP filter these data series and then feed them
into the model for the period 1950 to 2005. Thereafter, both parameters, g and δ are held
constant at their respective means, see table 5.1. A key variable that determines paths
of the rate of return to physical capital and wages is the capital output ratio. Figure 5.3
shows actual and fitted values for the period 1960-2005. Evidently, the fit of our model
is quite remarkable along this key dimension of the data. Our model tracks the observed
long-run swings in the data. The predicted amplitudes are slightly bigger in the model
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than they are in the data.
Figure 5.3: Capital Output Ratio
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Notes: Capital-output ratio in the model and in aggregate data. The data is HP filtered.
Data Source: National income and product accounts (NIPA).
Turning to the individual level, we recognize that our model fails to replicate the empirically
observed life-cycle consumption profile, cf. figure 5.4(a). The increase of consumption
over the life cycle is too steep and the peak is too late compared to the data. Since in
a model without idiosyncratic risk the decrease of consumption after the peak is solely
caused by falling survival rates, we cannot expect to match this dimension of the data (cf.
Hansen and Imrohorog˘lu (2008), Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Kru¨ger (2007)). As shown in
Ludwig, Kru¨ger, and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2007), omitting idiosyncratic risk has only a negligible
effect on welfare calculations. This is because welfare calculations are based on differences
in consumption profiles and the exact shape of the consumption profile is therefore less
important.
We next look at asset profiles. Figure 5.4(b) shows household net worth data from the
Survey of Consumer Finances for a cross-section in 1995 obtained from Bucks, Kennickell,
and Moore (2006) and the corresponding cross-sectional asset profile in the model. Our
model matches the broad pattern in the data. Observed discrepancies are threefold: First,
as borrowing constraints are absent from our model, initial assets are negative whereas
they are positive in the data. Second, the run-up of wealth until retirement age is stronger
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Figure 5.4: Life-Cycle and Cross-Sectional Profiles
(a) Consumption
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(b) Assets
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(c) Labor Supply
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(d) Wages
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Notes: Model and data profiles for consumption, assets, labor supply and wages. The model
consumption profile is the life-cycle consumption profile for the cohort born in 1960. The other
profiles are cross-sectional profiles in 1990 and 1995. Consumption, asset and wage profiles are
normalized by their respective mean. Hours data is normalized by 76 total hours per week.
Data Sources: Based on consumption profile estimated by Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Kru¨ger
(2007), SCF net worth data obtained from Bucks, Kennickell, and Moore (2006), hours worked
data from McGrattan and Rogerson (2004) and PSID wage data.
in our model than it is in the data. Third, decumulation of assets is stronger as well. This
last fact is due to the fact that our model neither has health risks as in De Nardi, French,
and Jones (2009) nor explicit bequest motives.
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Our model does a good job in matching the cross-sectional hours profile observed in 1990
Census data taken from McGrattan and Rogerson (2004), see figure 5.4(c).17 We relegate
a discussion of Frisch labor supply elasticities to appendix 5.A.
Figure 5.4(d) shows the cross-sectional wage profile observed in PSID data in 1990.18
Although our model matches the broad pattern observed in the data, the fit is much better
in 1970 and 1980, cf. appendix 5.A.19
5.4.2 Transitional Dynamics
We divide our analysis of the transitional dynamics into two parts. First, we analyze the
behavior of several important aggregate variables from 2005 to 2050. Second, we investigate
the welfare consequences of demographic change for generations already alive in 2005 and
for households born in the future. Throughout, we demonstrate how the design of the
social security system affects our results.
Aggregate Variables
The evolution of the policy variables in the two social security scenarios are presented in
figure 5.5.20 In the “const. τ” scenario pensions become less generous over time represented
by a decrease in the replacement rate from around 24% in 2005 to 14% in 2050. In contrast,
in the “const. ρ” scenario the generosity of the pension system remains at the 2005 level
implying that contribution rates have to increase from around 12% in 2005 to 19% in 2050.
Figure 5.6 reports the dynamics of four major macroeconomic variables for the two model
variants – with endogenous and exogenous human capital – in the “const. τ” social security
scenario and figure 5.7 does so in the “const. ρ” scenario.
In figures 5.6(a) and 5.7(a) we show the evolution of the rate of return to physical capital
17The hours data is normalized with total hours per week equal to 76. This might appear to be a low
number for total available hours. But such a magnitude is needed to make the McGrattan and Rogerson
(2004) hours data broadly consistent with the common belief that agents spend about one third of their
time working and standard practice of macroeconomists to calibrate their models (which we have followed).
18In order to smooth the data we show a centered average of five subsequent PSID samples.
19Part of this is due to the fortunate cohorts born after the war (see Ehrlich (2007) for a discussion).
20Figure drawn for the endogenous human capital model. The policy variables in the exogenous human
capital model are similar.
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Figure 5.5: Evolution of Policy Variables
(a) Contribution Rate
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(b) Replacement Rate
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Notes: Pension system contribution and replacement rate for the two social security scenarios.
“const. τ”: constant contribution rate scenario. “const. ρ”: constant replcement rate scenario.
for the different models.21 In the “standard” models with endogenous labor supply only,
the rate of return decreases from an initial level of around 8% in 2005 to 7.1% in the
“const. τ” scenario and to 7.5% in the “const. ρ” scenario in 2050.22 This magnitude
is in line with results reported elsewhere in the literature, cf., e.g., Bo¨sch-Supan, Ludwig,
and Winter (2006) and Kru¨ger and Ludwig (2007) whereas Attanasio, Kitao, and Violante
(2007) find slightly bigger effects. On the contrary, in the two models with endogenous
human capital adjustment, the rate of return is expected to fall by only 0.3 (0.1) percentage
points in the “const. τ” (“const. ρ”) scenario. This difference in the decrease of the rate
of return between the exogenous and the endogenous human capital models is large, at a
factor of about 3 (4.5).
In figure 5.6(b) and 5.7(b) we depict the evolution of average hours worked by all working
age individuals. Average hours worked increase both for the endogenous and exogenous
human capital models. Observe that there are level differences between the two model
21There are two reasons for the small level differences in 2005 across the various scenarios. First, our
calibration targets are averages for the period 1960 − 2004. Second, as already discussed in section 5.3,
we do not recalibrate across scenarios. Such level differences in initial values can be observed in all of the
following figures.
22The high initial level of the rate of return is caused by the baby boom in the past which increases the
labor force and hence decreases capital intensity.
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Figure 5.6: Aggregate Variables for Constant Contribution Rate Scenario
(a) Rate of Return to Physical Capital
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(c) Average Human Capital
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(d) Growth of GDP per Capita in %
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Notes: Rate of return to physical capital, average hours worked of the working age population,
average human capital per working hour and growth of GDP per capita in the constant contri-
bution rate social security scenario for two model variants. “endog. h.c.”: endogenous human
capital model. “exog. h.c.”: exogenous human capital model.
variants. This is mainly caused by differences in time investment into human capital
formation.
Figures 5.6(c) and 5.7(c) show that time investment into human capital formation increases
when agents are allowed to adjust their human capital. Specifically, with endogenous
human capital in the “const. τ” (“const. ρ”) scenario average human capital per working
hour increases by around 15% (10%) until 2050.
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Figure 5.7: Aggregate Variables for Constant Replacement Rate Scenario
(a) Rate of Return to Physical Capital
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(c) Average Human Capital
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(d) Growth of GDP per Capita in %
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Notes: Rate of return to physical capital, average hours worked of the working age population,
average human capital per working hour and growth of GDP per capita in the constant replace-
ment rate social security scenario for two model variants. “endog. h.c.”: endogenous human
capital model. “exog. h.c.”: exogenous human capital model.
Finally, we focus on the evolution of the growth rate of GDP per capita as shown in
figures 5.6(d) and 5.7(d). When the U.S. aging process peaks in 2025 (cf. figure 5.1), the
growth rate of per capita GDP falls in all scenarios to its lowest level. The drop is least
pronounced for the endogenous human capital model with a fixed contribution rate. There,
the growth rate gradually declines from 2.2% in 2005 to 1.9% in 2025.23 Comparing the
23The high initial growth rate is a consequence of the past baby boom, cf. footnote 22.
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two “const. τ” scenarios, it can be seen that not adjusting the human capital profile entails
a big drop in the growth rate. The maximum difference in about 2025 is 0.5 percentage
points. Although the difference across human capital models is only 0.3 percentage points
in case the replacement rate is held constant (“const. ρ” scenarios), the same conclusion
applies. The ageing process induces relative price changes so that agents increase their
time investment into human capital formation and thereby cushion the negative effects of
demographic change on growth.24
Welfare Effects
In our model, a household’s welfare is affected by two consequences of demographic change.
First, her lifetime utility changes because her own survival probabilities increase. Second,
households face a path of declining interest rates, increasing gross wages and decreasing
replacement rates (increasing contribution rates), relative to the situation without a de-
mographic transition.
We want to isolate the welfare consequences of the second effect. To this end, we com-
pare for an agent born at time t and of current age j her lifetime utility when she faces
equilibrium factor prices, transfers and contribution (replacement) rates as documented in
the previous section, with her lifetime utility when she instead faces prices, transfers and
contribution (replacement) rates that are held constant at their 2005 value. For both of
these scenarios we fix the households’ individual survival probabilities at their 2005 val-
ues.25 Following Attanasio, Kitao, and Violante (2007) and Kru¨ger and Ludwig (2007),
we then compute the consumption equivalent variation gt,j, i.e. the percentage increase in
consumption that needs to be given to an agent with characteristics t, j at each date in
her remaining lifetime at fixed prices to make her as well off as under the situation with
changing prices.26 Positive numbers of gt,j thus indicate that households obtain welfare
24In appendix 5.A we show that the cumulative effect of these growth rate differences between the
endogenous and exogenous human capital model on the level of GDP per capita are large. With human
capital adjustments the detrended level of GDP per capita will increase by around 15% (10%) more until
2050 in the “const. τ” (“const. ρ”) scenario than without these adjustments.
25Of course, they fully retain their age-dependency. We show in appendix 5.A that varying the survival
probabilities according to the underlying demographic projections leaves our conclusions on welfare in the
comparison across the two models essentially unchanged.
26With our assumptions on preferences, gt,j can be calculated as gt,j =
(
V¯t,j
V¯ 2005j
) 1
φ(1−σ) − 1, where V¯t,j
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gains from the general equilibrium effects of demographic change, negative numbers are
welfare losses.
Welfare of Generations Alive in 2005
Of particular interest is how the welfare of all generations already alive in 2005 will be
affected by demographic change. This analysis allows for an inter-generational welfare
comparison of the consequences of demographic change in terms of wellbeing that is not
possible using aggregated figures such as per capita GDP. Newborns and young generations
benefit from increasing wages as well as decreasing returns if they borrow to finance their
human capital formation. However, older – and thus asset-rich – generations are expected
to lose lifetime utility: First, they benefit less from increasing wages because they do not
significantly adjust their human capital and because their remaining working period is
short, second, falling returns diminish their capital income and, third, retirement income
decreases in our scenario with constant contribution rates.
Results, shown in figure 5.8, can be summarized as follows: First, newborn agents experi-
ence welfare gains in the “const. τ” scenarios of roughly 1% of life-time consumption and
welfare losses of roughly 3% in the “const. ρ” scenarios. As explained appendix 5.A, the
fact that these gains (and losses) are almost identical in the two human capital models
is due to a complex interaction between the value of human capital adjustments which
is positive and differential general equilibrium effects which partially offset this. Second,
middle-aged agents incur the highest losses in the “const. τ” scenarios: the maximum
loss of agents is much larger compared to a scenario with fixed replacement rates. Clearly,
constant replacement rates decrease net wages of the young but keep pensions more gen-
erous. This decreases lifetime utility of the young but narrows the loss of utility of the
old (compared to a situation with falling replacement rates). The redistribution through
the pension system shifts the balance somewhat in favor of the old. This also explains
why the maximum of the losses occurs at a much higher age in the “const. τ” scenario in
which agents close to retirement lose interest income and receive lower pensions. Third,
independent of future pension policy, agents lose relatively less in the endogenous human
capital model. Younger agents can adjust their human capital in response to higher wages
denotes lifetime utility at changing prices and V¯ 2005j at fixed 2005 prices.
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whereas older (asset-rich) households benefit from a smaller drop in the interest rate (cf.
figures 5.6(a) and 5.7(a)) and higher pension payments.27
Figure 5.8: Consumption Equivalent Variation of Agents alive in 2005
(a) Constant Contribution Rate Scenario
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(b) Constant Replacement Rate Scenario
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Notes: Consumption equivalent variation (CEV) in the two social security scenarios.
Table 5.2 finally provides numbers on the maximum welfare loss displayed in figure 5.8 as
a summary statistic. It is important to emphasize that, in the exogenous human capital
model, the maximum loss is about 3.7 (2.1) percentage points or 55% (71%) higher in
the “const. τ” (“const. ρ”) scenario than in the endogenous human capital model. This
exemplifies that ignoring the adjustment channel through human capital formation leads
to quantitatively important biases of the welfare assessments of demographic change.
Table 5.2: Maximum Utility Loss for Generations alive in 2005
Human Capital
Endogenous Exogenous
Const. τ (τt = τ¯) -6.8% -10.5%
Const. ρ (ρt = ρ¯) -3.1% -5.2%
27In appendix 5.A, we decompose the welfare differences between the two models into effects stemming
from differential changes in factor prices and the relative rise in social security benefits which is caused by
additional human capital formation.
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Welfare of Future Generations
We next look at the welfare consequences for all future newborns. Due to increasing
wages, agents born into a “const τ”-world with endogenous human capital experience
gains of lifetime utility throughout the entire projection window. Agents with exogenous
human capital born after 2035 incur utility losses of up to 1% of lifetime consumption.
However, welfare losses for future generations can be quite large despite the human capital
channel if the social security system is not reformed (“const ρ”). Despite of human capital
adjustments, they are at about −7% of lifetime consumption for cohorts born around and
after 2030 (−8% for exogenous human capital).28
5.5 Conclusion
This paper finds that increased investments in human capital may substantially mitigate
the macroeconomic impact of demographic change with profound implications for individ-
ual welfare. As labor will be relatively scarce and capital will be relatively abundant in an
aging society, interest rates will fall. As we emphasize, these effects will be much smaller
once we account for changes in human capital formation. For the U.S., our simulations
predict that if contribution rates (replacement rates) are kept constant then the rate of
return will fall by only 0.4 (0.7) percentage points until 2025 with endogenous human cap-
ital, compared to 1.1 (1.1) percentage points in the standard model with a fixed human
capital profile.
We also document that the welfare consequences from the increase in wages and declines
in rates of return can be substantial, in the order of up to 0.8% (-3%) with constant
contribution (replacement) rates in lifetime consumption for newborns in 2005. Thus,
welfare gains for newborns only come along if social security contribution rates are held
constant at current levels. Households that have already accumulated assets, on the other
hand, lose from the decline in rates of return. Importantly, we find that our model with
exogenous human capital overstates these losses by 50− 70%.
However we have operated in a frictionless environment where all endogenous human cap-
ital adjustments are driven by relative price changes. If instead human capital formation
28See graphs in appendix 5.A for more details.
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is characterized by substantial market failures then these automatic adjustments will be
inhibited. In this case appropriate education and training policies in aging societies are an
important topic for future research and the policy agenda.
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5.A Appendix: General Remarks
This appendix contains additional that could is not included in the main text due to
space limitations. The appendix is organized as follows. Section 5.A.1 contains the formal
equilibrium definition, sections 5.A.2 to 5.A.5 provide more results on the fit of our model
to observed life-cycle profiles of hours and wages, the implied labor supply elasticities of
our model, additional results on predicted aggregate variables during the demographic
transition as well as the associated welfare effects and our model to predict the future
population structure.
5.A.1 Equilibrium
Denoting current period/age variables by x and next period/age variables by x′, a house-
hold of age j solves, at the beginning of period t, the maximization problem
V (a, h, t, j) = max
c,`,e,a′,h′
{u(c, 1− `− e) + ϕβV (a′, h′, t+ 1, j + 1)} (5.7)
subject to wnt,j = `t,jht,jwt(1− τt), (5.2), (5.3) and the constraints ` ∈ [0, 1), e ∈ [0, 1).
Definition 3. Given the exogenous population distribution and survival rates in all peri-
ods {{Nt,j, ϕt,j}Jj=0}Tt=0, an initial physical capital stock and an initial level of average hu-
man capital {K0, h¯0}, and an initial distribution of assets and human capital {at,0, ht,0}Jj=0,
a competitive equilibrium are sequences of individual variables
{{ct,j, `t,j, et,j, at+1,j+1, ht+1,j+1}Jj=0}Tt=0, sequences of aggregate variables {Lt, Kt+1, Yt}Tt=0,
government policies {ρt, τt}Tt=0, prices {wt, rt}Tt=0, and transfers {trt}Tt=0 such that
1. given prices, bequests and initial conditions, households solve their maximization
problem as described above,
2. interest rates and wages are paid their marginal products, i.e. wt = (1 − α) YtLt and
rt = α
Yt
Kt
− δ,
3. per capita transfers are determined by
trt =
∑J
j=0 at,j(1− ϕt−1,j−1)Nt−1,j−1∑J
j=0Nt,j
, (5.8)
4. government policies are such that the budget of the social security system is balanced
every period, i.e. equation (5.4) holds ∀t, and household pension income is given by
pt,j = ρt(1− τt)wth¯t,
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5. markets clear every period:
Lt =
jr−1∑
j=0
`t,jht,jNt,j (5.9a)
Kt+1 =
J∑
j=0
at+1,j+1Nt,j (5.9b)
Yt =
J∑
j=0
ct,jNt,j +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt. (5.9c)
Definition 4. A stationary equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which per capita
variables grow at the constant rate 1+ g¯A and aggregate variables grow at the constant rate
(1 + g¯A)(1 + n).
5.A.2 Backfitting
Figure 5.9 presents the fit of our model to cross-sectional hours data from McGrattan and
Rogerson (2004) for the years 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000. We observe that our model does
a very good job in matching the data along this dimension from 1980 onwards.
A comparison between wage profiles observed in PSID data and the model is shown in
Figure 5.10. The fit of our model is very good in 1970 and 1980 and still broadly consistent
with the data in 1990 and 2000.
5.A.3 Labor Supply Elasticities
Since agents’ human capital investments do not only depend on changes in relative returns
but also on the extent of labor supply adjustments, realistic labor supply elasticities are
key for our analysis. First, we compute the Frisch (or λ-constant) elasticity of labor supply
that holds the marginal utility of wealth constant. We do so using the standard formula. In
the context of our model this means holding time investment into human capital formation
constant. It is then given by
²j`,w =
1− φ(1− σ)
σ
1− `j − ej
`j
, (5.10)
see Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) for a derivation. In our model the Frisch
elasticity depends on the amount of leisure and labor supply and therefore is age-dependent.
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Figure 5.9: Labor Supply
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(b) 1980
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
Age
H
ou
rs
 W
or
ke
d
Hours Worked in 1980
 
 
model
data
(c) 1990
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(d) 2000
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Notes: Model and data profiles for labor supply. Hours data is normalized by 76 total hours.
Data Sources: Based on hours worked data from the Decennial Censuses obtained from Mc-
Grattan and Rogerson (2004).
As a consequence of the hump-shaped labor supply, the Frisch labor supply elasticity is
u-shaped over the life-cycle. During the years 1960-2000 we find that agents between age
25 and 55 have a labor supply elasticity between 0.7 and 1.0, while it is higher for younger
and older agents. For agents of age 30-50 (20-60) the average Frisch elasticity is around
0.86 (1.10), while across all agents the average is around 1.36. If we aggregate the u-shaped
micro Frisch elasticities to a macro Frisch elasticity that takes the differing initial labor
supply at different ages of life into account then this yields a number around 1.17 for the
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Figure 5.10: Wages
(a) 1970
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(b) 1980
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(c) 1990
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(d) 2000
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Notes: Model and data profiles for wages. The data is a centered average of five subsequent
PSID samples.
Data Sources: Based on PSID wage data.
macro elasticity.
We also report a Frisch labor supply elasticity that allows time investment into human
capital formation to vary. In the spirit of the Frisch elasticity concept we hold the marginal
utility of human capital constant in addition to the marginal utility of wealth. This Frisch
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elasticity is then given by
²˜j`,w =
1− φ(1− σ)
σ
1− `j − ej
`j
+
1
1− ψ
ej
`j
. (5.11)
As usual, an interior solution is assumed here. If we use this concept then the labor
supply elasticity is higher because the second term is positive, i.e. agents invest less into
human capital formation when they face a higher wage today and the marginal utility
of human capital remains unchanged. Due to decreasing time investment into human
capital formation, the second term decreases over the life-cycle. The resulting labor supply
elasticity is still u-shaped over the life-cycle. Accordingly, during 1960-2000 for agents of
age 30-50 (20-60) the resulting average Frisch elasticity with varying time investment is
around 1.26 (1.79), while across all agents the average is around 2.47. Here, the macro
Frisch elasticity is around 1.97 when accounting for the differing initial labor supply across
agents of different age.
The numbers we find in our model are higher than the standard estimates reported in
the literature which are about 0.5, see e.g. Domeij and Flode´n (2006), or even lower,
see table 3.3 in Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999). However, the data used by
the empirical literature usually refers to prime-age, full-time employed, male workers and
therefore captures mainly the intensive margin. As reported above, if we restrict attention
to a subset of agents in the model, e.g. those of age 30-50, that is most comparable to
the data set of a typical empirical study then the estimates are quite close. Furthermore,
the fact that the empirical literature focusses mostly on the intensive margin and neglects
much of the extensive margin suggests that the empirical estimates are a lower bound on
the true labor supply elasticity. Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) also report that
empirical estimates for females can be much higher than for males. The u-shape of labor
supply elasticities in our model can be regarded as a good property because the extensive
margin is probably most relevant towards the beginning and the end of the life-cycle.
Another potential source of downward bias of the empirical literature results from not
considering endogenous human capital accumulation explicitly and thereby not correctly
accounting for the true opportunity cost of time. This was shown by Imai and Keane
(2004) in the context of a learning-by-doing model, so it is not directly applicable to our
model. But similar biases might also be present here. With regard to the Frisch elasticity
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with varying time investment reported above we are unaware of any attempt to estimate
the Frisch elasticity empirically in this model framework, which would mean to include the
marginal utility of human capital in the set of conditioning variables.
Lastly, as shown in figures 5.9 and 5.10 our model does a good job in replicating observed
life-cycle profiles of hours and wages. This is probably a more meaningful test of the ability
of our model to explain the relation between hours worked and wages than comparing a
single number that is very hard to identify empirically.
5.A.4 Transitional Dynamics
Aggregate Variables
The cumulative effect of the differences in growth rates on GDP per capita are displayed in
figure 5.11. In the endogenous human capital model with constant contribution (replace-
ment) rates, GDP per capita will increase by about 15% (10%) more until the year 2050
than without human capital adjustments.
Figure 5.11: Detrended GDP per Capita [Index, 2005=100]
(a) Constant Contribution Rate Scenario
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(b) Constant Replacement Rate Scenario
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Welfare Effects
Welfare of Future Generations
In our main text, we mostly analyze the welfare consequences for agents alive in 2005
and only briefly glance at the consequences for future generations. We here look at those.
Figure 5.12 shows the consumption equivalent variation for the two models and the two
social security scenarios. Agents born into a world with endogenous human capital and
constant contribution rates experience gains of lifetime utility throughout the entire pro-
jection window. Even if agents are allowed to invest into human capital, welfare losses of
future generation can be quite large if the contribution rates rise (“const ρ”). Notice again
that, in our comparison across models, differences are not large because the positive value
of human capital adjustments is offset by the more beneficial general equilibrium effects in
the exogenous human capital model. For this reason welfare gains for some cohorts may
even be slightly higher in the exogenous human capital model when the contribution rate
is held constant.
Figure 5.12: Consumption Equivalent Variation of Agents born in 2005-2050
(a) Constant Contribution Rate Scenario
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(b) Constant Replacement Rate Scenario
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
−8
−7
−6
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
Year
CE
V
Consumption Equivalent Variation − Cohorts born in 2005−2050
 
 
endog. h.c.
exog. h.c.
Notes: Consumption equivalent variation (CEV) in the two social security scenarios.
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The Value of Human Capital Adjustments
From figure 5.8 of our main text, we observe that welfare gains (and losses) for newborns are
almost identical in the endogenous and exogenous human capital models. Detailed numbers
are provided in table 5.3. The explanation for these similar welfare consequences is as
follows: While the value of human capital adjustments is positive (see below), the increase
of wages and the associated decrease of interest rates is much stronger in the exogenous
human capital model. As newborn households generally benefit from the combined effects
of increasing wages and decreasing returns, welfare gains from these general equilibrium
effects are higher in the exogenous human capital model. This explains why the overall
welfare consequences for newborns across models do not differ much despite the fact that
the value of human capital adjustments is positive.
Table 5.3: CEV for Generation Born in 2005 [in %]
Human Capital
Endogenous Exogenous
Const. τ (τt = τ¯) 0.8% 0.9%
Const. ρ (ρt = ρ¯) -3.0% -3.0%
Notes: CEV: consumption equivalent variation.
Our comparison across models does not tell us anything about the value of a flexible ad-
justment of human capital investments from the individual perspective, that is, about
the value of human capital adjustments within the endogenous human capital model. To
accomplish this, we store from our computation of V¯ 2005j (see above) the associated endoge-
nous time investment profile, {e2005j }Jj=0. Next, we compute V¯ CEt,j as the lifetime utility of
agents born at time t, age j facing constant 2005 survival rates, a sequence of equilibrium
prices, transfers and contribution (replacement) rates as documented for the endogenous
human capital model in the previous section, but keep the time investment profile fixed at
{e2005j }Jj=0. In correspondence to what we did before, we then compute
gCEt,j =
(
V¯ CEt,j
V¯ 2005j
) 1
φ(1−σ)
− 1, (5.12)
as the consumption equivalent variation with constant time investment decisions. The
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difference gt,j − gCEt,j is then our measure of the value of endogenous human capital (where
gt,j is the consumption equivalent variation with flexible time investments as computed
above).29
The value of human capital adjustments is obviously positive and more or less mono-
tonically decreasing with age (because of decreasing time investments over the life-cycle).
Furthermore, for all future generations, the value of human capital adjustments can be
expected to increase slightly because of the increasing rate of return to human capital for-
mation. For sake of brevity, we do not report these results and confine ourselves to a com-
parison of the value of human capital adjustments of newborns in 2005, that is g156,0−gCE156,0
across social security scenarios. As reported in table 5.4, the value of human capital ad-
justments in the “const. τ” scenario is 0.35% compared to only 0.07% in the “const. ρ”
scenario and thereby around 5 times higher.
Table 5.4: The Value of Human Capital Adjustments in 2005
Const. τ (τt = τ¯) 0.35%
Const. ρ (ρt = ρ¯) 0.07%
Notes: The value of human capital adjustments is computed as gt,j − gCEt,j .
Role of the Pension System: Agents alive in 2005
We here provide a decomposition of our welfare results into the effects stemming from
changes in relative factor prices and transfers and those of changing pension payments.
To this end, figure 5.13 shows the welfare consequences of demographic change for agents
alive in 2005 from changing factor prices alone, keeping pension payments constant. We
here look only at our scenario with constant contribution rates. Table 5.5 presents the
maximum utility loss for agents alive in 2005 with constant pension payments. In the
exogenous human capital model, the maximum loss is about 2.6 percentage points (or
270%) higher than in the endogenous human capital model. Observe from table 5.2 of
29To see this more clearly, rewrite the welfare difference as gt,j − gCEt,j =
(V¯ 2005j )
− 1
φ(1−σ)
(
V¯
1
φ(1−σ)
t,j − V¯ CE
1
φ(1−σ)
t,j
)
. The difference between the terms in the brackets is only
due to the fact that agents are (or are not) allowed to adjust their human capital.
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our main text that, in terms of the percentage point difference, this gain relative to the
exogenous human capital model is roughly 3.7 percentage points when pension payments
adjust. From comparing these numbers we can therefore conclude that roughly two thirds of
the overall gain of 3.7 percentage points can be attributed to differential changes in interest
rates, wages and accidental bequests and one third to the relative rise in social security
benefits which is caused by the additional human capital formation and the accompanying
increase of average wages.
Figure 5.13: CEV of Agents alive in 2005 with constant pensions: Constant Contribution
Rates
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Notes: Consumption equivalent variation (CEV) in the constant contribution rate scenario with
constant pension payments. “endog. h.c.”: endogenous human capital model with constant
pensions. “exog. h.c.”: exogenous human capital model with constant pensions.
Table 5.5: Maximum Utility Loss for Generations alive in 2005 with Constant Pensions
Human Capital
Endogenous Exogenous
Const. τ (τt = τ¯) -0.94% -3.47%
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Role of Survival Rates for Welfare Calculations
So far, we computed the welfare effects of demographic change by holding survival rates
constant. We here present welfare results for varying survival rates. Figures 5.14 and 5.15
present the results of these calculations. Table 5.6 presents the maximum utility loss for
agents alive in 2005 with changing survival rates. Comparing these results to those of
figures 5.8 and table 5.2 of our main text and those of figure 5.12, we can conclude that
holding survival rates constant or varying them according to the underlying demographic
projections does not affect our conclusions about the welfare consequences of demographic
change in our comparisons across various scenarios.
Figure 5.14: CEV of Agents alive in 2005 with changing Survival Rates
(a) Constant Contribution Rate Scenario
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(b) Constant Replacement Rate Scenario
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Notes: Consumption equivalent variation (CEV) calculated with changing survival rates in the
two social security scenarios.
Table 5.6: Maximum Utility Loss for Generations alive in 2005 with changing Survival
Rates
Human Capital
Endogenous Exogenous
Const. τ (τt = τ¯) -6.7% -10.2%
Const. ρ (ρt = ρ¯) -3.0% -4.9%
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Figure 5.15: CEV of Agents born in 2005-2050 with changing Survival Rates
(a) Constant Contribution Rate Scenario
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(b) Constant Replacement Rate Scenario
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Notes: Consumption equivalent variation (CEV) calculated with changing survival rates in the
two social security scenarios.
5.A.5 Demographic Data
Our demographic data are based on the Human Mortality Database (2008). Population
of age j in year t is determined by four factors: (i) an initial population distribution in
year 0, (ii) age and time specific mortality rates, (iii) age and time specific fertility rates
and (iv) age and time specific migration rates. We describe here how we model all of these
elements and then briefly compare results of our demographic predictions with those of
United Nations (2007).
Initial Population Distribution
We take as data the age and time specific population for the periods 1950− 2004.
Mortality Rates
Our mortality model is based on sex, age and time specific mortality rates. To simplify
notation, we suppress a separate index for sex. Using data from 1950− 2004, we apply the
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procedure developed by Lee and Carter (1992) to decompose mortality rates as
ln(1− ϕt,j) = aj + bjdt, (5.13)
where aj and bj are vectors of age-specific constants and dt is a time-specific index that
equally affects all age groups. We assume that the time-specific index, dt, evolves according
to a unit-root process with drift,
dt = χ+ dt−1 + ²t. (5.14)
The estimate of the drift term is χˆ = −1.2891. We then predict mortality rates into the
future (until 2100) by holding aˆj, bˆj and χˆ constant and setting ²t = 0 for all t. For all
years beyond 2100 we hold survival rates constant at their respective year 2100 values.
Figure 5.16 shows the corresponding path of life expectancy at birth.
Figure 5.16: Life Expectancy at Birth
1900 2000 2100 2200 2300 2400 2500
65
70
75
80
85
90
year
LE
0
predicted life expectency at birth, all years
Notes: Own predictions of life-expectancy at birth based on Human Mortality Database (2008).
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Fertility Rates
Fertility in our model is age and time specific. For our predictions, we assume that
age-specific fertility rates are constant at their respective year 2004 values for all peri-
ods 2005, . . . , 2100. For periods after 2100 we assume that the number of newborns is
constant. Since the U.S. reproduction rate is slightly above replacement levels this implies
that the total fertility rate is slightly decreasing each year from 2100 onwards until about
year 2200 when the population converges to a stationary distribution.
Population Dynamics
We use the estimated fertility and mortality data to forecast the future population dynam-
ics. The transition of the population is accordingly given by
Nt,j =
Nt−1,j−1ϕt−1,j−1 for j > 0∑J
i=0 ft−1,iNt−1,i for j = 0,
(5.15)
where ft,j denotes age and time specific fertility rates. Population growth is then given by
nt =
Nt+1
Nt
− 1, where Nt =
∑J
j=0Nt,j is total population in t.
Migration
Migration is exogenous in our economic model. Setting migration to zero would lead
us to overestimate future decreases in the working age population ratio and to overstate
the increases in old-age dependency. We therefore restrict migration to ages j ≤ 15 so
that migration plays a similar role as fertility in our economic model. This simplifying
assumption allows us to treat newborns and immigrants alike. We compute aggregate
migration from United Nations (2007) and distribute age-specific migrants in each year
equally across all ages 0, . . . , 15.
Evaluation
Figures 5.17-5.18 display the predicted working age population and old-age dependency
ratios, according to our population model and according to United Nations (2007). Com-
pared to this benchmark, our population model is close to the UN but predicts a slightly
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stronger decrease of the working age population ratio and a correspondingly stronger in-
crease of the old-age dependency ratio until 2050.
Figure 5.17: Working Age Population Ratio
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Notes: Population model: own predictions of the working age population ratio based on Human
Mortality Database (2008). UN data: working age population ratio according to United Nations
(2007).
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Figure 5.18: Old Age Dependency Ratio
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Notes: Population model: own predictions of the old-age dependency ratio based on Human
Mortality Database (2008). UN data: old-age dependency ratio according to United Nations
(2007).
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5.B Appendix: Computational Details
5.B.1 Household Problem
To simplify the description of the solution of the household model for given prices (wage
and interest rate), transfers and social security payments, we focus on steady states and
therefore drop the time index t. Furthermore, we focus on a de-trended version of the
household problem in which all variables x are transformed to x˜ = x
A
where A is the
technology level growing at the exogenous rate g. To simplify notation, we do not denote
variables by the symbol ·˜ but assume that the transformation is understood. The de-
trended version of the household problem is then given by
V (a, h, j) = max
c,`,e,a′,h′
{
u(c, 1− `− e) + βs(1 + g)φ(1−σ)V (a′, h′, j + 1)}
s.t.
a′ =
1
1 + g
((a+ tr)(1 + r) + y − c)
y =
`hw(1− τ) if j < jrp if j ≥ jr
h′ = g(h, e) (5.16)
` ∈ [0, 1], e ∈ [0, 1].
Here, g(h, e) is the human capital technology.
Let β˜ = βs(1 + g)φ(1−σ) be the transformation of the discount factor. Using the budget
constraints, now rewrite the above as
V (a, h, j) = max
c,`,e,a′,h′
{
u(c, 1− `− e) + β˜V
(
1
1 + g
((a+ tr)(1 + r) + y − c) , g(h, e), j + 1
)}
s.t.
` ≥ 0.
where we have also replaced the bounded support of time investment and leisure with a
one-side constraint on ` because the upper constraints, ` = 1, respectively e = 1, and the
lower constraint, e = 0, are never binding due to Inada conditions on the utility function
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and the functional form of the human capital technology (see below). Denoting by µ`
the Lagrange multiplier on the inequality constraint for `, we can write the first-order
conditions as
c : uc − β˜ 1
1 + g
Va′(a
′, h′; j + 1) = 0 (5.17a)
` : − u1−`−e + β˜hw(1− τ) 1
1 + g
Va′(a
′, h′, j + 1) + µ` = 0 (5.17b)
e : − u1−`−e + β˜geVh′(a′, h′, j + 1) = 0 (5.17c)
and the envelope conditions read as
a : Va(a, h, j) = β˜
1 + r
1 + g
Va′(a
′, h′, j + 1) (5.18a)
h : Vh(a, h, j) = β˜
(
`w(1− τ) 1
1 + g
Va′(a
′, h′, j + 1) + ghVh′(a′, h′, j + 1)
)
. (5.18b)
Note that for the retirement period, i.e. for j ≥ jr, equations (5.17b) and (5.17c) are
irrelevant and equation (5.18b) has to be replaced by
Vh(a, h, j) = β˜ghVh′(a
′, h′, j + 1).
From (5.17a) and (5.18a) we get
Va = (1 + r)uc (5.19)
and, using the above in (5.17a), the familiar inter-temporal Euler equation for consumption
follows as
uc = β˜
1 + r
1 + g
uc′ . (5.20)
From (5.17a) and (5.17b) we get the familiar intra-temporal Euler equation for leisure,
u1−`−e = hw(1− τ)uc + µ`. (5.21)
From the human capital technology (5.3) we further have
ge = ξψ(eh)
ψ−1h (5.22a)
gh = (1− δh) + ξψ(eh)ψ−1e. (5.22b)
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We loop backwards in j from j = J − 1, . . . , 0 by taking an initial guess of [cJ , hJ ] as
given and by initializing Va′(·, J) = Vh′(·, J) = 0. During retirement, that is for all ages
j ≥ jr, our solution procedure is by standard backward shooting using the first-order
conditions. However, during the period of human capital formation, that is for all ages
j < jr, the first order conditions would not be sufficient if the problem is not a convex-
programming problem. And thus, our backward shooting algorithm will not necessarily
find the true solution. In fact this may be the case in human capital models such as ours
because the effective wage rate is endogenous (it depends on the human capital investment
decision). For a given initial guess [cJ , hJ ] we therefore first compute a solution via first-
order conditions and then, for each age j < jr, we check whether this is the unique solution.
As an additional check, we consider variations of initial guesses of [cJ , hJ ] on a large grid.
In all of our scenarios we never found any multiplicities.
The details of our steps are as follows:
1. In each j, hj+1, Va′(·, j + 1), Vh′(·, j + 1) are known.
2. Compute uc from (5.17a).
3. For j ≥ jr, compute hj from (5.3) by setting ej = `j = 0 and by taking hj+1 as given
and compute cj directly from equation (5.26) below.
4. For j < jr:
(a) Assume ` ∈ [0, 1) so that µ` = 0.
(b) Combine (5.3), (5.17b), (5.17c) and (5.22a) to compute hj as
hj =
1
1− δh
hj+1 − ξ( ξψ 11+gVh′(·, j + 1)
ω(1− τ)Va′(·, j + 1)
) ψ
1−ψ
 (5.23)
(c) Compute e from (5.3) as
ej =
1
hj
(
hj+1−hj(1−δh)
ξ
) 1
ψ
. (5.24)
(d) Calculate lcrj =
1−ej−`j
cj
, the leisure to consumption ratio from (5.21) as follows:
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From our functional form assumption on utility marginal utilities are given by
uc =
(
cφ(1− `− e)1−φ)−σ φcφ−1(1− `− e)1−φ
u1−`−e =
(
cφ(1− `− e)1−φ)−σ (1− φ)cφ(1− `− e)−φ
hence we get from (5.21) the familiar equation:
u1−`−e
uc
= hw(1− τ) = 1− φ
φ
c
1− `− e,
and therefore:
lcrj =
1− ej − `j
cj
=
1− φ
φ
1
hw(1− τ) . (5.25)
(e) Next compute cj as follows. Notice first that one may also write marginal utility
from consumption as
uc = φc
φ(1−σ)−1(1− `− e)(1−σ)(1−φ). (5.26)
Using (5.25) in (5.26) we then get
uc = φc
φ(1−σ)−1(lcr · c)(1−σ)(1−φ)
= φc−σ · lcr(1−σ)(1−φ). (5.27)
Since uc is given from (5.17a), we can now compute c as
cj =
(
ucj
φ · lcr(1−σ)(1−φ)j
)− 1
σ
. (5.28)
(f) Given cj, ej compute labor, `j, as
`j = 1− lcrj · cj − ej.
(g) If `j < 0, set `j = 0 and iterate on hj as follows:
i. Guess hj
ii. Compute e as in step 4c.
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iii. Noticing that `j = 0, update cj from (5.26) as
c =
(
uc
φ(1− e)(1−σ)(1−φ)
) 1
φ(1−σ)−1
.
iv. Compute µ` from (5.17b) as
µ` = u1−`−e − β˜hw(1− τ)Va′(·, j + 1)
v. Finally, combining equations (5.17b), (5.17c) and (5.22a) gives the following
distance function f
f = e−
(
β˜ξψhψ 1
1+g
Vh′(·)
β˜ωh(1− τ)Va′(·) + µ`
) 1
1−ψ
, (5.29)
where e is given from step 4(g)ii. We solve for the root of f to get hj by a
non-linear solver iterating on steps 4(g)ii through 4(g)v until convergence.
(h) Check for uniqueness I : What is computed above is a candidate solution under
the assumption that the first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient. As a
consequence of potential non-convexities of our programming problem first-order
conditions may however not be sufficient and our procedure may therefore not
give the unique global optimum. To address this, we next compute solutions
on a grid and check if the previously computed candidate solution is indeed
the only solution to our system of equations. We do so as follows: For a grid
of ej ∈ [e = 0.0001, e = 0.9999], denote the equally spaced grid points by
ej,i, i = 1, . . . , ne and:
i. For each ej,i, compute the corresponding hj,i from (5.3).
ii. Compute the corresponding cj,i, `j,i by the analogous steps as described
above, again taking the case distinction for binding labor into account.
iii. Compute the corresponding value of the distance function in (5.29), fj,i.
30
If for all ej,i, i = 1, . . . , ne the value of the distance function, fj,i, changes signs
only once, then our previously computed candidate solution is indeed the unique
optimum. If it would change signs more than once, then there would be mul-
30Notice that if `j,i > 0, then we know from equation (5.23) that xj,i = {cj,i, `j,i, ej,i, hj,i} cannot be a
solution but we still proceed by computing fj,i.
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tiplicities and our first-order conditions would accordingly not be sufficient.
Setting ne = 200 we never found this to be the case in any of our scenarios.
5. Update as follows:
(a) Update Va using either (5.18a) or (5.19).
(b) Update Vh using (5.18b).
Next, loop forward on the human capital technology (5.3) for given h0 and {ej}Jj=0 to
compute an update of hJ denoted by h
n
J . Compute the present discounted value of con-
sumption, PV C, and, using the already computed values {hnj }Jj=0, compute the present
discounted value of income, PV I. Use the relationship
cn0 = c0 ·
PV I
PV C
(5.30)
to form an update of initial consumption, cn0 , and next use the Euler equations for con-
sumption to form an update of cJ , denoted as c
n
J . Define the distance functions
g1(cJ , hJ) = cJ − cnJ (5.31a)
g2(cJ , hJ) = hJ − hnJ . (5.31b)
In our search for general equilibrium prices, constraints of the household model are occa-
sionally binding. Therefore, solution of the system of equations in (5.31) using Newton
based methods, e.g., Broyden’s method, is instable. We solve this problem by a nested
Brent algorithm, that is, we solve two nested univariate problems, an outer one for cJ and
an inner one for hJ .
Check for uniqueness II: Observe that our nested Brent algorithm assumes that the func-
tions in (5.31) exhibit a unique root. As we adjust starting values [cJ , hJ ] with each outer
loop iteration we thereby consider different points in a variable box of [cJ , hJ ] as starting
values. For all of these combinations our procedure always converged. To systematically
check whether we also always converge to the unique optimum, we fix, after convergence
of the household problem, a large box around the previously computed [cJ , hJ ]. Precisely,
we choose as boundaries for this box ±50% of the solutions in the respective dimensions.
For these alternative starting values we then check whether there is an additional solution
to the system of equations (5.31). We never detected any such multiplicities.
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5.B.2 The Aggregate Model
For a given r× 1 vector ~Ψ of structural model parameters, we first solve for an “artificial”
initial steady state in period t = 0 which gives initial distributions of assets and human
capital. We thereby presume that households assume prices to remain constant for all
periods t ∈ {0, . . . , T} and are then surprised by the actual price changes induced by the
transitional dynamics. Next, we solve for the final steady state of our model which is
reached in period T and supported by our demographic projections, see appendix 5.A.5.
For both steady states, we solve for the equilibrium of the aggregate model by iterating on
the m×1 steady state vector ~Pss = [p1, . . . , pm]′. p1 is the capital intensity, p2 are transfers
(as a fraction of wages), p3 are social security contribution (or replacement) rates and p4 is
the average human capital stock. Notice that all elements of ~Pss are constant in the steady
state.
Solution for the steady states of the model involves the following steps:
1. In iteration q for a guess of ~P qss solve the household problem.
2. Update variables in ~Pss as follows:
(a) Aggregate across households to get aggregate assets and aggregate labor supply
to form an update of the capital intensity, pn1 .
(b) Calculate an update of bequests to get pn2 .
(c) Using the update of labor supply, update social security contribution (or re-
placement) rates to get pn3 .
(d) Use labor supply and human capital decisions to form an update of the average
human capital stock, pn4 .
3. Collect the updated variables in ~P nss and notice that ~P
n
ss = H(~Pss) where H is a
vector-valued non-linear function.
4. Define the root-finding problem G(~Pss) = ~Pss − H(~Pss) and iterate on ~Pss until
convergence. We use Broyden’s method to solve the problem and denote the final
approximate Jacobi matrix by Bss.
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Next, we solve for the transitional dynamics by the following steps:
1. Use the steady state solutions to form a linear interpolation to get the starting
values for the m(T − 2) × 1 vector of equilibrium prices, ~P = [~p′1, . . . , ~p′m]′, where
pi, i = 1, . . . ,m are vectors of length (T − 2)× 1.
2. In iteration q for guess ~P q solve the household problem. We do so by iterating
backwards in time for t = T − 1, . . . , 2 to get the decision rules and forward for
t = 2, . . . , T − 1 for aggregation.
3. Update variables as in the steady state solutions and denote by ~˜P = H(~P ) the
m(T − 2)× 1 vector of updated variables.
4. Define the root-finding problem as G(~P ) = ~P − H(~P ). Since T is large, this prob-
lem is substantially larger than the steady state root-finding problem and we use
the Gauss-Seidel-Quasi-Newton algorithm suggested in Ludwig (2007) to form and
update guesses of an approximate Jacobi matrix of the system of m(T −2) non-linear
equations. We initialize these loops by using a scaled up version of Bss.
5.B.3 Calibration of Structural Model Parameters
We split the r × 1 vector of structural model parameters, ~Ψ, as ~Ψ =
[
(~Ψe)′, (~Ψf )′
]′
. ~Ψf
is a vector of predetermined (fixed) parameters, whereas the e× 1 vector ~Ψe is estimated
by minimum distance (unconditional matching of moments using e moment conditions).
Denote by
ut(~Ψ
e) = yt − f(~Ψe) for t = 0, . . . , T0 (5.32)
the GMM error as the distance between data, yt, and model simulated (predicted) values,
f(~Ψe).
Under the assumption that the model is correctly specified, the restrictions on the GMM
error can be written as
E[ut(~Ψ
e
0)] = 0, (5.33)
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where Ψ˜e0 denotes the vector of true values. Denote sample averages of ut as
gT0(~Ψ
e) ≡ 1
T0 + 1
T0∑
t=0
ut(~Ψ
e). (5.34)
We estimate the elements of ~Ψe by setting these sample averages to zero (up to some
tolerance level).
In our economic model, only two parameters are pre-determined and we therefore have
that
~Ψf = [σ, h0]
′ . (5.35)
The vector ~Ψe is given by
~Ψe =
[
g, α, δ, β, φ, ψ, ξ, δh
]′
. (5.36)
We estimate the structural model parameters using data from various sources for the period
1960, ..., 2004, hence T0 = 44. The parameters ~Ψ
e
1 = [g, α]
′ are directly determined using
NIPA data on GDP, fixed assets, wages and labor supply. The remaining structural model
parameters, ~Ψe2 = [δ, β, φ, ψ, ξ, δ
h]′ are estimated by simulation. Our calibration targets
are summarized in table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Calibration Targets
Parameter Target Moment
~Ψf
σ predetermined parameter
h0 predetermined parameter
~Ψe1
gA growth rate of Solow residual 0.018
α share of wage income 0.33
~Ψe2
δ investment output ratio 0.2
β capital output ratio 2.8
φ average hours worked 0.33
ψ, ξ, δh coefficients of wage polynomial (from PSID)
Determining the subset of parameters ~Ψe2 along the transition is a computationally complex
problem that we translate into an equivalent simple problem. Point of departure of our
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procedure is the insight that calibrating the model for a steady state is easy and fast.
However, simulated steady state moments may differ quite substantially from simulated
averages along the transition even when the steady state is chosen to lie in the middle of
the calibration period, in our case year 1980. We therefore proceed as follows:
1. Initialization: Choose a vector of scaling factors, ~sf , of length e2 that appropriately
scales the steady state calibration targets (see below).
2. Calibrate the model in some steady state year, e.g., 1980, by solving the system of
equations
y¯e2,i
sfi
− f e,ss2,i (~Ψ) (5.37)
for all i = 1, . . . , e2 to get ~ˆΨ
e
2. Here, y¯
e
2,i is the average of moment i in the data for
the calibration period (1960-2004), e.g., the investment-output ratio for i = 1.
3. For the estimated parameter vector, ~ˆΨe2, solve the model along the transition.
4. Compute the relevant simulated moments for the transition, f e2 (~Ψ).
5. Update the vector of scaling vectors as
sfi =
f e2,i(~Ψ)
f e,ss2,i (
~Ψ)
(5.38)
for all i = 1, . . . , e2.
6. Continue with step 2 until convergence on scaling factors (fixed point problem).
We thereby translate a complex root-finding problem into a combination of a simple root-
finding problem (steady state calibration) and a fixed point iteration on scaling factors.
Since scaling factors are relatively insensitive to Ψe2, convergence is fast and robust. The
resulting scaling factors range from 0.94 to 1.29 which means that differences between sim-
ulated moments in the artificial steady state year (1980) and averages during the transition
are large (up to 30%). This also implies that calibrating the model in some artificial steady
year only would lead to significantly biased estimates of structural model parameters.
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